Université de Montréal

The Great Asymmetry

America's Closest Allies in Times of War

par
Stéfanie von Hlatky Udvarhelyi

Département de science politique
Faculté des arts et des sciences

Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales
en vue de l'obtention du grade de Ph.D
en science politique

Mars, 2010

Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales

Cette thèse intitulée :

The Great Asymmetry: America's Closest Allies in Times of War

Présentée par :
Stéfanie von Hlatky Udvarhelyi

a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes :

Pierre Martin, président-rapporteur
Michel Fortmann, directeur de recherche
T.V. Paul, co-directeur
Marie-Joëlle Zahar, membre du jury
Norrin Ripsman, examinateur externe
André-A. Lafrance, représentant du doyen de la FES

Résumé

Cette thèse étudie la dynamique entre les États-Unis et ses alliés privilégiés lorsque la coopération militaire est en jeu. Nous y proposons que les attentes de l'allié principal déterminent le niveau de coopération des autres pays mais que deux variables intermédiaires - la cohésion du gouvernement et la capacité militaire de l'allié - en déterminent l'exécution. Cette analyse porte aussi sur les stratégies utilisées par les états secondaires pour accroître leur pouvoir dans cette relation asymétrique : initier des négociations bilatérales dans le but d'obtenir des concessions stratégiques, faire valoir leur point de vue par le biais d'organisations internationales ou, encore, évoquer des principes d'ordre éthique et moral. Même si les alliés secondaires peuvent rarement influencer l'allié dominant, ils ont néanmoins la capacité d'agir de façon autonome et de résister aux pressions du plus fort.

L'argument de la thèse repose sur trois propositions : dans une alliance asymétrique, les pays ne partagent pas nécessairement la même perception des menaces au niveau international; en cas de désaccord, le résultat des négociations entre alliés ne favorise pas toujours le partenaire dominant ; au moment de la prise de décision en matière de politique étrangère, l'allié secondaire doit protéger sa réputation en tant qu'allié fiable face à l'allié dominant, mais il doit en peser l'impact politique au niveau national.

L'analyse théorique de ces alliances asymétrique s'inspire du réalisme néoclassique ce qui nous permet de mieux comprendre la relation entre les variables systémiques et étatiques. L'apport de cette recherche se situe au niveau de l'étude théorique des alliances militaires et de la prise de décision en politique étrangère et de défense. La recherche porte

sur le comportement des alliés secondaires qui doivent réagir aux décisions prises par les États-Unis en temps de menace, en étudiant l'interaction entre variables étatiques et contraintes systémiques.

Afin de préciser le lien causal entre la perception des menaces, les attentes de l'alliance et les contraintes du pays secondaire nous avons appliqué une méthode comparative en étudiant trois cas : La Grande Bretagne, le Canada, et l'Australie, et la réponse de chacun à l'appel de participer à la guerre en Afghanistan et en Iraq de 2001 à 2003. L'étude cible la prise de décision devant le choix de participer ou de ne pas participer dans une mobilisation conjointe avec les États-Unis. Le processus décisionnel est observé du point de vue de l'allié secondaire et nous permet de mesurer les facteurs explicatifs qui ont motivé la décision en vue d'une coopération militaire.

Mots-clés : Relations internationales, sécurité internationale, coopération militaire, alliances militaires, politique étrangère et de défense, interventions militaires

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner.

The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs.

To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond

to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables.

To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia's response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.

Keywords: International relations, international security, military cooperation, military alliances, foreign and defence policy, military intervention

Contents

Tables

Figures

Abbreviations

187 BCT: 187th Brigade Combat Team

AASR: Anglo-American Special Relationship

ADF: Australian Defence Force

ANZUS: Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty

CDS: Chief of Defence Staff

CGI: Governing Council of Iraq

CJTFSWA: Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia

COBRA: Cabinet Office Briefing Room A

COW: Correlates of War

CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority

DFAT: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

DHS: Department of Homeland Security

DND: Canadian Department of National Defence

FAC: Foreign Affairs Committee

FCO: British Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FTA: Free Trade Agreement

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GVT: Government

GWOT: Global War on Terror

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IR: International Relations

IRF(L): Immediate Reaction Force (Land)

ISAF: International Stabilization and Assistance Force

JIC: Joint Intelligence Committee

JTF2: Joint Task Force 2

MEPP: Middle East Peace Process

MIL: Military

MOD: British Ministry of Defence

MOU: Memoranda of understanding

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NORAD: North American Aerospace Defense command

NORTHCOM: Northern Command

NSS: National Security Strategy

OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom

OI: International Organization

OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom

OSF: Operation Southern Focus

PPCLI: Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

PGM: Precision-guided munitions

PJBD: Permanent Joint Board of Defence

PUS: Permanent Undersecretary

RAF: Royal Air Force

SRT: Strategic Reconnaissance Team

TNO: Trade Negotiations Office

UN: United Nations

UNAMI: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

UNMOVIC: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UNSCOM: United Nations Special Commission

WMD: Weapon of Mass Destruction

à Philippe

Acknowledgments

On September 11, 2001, I was in Montreal and my mother was in New York. On a personal level and as an aspiring political scientist, I was consumed with thoughts about what the implications of that day would mean. It turns out that I spent more time thinking about it than anticipated, way beyond my mother's safe return to Montreal. Completing the Ph.D. program is my biggest personal accomplishment to date. It is the culmination of an incredible journey that allowed me the luxury of reading, thinking, and writing for a living. For this, I offer sincere thanks to my advisers. Michel Fortmann was generous enough to include me in many of his projects, most significant of which for me was the Research Group in International Security (REGIS). I am also grateful to T.V. Paul for being a tough but dedicated mentor. I have learned a lot from his committed work ethic. I thank Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Frédéric Mérand and Philippe Faucher who have all asked me provocative questions that made me completely insecure about my research. I salute my brothers and sisters in arms Djallil Lounnas, Jessica Trisko, Grant Holly, Ginger DiGaetano, Ora Szekely and Mirko Palmesi. For their help and support, I would like to acknowledge Gaëlle Rivard Piché, Véronique Dumais, Simon Hogue and Audrey Reeves. I am grateful to all those whom I have interviewed in Ottawa, Canberra and London. I must also acknowledge the precious support of the SDF, FQRSC, le department de science politique de l'Université de Montréal et la Faculté des études supérieures. For helping me keep a relatively sane mind, I am indebted to Katherine Porowska, Justine Laurier, Véronique Malo, Dina Bestawros and Bernard Côté. To my mother, Kristina von Hlatky, I owe everything. I am appreciative of her patience and dedication in reading many drafts of my dissertation. I thank my father, John Udvarhelyi, for helpful comments that are always delivered in a humorous way. I would like to express gratitude to Paul Jutras for making sure I had the best tools to work with and Lise Éthier for lively discussions and great food on de l'Esplanade. I dedicate my dissertation to my husband, Philippe Lacoursière, after one exciting first year of marriage and seven years of deep friendship and admiration.

Introduction

There has been much controversy surrounding the United States' decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003. The overwhelming support exhibited by the United States' allies, immediately following September 11, began to unravel over the course of 2002 and did not recover during George W. Bush's second term. The process leading to war was closely scrutinized by the international community in what turned out to be a public trial of American legitimacy. Throughout this trying period, however, the survival of these alliance relationships was not at stake. In hindsight, it appears that no long-term damage was inflicted on the United States' web of alliances. The central puzzle is why Canada, the UK and Australia, the closest American allies, participate in some US-led wars, but not others. What determines the nature and scope of their military commitments? Why is their behaviour so unpredictable when these states rely on, thrive under, and support American leadership? This project addresses these questions by investigating the UK, Canada and Australia's level of participation when contemplating military cooperation with the United States after September 11, 2001.

Despite the resilience of Western alliances, the diversity of state responses to the American-led *War on Terror* is perplexing, especially in light of the power differentials between the United States and its allies. At first glance, it could be assumed that this asymmetry would impose powerful constraints on allies to act in step with US plans. The reality is far more complex. If we look at the period since the end of World War II, there have been several examples of close allies acting autonomously to the detriment of their more powerful ally, the US. For example, President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of

State Dean Rusk failed in their bid to get allies to rally behind them in Vietnam with their *More Flags* campaign. Canada and Britain, countries that have closely tied their foreign policy to the American grand strategy, did not contribute a single pair of boots to the Vietnam effort, while Australia sent a force of 50 000. Looking at the recent past, Australia did not make a military contribution during the war in Kosovo in 1999 and Canada opted out of the Iraq War in 2003. Power differentials in themselves are important but we need to consider how asymmetry interacts with other factors to explain this variation in behaviour. Non-western allies appear to be driven by short-term strategic imperatives when lending support to the United States, as demonstrated by South Korea or the Republic of China's participation in the Vietnam War. The alliance relationship was primarily defined by regional security concerns but did not result in close security integration. Traditional allies, however, are set apart by longer-term strategic imperatives, as their institutional arrangements are far reaching and deeply entrenched and because there are strong common historical and cultural ties linking these states.

In the field of International Relations (IR), alliances have been presented as devices for strong states to control, or manage, secondary powers.[1] This feature of alliance dynamics has most often been discussed in the context of alliance creation. This concern is present at different levels of interaction, from bilateral meetings between states to multilateral settings, such as the United Nations. Through diverse fora, the pressures of

---

[1] Christopher Gelpi, "Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control" in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander (eds), *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 107-139. This argument was introduced in Paul Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management" in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Problems of National Security* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 247-286.

asymmetry weigh heavily on the relationship between allies, but in more subtle ways than acknowledged by arguments dealing with alliances as tools of control. When combined with other factors, power asymmetry is expected to account for a significant portion of alliance dynamics. Although a common phenomenon, not much has been written on asymmetric security cooperation. Moreover, the explanations offered to account for the impact of asymmetry on alliance relationships tend to be case specific.

This dissertation addresses the interactions and decision-making processes leading to military cooperation so as to understand the behaviour of long-standing alliance partners. By studying the United States' closest allies, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, my goal is to develop a theory of foreign policy which will account for allied contributions in times of war. Central to this task is to identify how these allies, through various strategies, attempt to benefit from their interactions with their powerful partner, the United States. I argue that alliance expectations are fundamental in determining military commitments. Special allies must balance US expectations against domestic constraints, defined as the level of government cohesion and available military capabilities.

The United States and its Allies

The UK, Canada, and Australia all consider the United States as their most important bilateral partner. The relationship between the United States and these closest alliance partners is asymmetric by all material indicators of power. This relationship is also deeply institutionalized and characterized by a history of integrated military cooperation, through interoperability, common military exercises and intelligence sharing. Among asymmetric

allies there are major structural differences, however, based on underlying disparities in their power capabilities and global interests, as will be discussed in the case studies.

The United States, for its part, has the status of a superpower and ambitions to match. A dominant state in the international system, the U.S. has the capacity to project its power across different regions of the world. This trend evolved from the Second World War, when American interests shifted in a definitive way from the regional to the global realm. Global interests then translated to a more expansive definition of what could constitute a threat to the United States. As Knorr states, commenting on this historical juncture: "American security was now seen as requiring a particular world order which could be maintained only by the global commitment of American power to the preservation of the status quo."[2] Moreover, while the United States focuses on its many international responsibilities on the global stage, secondary states can work to advance their case in bilateral negotiations by investing more time and effort in them than their more powerful ally. In international economic negotiations, for example, the United States may concede more easily to demands made by their allies. Do asymmetric advantages also apply to high security issues? The United States is arguably more responsive to the management of international security issues which challenge its systemic predominance.

The United States, as a leading power in the international system, has a stake in the status quo and is sensitive to international threats directed against its higher global power position. This corresponds to the well-established realist notion that as a state's relative

---

[2] Klaus Knorr, "Threat Perception" in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1976), 93.

power expands, so will its interests.[3] The United States has consolidated its position of primacy in the international system with the end of the Cold War. More than ever, American power has extended its reach across regions. American pre-eminence carries a burden, as the United States must also address threats internationally, alone or with alliance partners. Walt argues that international threats are evaluated according to other states' material capabilities, their geographic proximity, the capacity for offensive power and overall aggressive intentions.[4] I argue that the perception of threat is in the eye of the beholder and is strongly influenced by a state's relative power. In other words, not all states, even allied states, perceive threats similarly given asymmetric capabilities. Perceptions of threats certainly converge at the moment of alliance creation but are re-evaluated over time. Even if the alliance endures and becomes institutionalized, allies will have individual assessments of threat that may or may not be shared, or considered in the same order of priority, by their alliance partners. Secondary states respond to threats in their immediate region but leave international burdens to the initiative of the dominant power. As such, secondary states rely on the United States for international threat assessments, and are guided by alliance requirements when responding to them.

---

[3] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (New York: Random House, 1987); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This argument is consistent with various strands of realism, from classical realism, to structural realism and neorealism.

[4] Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Walt's argument is similar but distinct from the argument made in Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* in that states are said to balance against threat, rather than power alone. As such, the assessment of another state's aggressive intentions is crucial in evaluating the seriousness of the threat posed by another state.

In other words, for allies, the weight of American actions structures their foreign policy options to a considerable extent. Given the presence of overlapping security institutions between the United States and its closest allies, actions undertaken by the dominant state in the alliance has repercussions for all other partners. The new orientation in American foreign and defence policy following September 11 changed the basic parameters of military cooperation, with a marked preference for coalition-based cooperation rather than the more multilateral approach favoured in the 1990's. It initiated two wars, inviting allies to join in the Coalition. The allies' responses have been varied. The focus here is on special allies, as they have most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. I will establish parameters to examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation by elaborating on the literature in IR and alliance theory. Beyond these observations, how can we systematize our understanding of asymmetric alliance interactions?

The Literature

In order to understand asymmetric alliances, it seems crucial to recognize that, given substantial power differentials, two allies might not be prone to the same insecurities. By focusing on the internal dynamics of asymmetric alliances, my goal is to address the following questions: Under what conditions will secondary states contribute to military cooperation to pursue allied goals? What types of strategies can secondary states pursue in such situations?

This dissertation will study these questions, while investigating three of the United States' closest allies: the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, since 2001. The period from 9/11 to the beginning of the War in Iraq in 2003 is significant because it is rich in allied interactions. Beyond these watershed events, the goal is to uncover alliance patterns that are telling of the bilateral and multilateral security arrangements which tie these states together and are brought to the fore when the status quo has been shattered. It has been argued that the George W. Bush administration stands apart from previous administrations and may be unique in its management of foreign and defence policy during both terms. Kupchan and Trubowitz describe a broadly held perception that "…the Bush administration's foreign policy is an aberration and that the United States' commitment to the formula of liberal internationalism – U.S. power plus international cooperation – will be restored after Bush leaves office".[5] This may be true but the significance of this period for the study of asymmetric security cooperation is not undermined. The interaction of the US and its allies during this important time in history transcends the particularities of the Bush administration. If anything, periods of disagreements between the United States and its allies highlight how divergent expectations can be reconciled under conditions of asymmetry.

When looking at the United States' closest allies, I argue that their level of military cooperation with the United States is determined by alliance expectations and domestic constraints, defined as the level of government cohesion and available military capabilities.

---

[5] Charles A. Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, "Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States", *International Security* 32, 2 (2007), 7-44.

Because special allies look to their dominant alliance partner for international leadership, they strongly rely on US expectations when pledging their political and military support. At the same time, state leaders are sensitive to domestic constraints, as these structure the type and scope of their alliance commitment. Stated differently, special allies are inclined to favour US requests for assistance due to the close nature of their security relationship, but are limited in the commitments they can make: military capabilities determine the scope of military cooperation, while the level of government cohesion influences the implementation of the commitment, as a measure of political feasibility. This is reminiscent of the two-level game, where states balance allied and domestic expectations in international negotiation.[6] The main argument illustrates how secondary states must pursue a foreign and defence policy that strikes the right balance between alliance requirements and domestic considerations. In other words, the UK, Canada and Australia must fulfill American expectations in a politically and militarily feasible way. How has the literature in International Relations (IR) addressed the question of military cooperation under conditions of asymmetry?

The IR literature on alliance theory can be broadly classified according to the three dominant schools in the field: realism, liberalism and constructivism. A more detailed discussion of individual theories will follow in the next chapter. The realist literature suggests that alliances are ruled by existing power differentials.[7] To the extent that realism

---

[6] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organization* 42, 3 (1988), 427-461.

[7] This argument is consistent across different variants: classical realism, structural realism, neorealism and neoclassical realism. See Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*

discusses the relationship between asymmetric alliance partners, the argument is that the dominant power in the alliance will generally dictate the conditions of cooperation without upsetting the balance of capabilities between partners.[8] However, in terms of *specifying* the conditions under which the secondary partners can manifest greater autonomy, other theories fare better in explaining intra-alliance dynamics.

For example, theories of systemic change represent a more persuasive argument associated with realist thinking. The bipolar distribution of power during the Cold War was represented by two blocs, each consisting of a superpower and its supporting states. This structure allowed for little flexibility, as the Soviet Union and the United States invested heavily in countervailing alliances.[9] With the bipolar competition no longer being a guiding principle of American foreign policy, US military interventions and their size are still influenced by its national interests, regional considerations, and capabilities, but are also confronted with more diverse international threats.[10] This unipolar distribution of power, it is argued, makes alliances more fluid and their decision-making more context dependent.[11] This is arguably correct if the goal is to explain the presence or absence of military

---

(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

[8] Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 47.

[9] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

[10] Benjamin Miller, "The Logic of U.S. Military Interventions in the Post-Cold War Era", *Contemporary Security Policy* 19, 3 (1998), 72-109.

[11] Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War", *International Organization* 48, 1 (1994), 39-75.

cooperation but this macro-level explanation cannot account for the scope of particular commitments.

Turning to the liberal school in IR, the literature on international institutions is particularly relevant in providing insights on intra-alliance dynamics. Referring to the US-Canada alliance specifically, Keohane and Nye reject the realist account for making sense of the asymmetric relationship.[12] By identifying cases where Canada was able to secure better outcomes than the US, liberal institutionalism makes the point that secondary powers can influence powerful alliance partners through institutions.[13] International institutions can enhance the role of secondary powers in the system by allowing states to act collectively.[14] Although institutions can be leveraged by weaker states, the dominant power can choose to act outside of these institutional frameworks. My argument does not discount the importance of international institutions but presents them as enablers of autonomy-enhancing strategies on behalf of allied states when attempting to gain leverage with the United States, rather than as an independent variable when evaluating allied levels of military cooperation. International institutions are instrumental to both dominant and secondary states in their strategies to manage their alliance partners.

---

[12] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence, 3rd Edition* (New York: Longman, 2001).

[13] Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander, *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[14] Robert O. Keohane, "Lilliputian's Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics", *International Organization* 23, 2 (1969), 291-310. See also Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) and David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

Finally, the contribution of constructivism to the debate on asymmetric security cooperation is tied to the consideration of non-material and ideational variables in crafting explanations for alliance behaviour. The constructivist thesis on security communities offers a plausible explanation as to why there is an absence of violent conflict between long-standing allies due to a "shared sense of community".[15] Even when allies have competing interests, the relationship is held together by the community. We can thus identify patterns of cooperative behaviour and explain how these are strengthened through iterated practice. However, in this case as well, explaining non-cooperative outcomes presents a challenge.

Arguments on strategic culture are also useful to the extent that they highlight longstanding trends in foreign policy, and examine the interaction between the government and public opinion in defining the role of a state's armed forces.[16] I intend to control for these important variables by selecting cases that are similar in this respect. Indeed, by focusing on states that belong to the so-called Anglosphere, we can assume that cultural variables are not crucial to the difference in outcomes, namely the level of participation to military cooperation with the United States.[17]

From this brief introduction of the IR literature on alliances, we can make the following observations. The appeal of realism is its appreciation of relative power and

---

[15] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 333.

[16] Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", *International Security* 19, 4 (1995), 32-64.

[17] For a discussion on the uses of the term *anglosphere*, see James Bennett, "American and the West: The Emerging Anglosphere", *Orbis* 46, 1 (2002), 111-126.

systemic constraints in structuring alliance relationships. To explain variation in military cooperation between allies, the neoclassical variant, discussed in the next section, may be most helpful since it considers domestic factors as well, such as state structure, elite perceptions, state-society interactions, etc. Liberalism, especially the literature which focuses on the role of international institutions, may be ill-fitted for the research question at hand. Allied contributions are certainly negotiated through the use of institutions, but ultimately, governments decide on the scope and size of their military commitments and finalize these commitments bilaterally with the United States. There is thus a strong rationale for including domestic-level variables in the analysis. Finally, constructivism may explain the endurance of certain military alliances better than any other framework, but focuses on the variables that are controlled for in the analysis: identity, culture, and a legacy of established security practices.

The Argument

My argument is built on three central claims: First, power asymmetries between allies can translate into different assessments of international threats. In other words, relative power capabilities largely determine the importance of security threats. States that have different power capabilities may not rank threats in the same order of priority. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Through various devices and strategies, states of secondary rank can act autonomously when dealing with a dominant partner. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when

confronting major foreign policy decisions, i.e. there is a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To overcome this fundamental trade-off, secondary states appeal to strategies in order to minimize the impact of the chosen course of action. If the decision favours the alliance over domestic factors, certain strategies, such as appealing to principle or lessening the visibility of the commitment, can minimize the negative impacts of the decision. If a state turns down an alliance partner because of domestic factors, there are different types of strategies to minimize the damages to the alliance such as offering a financial contribution or promising a future commitment, when engagement is less controversial. Secondary states must carefully balance the United States' expectations and domestic constraints when contemplating military cooperation.

Given their special status and considering their strategic linkages with the United States; the UK, Canada and Australia have structural pressures which favour their following the American lead in high security issues. There are certainly important implications from opting out of military cooperation when their security is so intertwined. Their foreign and defence policy statements invariably prioritize the American alliance as vital to their security. The fact that there is so much variation in the levels of participation deserves further investigation as standard explanations relying on coercion or conformism through dependence (realist), institutional cooperation (liberal) and shared values (constructivist) cannot fully account for such intra-alliance dynamics.

To make sense of asymmetric alliances, I will build on neoclassical realism's argument that perception of threats is "shaped by one's relative material power," but that

domestic-level variables complete the equation.[18] This type of analysis allows for research questions on foreign policy decisions rather than on international outcomes. Drawing on the scholarly work in IR, it can be argued that the parameters of allied interactions are primarily determined by systemic conditions. However, specific alliance decisions can only be understood by referring to interactions at the state level as well. Thus, it is possible to reconcile IR theory and foreign policy theory, through different sets of questions. In other words, systemic factors are made intelligible by the calculations and perceptions of political leaders, as their capabilities set clear constraints on what they can undertake and the kinds of threats they can pursue beyond their borders.

To correct this over-reliance on systemic factors, which is one of the main shortcomings of neorealist thinking, neoclassical realism focuses on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. As Lobell and his co-authors remind us, long-term trends in the international system are well explained by system-level variables, but are generally insufficient in dealing with specific policy decisions.[19] This approach challenges us to delve into how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables, a central concern for this research. While neoclassical realist authors are primarily concerned with how contemporary great powers formulate grand strategy, my research focuses on state behaviour between allies, by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat.

---

[18] Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics* 51, 1 (1998), 150.

[19] *Ibid*.

In this research, I focus on two main questions: first, how states appraise international threats, and second, what happens when disagreements arise over which threats to respond to.[20] Threat perception is an important starting point, an underlying variable, but secondary states must sometimes choose which threats to prioritize and devote resources to. They do so based on alliance expectations and the desire to enhance their bilateral alliance with the United States. There are also constraints at the domestic level that set limits on the types of ventures allies can undertake. How allies respond to American expectations, or perceived expectations, is at the heart of the decision-making process. This explanation is thus located at both the systemic and domestic levels. Furthermore, while focusing on asymmetric alliances, I also investigate the types of strategies on which secondary states rely when dealing with the dominant alliance partner. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively but they can act autonomously and resist pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner, or at least mitigate the impact of doing so as not to damage the alliance relationship.

Case Selection and Methodology

To further investigate the link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study will rely on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The chosen case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia's response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, during the period from

---

[20] Steve E. Lobell, Norrin P. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

2001 to 2003 when the initial military commitments were made for both missions. The case selection is discussed at length in the third chapter. In terms of primary sources of data, references will be made to the many publicly available government documents, which are supplemented with information collected through in-depth interviews with officials from Foreign Affairs and Defence in each of the three case study countries. The focus is on the initial decision made by these allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States and on the explanatory factors which motivated the commitment of troops. These decisions are inherently political and do not reflect the complexity of the allied interactions which follow be it in cases of military cooperation or non-participation. The analysis will go beyond the presence or absence of military cooperation to evaluate the level of military cooperation.

By targeting the UK, Canada and Australia, the focus is on the United States' special allies. In terms of military cooperation, no other states share such closely integrated security arrangements, from intelligence sharing to the use of interoperable military hardware. The UK, Canada, and Australia are ideal subjects for comparison because they are all parliamentary democracies and have a close historical, cultural and linguistic bond. Their domestic institutions are similar and the decision-making on national security issues is largely the prerogative of the executive. As such, certain domestic variables can be controlled for in the analysis, such as the nature of the political system.[21] Other factors can mitigate the effects of asymmetry as well. The challenge will reside in identifying the

[21] The UK, Canada and Australia are parliamentary democracies.

specific ways in which asymmetry is altered and under what conditions. For example, long-term partners engaged in a cooperative relationship have built-in incentives to reach agreements on certain issues: "relationships imposed by geography or strategy add supplementary interests to the negotiated stakes, equalizing power, and limiting its asymmetrical exercise".[22]

Given what was outlined in this section, this is a most-similar research design, where the UK, Canada, and Australia are similar in most respects but for the explanatory variables, with variance on the dependent variable.[23] The dependent variable, the level of participation in military cooperation with the United States varies along a continuum: non-participation, political support with no troops, minimal military contribution and full military cooperation.

Conclusion

Special security relationships are epitomized as models for security cooperation.[24] However, perceptions of threats are sometimes greatly divergent between the United States and its allies. They may also hold different views on threat response. In other words, both threat perceptions and responses to perceived threats vary. As the leading power in the international system, the United States is concerned with staying *on top of the game*. This is

---

[22] I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation", in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 288.

[23] Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and theory in Political Science", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds), *Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-137.

[24] This is true in regards to the literature on complex interdependence and on security communities, as referred to in the first section.

expressed by its continued efforts to project power across the globe despite the formidable costs entailed. In contrast, weaker powers, with no hegemonic ambitions, might not be so bold in terms of their foreign and defence policy. Thus, military initiatives are mostly driven by the stronger power. Under such circumstances, allied countries rely principally on US expectations when deciding on military commitments.

The next chapter is a review of the literature on alliances, with particular emphasis on asymmetric security cooperation. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework. It focuses on the decision-making matrix of secondary states when dealing with a dominant alliance partner and argues that there is a fundamental trade-off between alliance requirements and domestic constraints. Comparative case studies, drawing on the UK, Canada and Australia's foreign and defence policy since 9/11 are presented to test the argument in chapters 4, 5 and 6. Qualitative data were generated through interviews, official documents and a variety of secondary sources. The conclusion includes a summary of the argument based on the research project's main findings. The discussion is also broadened to include avenues for future research and policy implications.

-1-

Asymmetric Alliances in International Relations

Although inter-state alliances are quite diverse in their manifestations, they largely are created for defensive purposes: addressing a security threat. Once created, alliances evolve and may outlive the threats which motivated their creation. Specific intra-alliance patterns of behaviour emerge over time. How do we uncover these patterns? In this chapter, I will review the literature in International Relations (IR) that deals with the topic of asymmetric alliances to see how we can make sense of state behaviour within the framework of a long-standing alliance.

This topic is made more complex by the diversity of alliance relationships. Not only is the literature biased in favour of alliance formation, but the main focus seems to be on great power alliances, which account only for a smaller portion of alliance interactions.[25] Indeed, a great number of alliances, like those led by the United States, are characterized by power asymmetries. As Zartman and Rubin mention, "… they [asymmetrical cases] correspond to the nature of international relations, where the number of asymmetrical encounters vastly exceeds more symmetrical relations; and second, these cases tend to be

---

[25] The literature on alliance formation is too large to be properly cited in a footnote. For a sample, see Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and tools of Management"; Jack Levy, "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25 (1981), 581-613; Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73", *International Organization* 45, 3 (1991), 369-395; Douglas M. Gibler and John A. Vasquez, "Uncovering Dangerous Alliance, 1495-1980", *International Studies Quarterly* 42, 4 (1998), 785-807; Kathy L. Powers, "Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances", *International Interactions* 30, 4 (2004), 373-395.

the most theoretically interesting cases".[26] At first glance, power assymetries would appear to have a huge impact on the nature of the security relationship. How can the weaker partner hope to gain when dealing with the stronger partner, or is compliance the only option?

A more optimistic segment of the literature, dealing with security communities, presents certain defense arrangements in terms of the actualization of common interests or the achievement, over time, of a consensus in terms of security planning between the partners involved.[27] This argument provides a compelling explanation for the absence of war in certain regions, but does not deal specifically with alliance dynamics. Thomas Risse combines both constructivist and institutionalist approaches by making the case that because of their interdependence and their shared values, war between Western allies is unthinkable.[28] In both versions of the argument, the theoretical claims stress the importance of relationships and practices built over the long term. For example, the United States-Canada relationship has evolved as a partnership built on "formal equality, consensus building, and a great deal of informal contact."[29] However, a recurring tension for the secondary partner engaged in asymmetric security cooperation exists: Do such agreements

---

[26] I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation", in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 22.

[27] Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities;* Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations", *International Organization* 53, 4 (1999), 699-732.

[28] Thomas Risse, "U.S. Power in a Liberal Security Community", in John Ikenberry (ed.) *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 260-283.

[29] Dwight N. Mason, "The Canadian-American North American Defence Alliance in 2005", *International Journal* 60, 2 (2005), 386.

enhance its sovereignty through increased security, or threaten its sovereignty by surrendering autonomy to the stronger partner.[30]

In order to understand the asymmetric alliance dynamic, it seems crucial to recognize that, given substantial power differentials, two allies might not be prone to the same insecurities, even when they have overlapping interests. Secondary states must adjust to actions undertaken by the dominant alliance partner as it responds to international threats. The goal of this chapter is to address the topic of asymmetric alliances through different theoretical perspectives in IR and to evaluate their potential for explaining asymmetric security cooperation. I will review the merits of various theoretical frameworks in IR, namely neorealism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism in order to understand asymmetric alliance behaviour. The literature on international economic cooperation is also introduced, with some important insights about asymmetric security cooperation.

Asymmetry in Security Studies

The dynamics of asymmetry have been well explored in the context of conflict and war. A scan of the literature will reveal that we have a better understanding of asymmetry between opponents than we do for allies. The general expectation when examining how weaker states behave is that there are strong constraints on what they can undertake, given their asymmetric capabilities. However, the historical record shows that weaker states can overcome such constraints through different means.

---

[30] Nils Ørvik, "The Basic Issue in Canadian National Security: Defence Against Help/Defence to Help Others", *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 11, 1 (1981), 3-7.

Paul looks at the perplexing empirical occurrence of war initiated by weaker states.[31] He argues that a state, despite considerable disadvantages in overall material strength, may instigate a war if specific conditions are present: the possibility of opting for a fait accompli strategy (as opposed to initiating an open-ended war or war of attrition); possessing mighty offensive weapons; having powerful allies, and finally; favourable domestic conditions. Paul argues that, although these considerations are important for war initiation by great powers as well, they are more significant for weaker powers. Certain findings from this work may be relevant for asymmetric alliances: how specific strategies can be used by weaker states to overcome a condition of asymmetry.

Arreguin-Toft also explores the problem of asymmetry, but he is particularly interested in outcomes where the weak defeat the strong.[32] His explanation stresses that the choice of strategy matters more than power. His account of *strategic interaction* posits that when the strong actor and weak actor follow different approaches, the outcome is likely to favour the weak actor. When they follow the same strategy, the strong will probably prevail. In other words, opposite military strategies increase the likelihood of the weak winning the confrontation. Weaker states appear more successful when opting for a niche strategy. Arguably, weaker states committed to an asymmetric alliance can level the playing field through strategies of their own.

---

[31] T.V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). See also, Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", *World Politics* 27, 2 (1975), 181.

[32] Ivan Arreguin-Toft, *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). See also Mack, "Why Big nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict".

The literature on asymmetric security cooperation, though scarce, has generally depicted the tendency of the weaker partner to pursue reactive defensive policies driven by its ties to the stronger state. In a sense, the theoretical literature on alliances and empirical findings on asymmetric alliances naturally intersect. What is common to both segments (theoretical and case-specific literature) is that they focus on watershed moments, mainly alliance creation, but say little about how the alliance relationship matures.

A pervasive idea is that the weaker power must carefully manage the alliance because the stronger partner has a tendency to act unilaterally.[33] Within alliances, however, we witness events where some players demonstrate considerable autonomy with regards to foreign and defence policy. There is evidence to suggest that the security relationship is more complex than is illustrated by the "reactive defense" thesis, which states that, if a weaker alliance partner fails to provide for his own security in a way that is satisfactory to the dominant alliance partner, the latter will impose his standards on the weaker partner.[34]

Neorealism

Mainstream IR theories have also addressed the topic of asymmetric alliances. For its part, the realist school suggests that alliances are ruled by existing power differentials. Moreover, several realist theories presuppose that the dominant power in the alliance will dictate the conditions of cooperation without upsetting the balance of capabilities between

---

[33] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* 118; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower", *Foreign Affairs* 78, 2 (1999), 35-50. See essay by Gary Willis, "Bully of the Free World", 50-59 in the same issue.

[34] Nils Ørvik, "Defence against Help: A Strategy for Small States?", *Survival* 15, 5 (1973), 228-231.

partners. Concerns over relative gains are cited as the main impediment to cooperation.[35] Realist authors offer rationalist predictions about burden-sharing between allies, arguing that military cooperation with allies is a function of cost-benefit calculations.[36]

A change in the security environment may also have an impact. Authors such as David Skidmore argue that the end of the Cold War has lessened key allies' dependence on the US for their security.[37] For instance, decreasing international tensions permitted European states to distance themselves from the unilateralist turn exhibited by the United States in the conduct of its War on Terror. Indeed, the realist view sees the security environment as an important influence on the amount of pressure the alliance leader would exert on its smaller allies. Such constraints would be especially strong during the Cold War, given the bipolar structure.[38] During the Cold War, it is fairly obvious that there was a structural divide which polarized the broadly conceived East/West geographical divide. For the West, the chief threat was Communism, personified by the Soviet Union. As such, anticommunism served as a broad framework for Western foreign policy, internalized by the United States and its allies.

---

[35] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade*, 47; Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation", *American Political Science Review* 85 (1991), 710-726.

[36] Miller, "The Logic of U.S. Military Interventions in the post-Cold War Era".

[37] David Skidmore, "Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy", *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2 (2005), 207-228.

[38] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Stephen Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse", *World Politics* 39, 1 (1997), 156-179.

The end of the Cold War is often seen as a significant marker in assessing alliance performance.[39] No longer bound by the constraints of bipolarity, special allies have a new window of opportunity to assert their independence from the United States and to push for international pre-eminence with a new foreign policy agenda.[40] There was a period of transition in the 1990's where the challenges of weak states and unstable dictatorships preoccupied Western nations, but not in the sense of being the potential targets for aggression. No existential threat dominated the conduct of international security at that time. This, of course, was altered by the events of September 11, which ushered in a new unifying theme, namely the War on Terror.

Under this banner, one could finally funnel all the disparate threats which had plagued the post-Cold War order: they were asymmetric in nature, difficult to locate and proliferated in weak or stateless societies. A main enemy was identifiable once again since terrorism was personified by al-Qaeda and terrorist-harboring countries. This unifying theme, heavily focused on terror, has been in flux since September 11 and can clearly be seen as defining the parameters of American foreign and defence policy. However, the absence of a near-peer, clearly identifiable foe should make the alliance more flexible, as the currently unchallenged dominant power is more secure in its preeminence. Some

---

[39] John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", *International Security* 17, 3 (1992-93), 5-58.

[40] Nicholas Gammer, *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), 78.

scholars have even charged realist theories with failure, as the absence of hard balancing became one of the realizations of the 1990's.[41]

The era of American primacy, whether hegemonic, imperial, unipolar or multipolar, has stimulated much scholarly attention in an attempt to explain the logic of American intervention in the world. While structural realists as Kenneth Waltz argue that such unbalanced configurations of power are likely to provoke balancing and are ultimately unstable, others, like Walt and Wohlforth, maintain that the gap between the United States and other powers is so vast that the current order is likely to endure for some time.[42] Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism posits "unbalanced multipolarity" as the least stable power configuration where there is a gap between the most powerful state, the potential hegemon, and the next state in line.[43] There is no consensus on the relationship between polarity and the stability of the international system. As a basic claim, it is reasonable to state that the United States is the most powerful state in the system militarily and economically, and that it is currently unchallenged.[44]

---

[41] Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism", *International Organization* 48, 2 (1994), 249-277. For a more in-depth discussion on the applicability of the balance of power concept in the post-Cold War context, see T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (eds), *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

[42] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000*; Stephen Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005); William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *International Security* 24, 1 (1999), 5-41; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[43] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 45.

[44] More than 20 years of American unipolarity has disconfirmed the early predictions of realists, immediately after the end of the Cold War. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", *International Security* 25, 1 (2000), 5-41; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories", *American Political Science Review* 91,

Arguments on soft balancing bring nuance to this claim, suggesting that states engage in balancing behaviour against the United States by using non-military means. Paul defines soft balancing as "…the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the United Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if the United States goes beyond its stated goals," citing the military interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and Iraq in 2003 as such cases.[45] Since potential near-peer competitors such as Russia and China, and second-tier major powers perceive the United States as a constrained hegemon, hard balancing does not appeal to these states as a necessary response to American preponderance.[46] In the absence of hard balancing, these states can impose costs on the use of American power through soft balancing.[47]

The Iraq War is often used as an example of soft balancing. Close US allies not only failed to provide political support for the invasion, but actively sought to constrain American actions. Countries, like Germany and France, appealed to the UN to oppose the United States' position, employing fiery political rhetoric meant for their domestic

---

4 (1997): 913-917; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", *International Security* 18, 2 (1993), 44-79; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security* 15, 1 (1990), 5-56; Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Power Will Rise", *International Security* 17, 4 (1993), 5-51 and his updated article "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar moment", *International Security* 31, 2 (2006): 7-41.

[45] T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of Primacy", *International Security* 31, 1 (2005), 47.

[46] *Ibid*., 53.

[47] A related argument to T.V. Paul's can be found in the same issue of International Security. See Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States", *International Security* 30, 1 (2005), 7-45. While Paul argues that the United States was a target of soft balancing in the 1990s, Pape argues that the United States was exempt from such tactics in the 1990s and that soft balancing occurred only in response to the Bush administration's unilateralist foreign policy. For a critique of soft balancing, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing", *International Security* 30, 1 (2005), 72-108.

audiences. The role of France is of particular interest, since key official figures such as Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, explicitly stated the French intention of providing a counterweight to American influence.[48] However, it is not clear that the decision to oppose the United States was motivated by systemic incentives, as the soft balancing argument states.[49] The Russian case is also cited as an example of soft balancing, but the argument may be undermined by Russia's efforts to minimize the political costs of the decision with the United States. As Brooks and Wohlforth mention, "Putin worked very hard to ensure that his tack toward Europe did not come at the expense of a working strategic partnership with the United States."[50] For Paul, soft balancing does not preclude such possibilities, since soft balancing is used precisely to avoid costly backlash from the US.[51]

With their emphasis on first-tier states and their efforts to restore the balance of power, classical, structural and offensive realism do not specify exactly how a change in the international structure impacts the foreign policy options of United States' allies. Indeed the systemic explanation can be turned on its head: after the end of the Cold War and throughout the 1990s, European states saw a decrease in their military expenditures, consistent with a lower level of threat, while Canada's military expenditures declined in the

---

[48] Dominique de Villepin. France. Sénat. "Iraq". *Compte rendu intégral des débats*. February 26, 2003.

[49] Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing", 99-100.

[50] *Ibid*., 98.

[51] Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of Primacy", 46-71.

mid-1990s and Australia's remained relatively constant.[52] Some states, having failed to independently provide for their security have increased their security dependence on the United States since the Cold War. However, this tendency is not necessarily observed across all regions, leading to interesting intra-alliance variation. To understand the conditions under which secondary states can manifest greater autonomy, we need to consider variables other than how power is distributed in the international system. The United States relies on alliances and institutions to consolidate and manage its position of pre-eminence. This implies a tacit international bargain where the United States exerts a certain level of authority by providing the leadership necessary for the maintenance of this international order, an argument made by the liberal school, to which I will now turn.[53]

Neoliberalism

Neoliberal perspectives argue that international institutions can improve the prospects of cooperation by improving information and alleviating concerns for cheating, thereby mitigating the effects of anarchy in the international system.[54] Institutions or regimes can also level the playing field by mediating cooperation between unequal states. Asymmetry, in this context, is directly tied to the problem of order. The extent to which the United

---

[52] David Lake offers an alternative explanation arguing that a decrease in defence spending is a feature of international hierarchy under the United States' leadership. See David Lake, "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics", *International Security* 32, 1 (2007), 47-79.

[53] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 4-6.

[54] Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Neoliberalism has been criticized for paying insufficient attention to the distribution of power underlying international institutions or regimes. For example, see Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier", *World Politics* 43 (1991), 336-366.

States needs its allies is a complex question. In the long term, the United States is concerned with maintaining its position of primacy, supported by allies. In the short term, alliance decisions may be highly context dependent.

Ikenberry defines the great bargain made by the United States at critical historical junctures to maintain the status quo, which favours it.[55] Responding to weaker states' fears of abandonment or domination, the US accepts that it will bear a greater share of the burden in security cooperation. The process is replicated when we consider alliance relationships, since alliances are a formal solution to curtail fears of abandonment and domination. In the context of a longstanding alliance such as NATO, we can assume that a minimal consensus about security goals has emerged over time. Indeed, alliance arrangements are more durable when they are led by a hegemonic power willing to bear a greater share of the burden.[56]

The argument goes even further, stating that secondary powers can influence powerful alliance partners through institutions.[57] To overcome inherent disadvantages in hard power, secondary states can resort to several strategies at the international level. Opting for multilateral settings is one such strategy, allowing the weaker powers to tie great powers to institutions, thereby mitigating the asymmetry.[58] Institutional arrangements may also temper fears of entrapment, as they encourage consultations and discussions for

---

[55] John G. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4.

[56] Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse".

[57] Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy*; Haftendorn, Keohane and Wallander, *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space.*

[58] Steven Holloway, "U.S. Unilateralism at the U.N.: Why Great Powers Do Not Make Great Multilateralists", *Global Governance* 6, 3 (2000), 361-382.

foreign policy decision-making. Notwithstanding, secondary states still have to demonstrate the credibility of their commitment to increase their bargaining leverage.[59] Despite a wide range of multilateral arrangements and agreements, the international community's ability to constrain American behaviour has been called into question as the United States has sometimes undermined international cooperation through inconsistent and sometimes damaging treaty behaviour.[60]

This segment of the literature also looks at how the degree of institutionalization may have an impact on the asymmetric dynamic. As stated before, the moment of alliance creation does not predetermine the following intra-alliance interactions. Time is a strong component in understanding this dynamic. If allies engage in peacetime military coordination and invest in the formalization of their alliance, it is arguably solidified in a way proportional to the investments made.[61] Despite this process of consolidation, empirical studies have shown that alliance performance does not become more reliable.[62] Allies are no more likely to commit to war initiatives, no matter how formalized or enduring the alliance commitment is.

---

[59] Brian Lai, *Reducing the Effects of Moral Hazard: Institutional Designs Within International Alliance*, (Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30, 2007, Chicago).

[60] Antonia Chayes, "How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security", *International Security* 33, 1 (2008), 45-81. Chayes points to the United States' uneven record in upholding its treaty obligations, from failing to ratify treaties to noncompliance (see pp.45-71).

[61] Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973).

[62] Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac, "Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance", *International Interactions* 31 (2005), 199.

Alternatively, as an alliance becomes increasingly consolidated over time, the initial commitment is no longer put into question. This may translate in alliance partners being more creative in regards to the original requirements. Even if power differentials remain unchanged, an alliance which is more institutionalized should allow weaker alliance partners more leeway in achieving their aims vis-à-vis the dominant power when those aims do not coincide. Since the dissolution of the alliance is no longer feared, the secondary powers may be willing to risk an autonomous course of action as Canada did in opting out of the 2003 Iraq invasion.

Moreover, the presence of multiple security institutions, which are common to both the dominant partner and its special allies, may allow the latter to forum shop. Forum-shopping refers to the ability of states to choose the most strategic venue to pursue their aims. "A key strategy for actors seeking to influence outcomes is to push issues to arenas, which work to their advantage".[63] This argument is to show that soft power is instrumentalized by secondary states that want to influence a dominant alliance partner.

The literature on soft power in its original version highlights the importance of multilateral support on major international security issues and the advantages of funneling American leadership through international institutions.[64] This is essential, it is argued, to

---

[63] Aynsley Kellow and Anthony R. Zito, "Steering through Complexity: EU Environmental Regulation in the International Context", *Political Studies* 50, 1 (2002), 46-47.

[64] Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2004); Richard N. Haas, "Defining US Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold-War World" (Arthur Ross Lecture, Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 22, 2002).

ensure the sustainability of American foreign policy in the long term.[65] Nye defines soft power as "the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others" based on intangible resources like culture.[66] However, soft power is a considerably more elusive concept than hard power, which benefits from tangible measures. What tools of persuasion-by-attraction can be brought to bear on specific foreign policy decisions to enlist the compliance and even participation of allies? More specifically, how can the government deploy soft power to achieve foreign policy support from its closest allies in times of war? Even if there were mutual recognition of these converging long-term interests, they would not necessarily buy supplemental leverage to secondary states in the short term. Beyond the established institutional bargain embodied by alliances, how are specific courses of action chosen? How are disagreements overcome between alliance partners?

Constructivism

The constructivist research program on security communities offers a third plausible explanation for asymmetric security cooperation. Over time, it is argued, close allies develop a shared sense of community which develops into a tradition of peaceful interactions. Thus, reiterated practice between cooperative states explains the absence of violent conflict between long-standing allies.[67] A different strand of constructivist thought

---

[65] Evelyn Goh, "Hegemonic Constraints: The Implications of 11 September for American Power", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, 1 (2003), 77-97.

[66] Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, 9.

[67] Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 333.

focuses on strategic culture as: "[…] shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment".[68] As such, we can identify national strategic cultures based on observable trends in foreign and defence policy, which make state behaviour more predictable. Both theories offer empirically-grounded explanations about alliance behaviour that go beyond power considerations, an early challenge for an explanation premised on asymmetry.[69]

Based on several studies, the US, the UK, Canada and Australia should benefit from a minimal level of cohesion due to a sense of shared identity. Threat perception has been depicted along the in-group/out-group distinction.[70] As such, some strains of constructivism attempt to synthesize realist and liberal arguments by suggesting that threat perception is determined by the interaction of identity and power, although there is no consensus on this point. Where power differentials still matter in identifying sources of threats, a shared sense of identity can mitigate power as a source of threat. However, the end of the Cold War may make differences between in-group identities more salient. Ted Hopf argues that the end of the struggle between democracy and communism has led to an increase in ideological divisions between the United States and Europe, between American liberalism and

---

[68] Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture".

[69] A third argument in the constructivist research agenda relates to the role of epistemic communities, as facilitating cooperation between states, as they provide expert information on which state interests can converge. This argument is less relevant for alliance theory and so has been purposefully excluded here. For a discussion on epistemic communities, see Peter Haas. *Saving the Mediterranean* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

[70] David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: A Cross-National Experiment", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15, 5 (2007), 744-771.

European social democracy. Some authors have even argued that a unified European Union could balance against the United States.[71] Still, even the United States' closest allies may express dissent. What kinds of strategies can these states use as leverage over the U.S.? Can allies affect the United States' political capability to wage war, for example?

Despite some gloomy prognosis, Western alliances, such as NATO, NORAD, and ANZUS, have been relatively stable over time, although New Zealand was excluded from ANZUS because it declared itself nuclear free in 1985, which conflicted with the American interpretation of the alliance. The fact that certain alliances have endured beyond the 50-year mark, withstanding major shifts in the international system, deserves attention. The fact that ex-Soviet states are lining up to join NATO is even more significant. For core groups of states in long-standing alliances, the fear that "today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war" has been alleviated through practice, which is strong evidence for the constructivist thesis.[72] This is reinforced by a sense of shared identity, where members of an alliance become an in-group, at the international level. For example, building on both liberal and constructivist claims, Owen argues that transnational affiliation, such as a state's liberal identity, will structure how it interacts with other states in the international system.[73]

---

[71] Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*.

[72] Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization* 42 (1988), 487. Grieco's quote stands in contrast to the *practice turn* in the constructivist research program. See Vincent Pouliot, "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities", *International Organization* 62, 2 (2008), 257-288.

[73] John M. Owen IV, "Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy", *International Security* 26, 3 (2001/02), 122.

The main contribution of constructivism is that it attempts to problematize state interests. By responding to what is perceived as appropriate behaviour, states can pursue political goals beyond power and security.[74] States may also be influenced by a variety of domestic or international actors. For example, Finnemore looks at the role of international organizations (IOs) and their sociological (and causal) interactions with states in a given issue-area. She argues that "… IOs socialize states to accept new political goals and new values that have lasting impacts on the conduct of war, the workings of the international political economy, and the structure of states themselves".[75] She uses the logic of appropriateness to explain why the United States abided by the norms of multilateralism in military interventions during the 1990s, making strong statements about the UN's legitimating role: "That UN involvement continues to be a central feature of these operations, despite the UN's apparent lack of military competence, underscores the power of multilateral norm."[76] This is an important argument to explain change, learning and adaptation by states, but may not be well suited for a research question that focuses on how states respond to American demands, or perceived expectations. Finnemore and Sikkink, commenting on military interventions in the 1990's, attempt to address this question. They

---

[74] The logic of appropriateness is usually associated with the constructivist school in IR; while the logic of consequence, premised on states as rational actors is identified with the neorealist and neoliberal schools. See Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For a discussion on the merits of both logics applied to military cooperation, see Sarah Kreps, "When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan", *Security Studies* 17 (2008), 531-567.

[75] Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 3.

[76] Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 82.

argue that international norms made the United States more multilateralist.[77] The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in contrast, suggest that alliance-seeking behaviour may not be amenable to such a generalization. In sum, the realist, liberal and constructivist literatures in IR make important contributions in explaining how power asymmetries may operate differently in longstanding alliances, but focus on the macro-level of explanation. For research questions on foreign policy decision-making, attention must be paid to domestic-level factors as well.

The most fruitful way, then, to address both ontological and epistemological questions in IR is to first reflect on the questions for which we are looking answers to. By comparing IR theories on their merits in addressing specific research questions as opposed to subscribing to one in particular. In fact, using the threat of military or economic sanctions against allies might prove utterly counterproductive by jeopardizing the very international arrangements that lock in American primacy. A majority of states subscribe to the post-WWII liberal bargain created by the United States, but the survival of this bargain is highly dependent on core support provided by these longstanding allies that benefit from the most privileged ties with the U.S. There are other practical reasons for not using coercion when dealing with allies. Salacuse mentions that domineering behaviour is risky for two main reasons:

> First, behaving exploitatively and flaunting power often leads the weaker side to become defensive and cautious, or indeed to avoid making any commitments until the

---

[77] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change", *International* Organization 52, 4 (1998), 887-917.

> last possible minute… Second, demonstrating and using power may indeed result in an agreement with the weaker party, but that agreement may prove unstable in the long run.[78]

The concept of asymmetry must account for interdependencies going beyond a narrow definition built on power differentials. When looking at security cooperation between the United States and its allies, it is clear that the US will take on a disproportionate share of the costs. Looking at power alone obscures the valued contributions of secondary states, making every ally look like a free-rider. To develop a more balanced and operable concept of asymmetry for burden-sharing, we must examine the requests made by the US. For example, if American expectations are minimal in terms of allied contributions, it would be a misnomer to call this free-riding. I suggest that we measure burden-sharing on the basis of requests made by the United States to its allies. Contributions should be judged according to operational needs and alliance expectations and not in absolute terms based on the size of those contributions alone.

Moreover, qualitative indicators of asymmetric security cooperation make specific requests more intelligible. As will be discussed in the case study chapters, there is ample evidence that former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice suggested that allied troops would actually interfere with combat operations at the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003.[79] The Bush administration valued allied commitments but in the framework of peace support

---

[78] Jeswald W. Salacuse, "Lessons for Practice" in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 268.

[79] Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

operations rather than the initial military engagement against Saddam's army. In this context, it would not make sense to judge troop contributions in absolute terms. Instead, burden-sharing is best seen as a division-of-labor, with the dominant ally making specific requests about what is expected on the part of the contributing allies. Burden-sharing and the free riding hypothesis will be discussed at greater length in the following section.

From IR Theory to a Theory of Foreign Policy

So far, I have provided a summary of the relevant literature on asymmetric alliances, relying primarily on contributions from IR theory. To narrow the scope of the literature review, I will now turn to scholarship that focuses on asymmetry in specific foreign policy decisions. Since the aim of my research is to explain allied decisions in times of war, I concentrate on foreign policy decision-making as opposed to international outcomes. Zakaria makes a clear distinction between IR theory and foreign policy theory:

> …In accounting for international events, a theory of international politics cannot explain the motives of nations; it must instead make assumptions about them. By contrast, a theory of foreign policy explains why different states, or the same state at different historical moments, have different intentions, goals, and preferences toward the outside world. A theory of foreign policy sheds light on the reasons for a nation's efforts – the search for allies, the attempt to annex a colony – but it cannot account for the results of those efforts.[80]

---

[80] Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 13.

The logical starting point for this discussion is the literature on international negotiations as it sheds light on intra-alliance dynamics. The conditions under which allies participate are the product of a bargain with the dominant alliance partner.[81] This literature draws on variables which are specific to the negotiation context, such as the negotiating skills of participants, the issue at hand, and cross-issue linkages.[82] Zartman and Rubin also note that attitudinal predispositions between negotiating parties trump power considerations: "When negotiations take place under […] circumstances characterized by friendly relations and cooperative MOs [motivational orientations], these conditions predominate over any power structure and produce integrative results under symmetry or asymmetry."[83] Thus, asymmetric conditions at the structural level can be compensated for through comparative advantages held by individual parties at the negotiating table. At the same time, vulnerabilities are particularly salient when the United States chooses to act unilaterally, as legal countermeasures have been deficient in redressing grievances. For example, Canada has suffered under the protectionist trend undertaken by the United States in the spring of 2002 with damaging consequences for the softwood lumber industry, despite the provisions under NAFTA's Article 11.[84]

---

[81] James Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Cooperation", *International Organization* 52, 2 (1998), 269-305.

[82] William Roberts Clark, Erick Duchesne and Sophie Meunier, "Domestic and International Asymmetries in United-States-European Union Trade Negotiations", *International Negotiation* 5 (2000), 69-95.

[83] Zartman and Rubin, "Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotation".

[84] Matthew Thomas Simpson, *Sleeping with an Elephant: A Canadian Defence against 21st Century U.S. Protectionism* (MA thesis. Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2004).

The literature on international negotiation deals with different levels of analysis including both domestic and international factors. Domestic variables are comparatively understudied in the field of alliance theory and international cooperation more broadly.[85] Domestic politics-driven explanations may address several shortcomings associated with structural theories. Milner makes a case for the consideration of domestic variables in the study of international cooperation:

> First, domestic politics tells us how preferences are aggregated and national interests constructed…Second, domestic politics can help explain the strategies states adopt to realize their goals…Strategies may be suggested by a state's structural position, but the nature of its political system, bureaucratic politics, the influence of special interests, and public opinion may ultimately determine which strategies states can pursue internationally. Third, the final step in establishing cooperative agreements occurs when domestic actors agree to abide by the terms negotiated internationally.[86]

Domestic factors such as electoral cycles, changes in domestic coalitions, and interest groups influence the international bargaining game. The literature on public opinion and foreign policy can offer powerful domestic-level explanations in certain contexts. Indeed, public opinion evaluations provide a general guide for assessing the climate of foreign policy decisions. It is difficult to isolate public opinion as an explanatory variable, however, because political leaders seek to influence and control public opinion through framing. Though we should not underestimate the interdependence between public opinion, framing

---

[85] Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics", *International Organization* 32, 4 (1978), 881-912. For a classic example, see Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of the Two-Level Games".

[86] Helen Milner, "International theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses", *World Politics* 44, 3 (1992), 493.

and foreign policy decisions, the precise mechanisms operating within this relationship are not well understood.

Entman's cascading model illustrates how political information trickles down from political leaders through the media all the way down to the public, with the important caveat that while the relationship from top to bottom is straightforward, it is unclear how much public opinion can make its way up to political leaders and truly influence foreign policy decisions.[87] There are several reasons for this: (1) the public draws a lot of information from framed discourse without ever having direct contact with political leaders; (2) political elites can never perfectly assess public opinion, meaning their interpretation will necessarily be a partial approximation; (3) there is a dynamic interplay between public opinion and political leaders because the latter will incessantly try to exert influence on the former over time.[88] Finally, on certain issues or in crisis situations, public opinion can be evacuated from the decision-making process.[89] This can be exacerbated in parliamentary regimes where the executive, under the Prime Minister's leadership, makes important foreign policy decisions away from the public radar. This seems to have been the case in Canada, between 2001 and 2003, as successive governments defined a mission for

---

[87] Robert Entman, *Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003).

[88] *Ibid*., chapter 1.

[89] Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *A Study of Crisis* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997).

the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan with little parliamentary debate on the issue.[90] For this reason, I focus on domestic constraints that are more likely to influence high-level decision-making on foreign an defence policy issues: the level of government cohesion, since divisions can undermine executive leadership and its level of discretion, and military feasibility, since the executive relies on the advice of Defence when considering military options for international engagements.

The structure of international negotiations also seems to impact the types of strategies available to secondary powers. Putnam's two-level game offers a good example for this, where state officials leverage their domestic and international positions to increase their bargaining power.[91] By appealing to domestic constraints when negotiating at the international level; or by appealing to international constraints when addressing domestic audiences, decision-makers can seek concessions. Drawing on cases of WTO negotiations, Drahos highlights the advantages of multilateral encounters as opposed to bilateral negotiations with the United States.[92] In the multilateral context, smaller states can create a coalition to counter American pressures. Regardless of these advantages, however, weaker states remain consistently more responsive to threats made by stronger states. The record of asymmetric bargaining is mixed. Under what conditions can weaker states hope to benefit?

---

[90] Neil Earle, "Foreign Policy and Canadian Commentary on the Afghanistan War," *American Review on Canadian Studies* 39, 2 (2009): 162.

[91] Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of the Two-Level Games"; see also Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds), *International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[92] Peter Drahos, "When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization", *International Negotiations* 8, 1 (2003), 79-109.

To explain the variation in intra-alliance behaviour, the literature on international negotiation brings us a step closer to uncovering the dynamics inherent to asymmetric bargaining. As Zartman and Rubin relate in their work *Power and Negotiation*, two different schools of thought represent the field of international negotiation. The first school argues that the negotiation process evens the playing field between asymmetric partners, while the second school argues that the more powerful players have a definite advantage and can influence the outcome in their favour.[93]

The dilemma that these authors are concerned with is called the structuralist *paradox* and deals with the counter-intuitive finding that situations of asymmetry can in fact produce better agreements than symmetric negotiations, or as Zartman and Rubin put it " … that the most powerful party in terms of force or resources does not always win at negotiation".[94] Zartman argues that under certain conditions, asymmetry can even result in better agreements for weaker states. He does this by rejecting realist definitions of power as force; and instead, focuses on persuasion, influence, leverage and pressure. A striking finding is that, although stronger states attempt to dominate weaker states, the latter do not act submissively. Instead, these comparatively lesser powers compensate for their relative weakness through several strategies, like appealing to principle or building coalitions on particular issues.[95]

---

[93] Zartman and Rubin, "The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation", 4.

[94] *Ibid,* 12.

[95] I. William Zartman, "The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation", Working Paper 1 (Research Group in International Security (REGIS). Université de Montréal and McGill University), 18.

It is also argued that international negotiations can be less effective and lead to worse outcomes for symmetric powers because both parties are sensitive to the gains made by the other, which would be consistent with the realist argument about relative gains. Commenting on China-US actions during the Korean War armistice negotiations, Fan argues that American and Chinese behaviour remain consistent with this model, leading to the parties being "… less effective in reaching agreement because both sides try to exploit gains as much as possible to maintain their power reputations".[96] Focusing exclusively on material power obscures other goals pursued by the alliance partners, such as institution-building or prestige enhancement.

Turning to economic theories of alliances, smaller alliance partners are portrayed as free riders.[97] According to this logic, defense burdens are expected to be shared unevenly among allies, where the stronger partner bears the brunt of alliance costs while the weaker ally enjoys a free ride, the classic free-rider hypothesis.[98] When allies perceive diminishing returns from the relationship, they can work to reform it or withdraw. Following Hirschman's logic, the more enduring the alliance, the more likely it seems that partners will want to invest in upgrading the alliance rather than terminating it.[99] An alternative

---

[96] Xibo Fan, "Korean War Armistice Negotiations" in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 226.

[97] Joseph R. Nunez, "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power", *Parameters* 34, Autumn (2004), 75-93.

[98] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[99] Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

hypothesis from the economic tradition is that burdens are shared according to the benefits received by each ally.[100] Given substantial power differentials, weaker allies can minimize the appearance of free-riding through certain concessions on their territory, like agreeing to the foreign use of military bases.[101] Access to strategic territory has been especially prized by the United States in its efforts to combat terrorism abroad.[102]

We can identify key resources held by weaker powers that make for situations of security interdependence: geography, capability specialization and legitimacy. States may also gain advantages that go beyond the alliance context. American allies may increase their influence internationally as a result of their ties with the United States. While the main cost to the allies is a loss of autonomy in foreign policy decision-making, the benefits are straightforward: enhanced deterrence, mutual defence obligations, potential influence and policy input with the allied state, and over time, the establishment of norms of cooperative behaviour.[103] Nevertheless, Wilkins finds that bargaining positions are heavily determined, though not decisively so, by relative power capabilities.[104]

This research focuses on the foreign policy options of secondary states when dealing with a much stronger alliance partner. The purpose is to identify the factors that

---

[100] Todd Sandler, "The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, 3 (1993), 446-483.

[101] Daizo Sakurada, "Why We Need the US-Japan Security Treaty", *Asia Pacific Review* 5, 1 (1998), 13-38.

[102] Thomas Donnely and Vance Serchuk, "Transforming America's Alliances", *National Security Outlook* January (2005), 1-7.

[103] David Alexander, Canada's Dependence on Military Alliances: a Path for the Future (MA thesis, Joint Command and Staff Program, Canadian Forces College, 2002).

[104] Thomas S. Wilkins, "Towards a 'Trilateral Alliance'? Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American-Japanese-Australian Relations", *Asian Security* 3, 3 (2007), 251-278.

structure the commitments of secondary states when contemplating military cooperation with the United States. The calculations of these states are strongly influenced by where they stand vis-à-vis the dominant alliance partner. While the core state and its weaker partners do not face the same constraints, the outcome is not necessarily dictated by the stronger power. This section has provided an overview of the relevant literature regarding asymmetric alliances. The next section focuses on the core concepts for the theoretical argument.

Conceptual Clarifications

Sartori reminds us that "a concept is empirical if, and only if, it can be rendered in testable propositions that confirm it …"[105] The concept of alliances as used here refers to its most basic and empirical sense, regarding treaty obligations between two or more states. Alliances, as defined by Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell and Long are "written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict."[106] In focusing on asymmetric alliances

---

[105] Giovanni Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis", in David Collier and John Gerring (eds), *Concepts and Method in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori* (New York & London: Routledge, 2009), 106.

[106] Brett Leeds, Jeffrey Ritter, Sara Mitchell and Andrew Long, "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944", *International Interactions* 28, 3 (2002), 238.

between special partners, I examine more closely the highly-institutionalized security cooperation between two unequal states, known as formal alliances.

In the Correlates of War (COW) Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset (1816-2000), the United States shares a defensive pact with Canada, Great Britain and Australia, which is a commitment "to intervene militarily on the side of any treaty partner that is attacked."[107] NATO's Article V, the mutual defence clause, is another example. These more intrusive treaty obligations are symptomatic of a political commitment within the NATO alliance, also referred to as "… a political-military alliance that combines the key political function of guiding members' foreign and security policy and providing a forum for alliance consultation with the operational function of ensuring that members can train and develop the capabilities to cooperate militarily."[108] *Defensive pacts* are different from less intrusive commitments such as neutrality and non-aggression pacts, or ententes. To this, we can add the qualification of *special* alliances, where allied states share intelligence and pursue military interoperability in a highly institutionalized way as a goal of defence force structure.

---

[107] Douglas M. Gibler and Meredith Reid Sarkees, "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000", *Journal of Peace Research* 41, 2 (2004), 215.

[108] Renée de Nevers, "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era", *International Security* 31, 4 (2007), 36.

Figure 2.1: Alliances and Alliance Subtypes



The diagram (Figure 1) featuring alliance subtypes is a visualization of the aforementioned concept. The outer circle represents alliances that are established by written agreements regarding neutrality or non-aggression ententes. These are less intrusive than alliances based on defensive pacts shown in the second circle. These defensive alliances are based on commitments to intervene militarily, such as the commitment within the NATO alliance.

The inner circle is reserved for the sub-category of special allies which is characterized by more far reaching and institutionalized security commitments, a long history of security cooperation, and security "privileges" such as shared intelligence arrangements.[109] Cultural ties can further cement alliance relationships.[110] This would

---

[109] David G. Haglund, *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canada's Grand Strategy at Century's End,* (Toronto: Irwin, 2000).

[110] James C. Bennett, *The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

arguably make alliance behaviour more predictable. To the extent that military cooperation between special allies is still uneven in practice, theoretical explanations that can account for this variation may be applicable to more loosely defined formal alliances.

Moving on to the concept of asymmetry, security cooperation between the United States and the UK, Canada and Australia must address the underlying gap in relative capabilities. The asymmetry is to be understood as both quantitative and qualitative. First, I rely on a standard definition of relative power as opposed to aggregate power based on a comparison of several attributes, such as "size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence."[111] As such, even a great power can be engaged in an asymmetric alliance, so long as it is superceded by a stronger state within the alliance. Such is the case between the UK and the United States, which share membership in several institutions where the US is always dominant.

Second, the asymmetry is qualitative as it represents the types of gains made through the alliance. Here we can distinguish symmetric alliances, where "both allies receive security or autonomy benefits", from asymmetric alliances, where "one ally gains security and the other autonomy".[112] This leads us to the autonomy-security trade-off model. According to Morrow, alliances thus provide states with two kinds of benefits. The first benefit, security, is defined as a state's ability "to maintain the current resolution of the

---

[111] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 131.

[112] James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances", *American Journal of Political Science* 35, 4 (1991), 905.

issues that it wishes to preserve"; while the second benefit, autonomy, is defined as "the degree to which it pursues desired changes in the status quo".[113] Alternatively, the distribution of benefits may also produce asymmetry, where the party with a greater share of the benefits is the most dependent in the relationship.[114] In the case studies that follow, all special allies are in a position of asymmetry vis-à-vis the United States. Gains made through economic and security arrangements only exacerbate this asymmetry, because they rely on the US bilaterally more than the US relies on them.

As mentioned before, the way power is used between close allies is more specific than the definition of power used broadly in IR. Indeed, I am concerned with the application of power to a sub-set of states, states which have developed a tradition of military cooperation and have moved beyond the so-called security dilemma and do not necessarily see their relationship as a zero-sum game. As such, the definition of power introduced by Zartman and Rubin fits nicely within the research question since it can account for how power relationships are reiterated over time.[115] They define power as "the perceived capacity of one side to produce an intended effect on another through a move that may involve the use of resources."[116]

---

[113] *Ibid*., 908.

[114] David Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis", *International Organization* 34, 4 (1980), 471-506; and Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence, 3rd Edition*.

[115] The authors acknowledge Tawney's work in formulating this definition, as it brings a strong perceptual element to more classical definitions of power based on material factors alone. For more on Tawney's definition of power, see R.H. Tawney, *Equality* (London: Unwin, 1931/1952).

[116] The use of resources should be understood as both material endowments and a combination of *will* and *skill*, i.e. which are dependent on how much each partner values the object of negotiation, comparatively and the negotiating skills they bring to the table. Skills can refer to individual negotiators, the ability to devote

Although this definition was developed for the study of international negotiation, it can be transferred to the context of military cooperation, since burden-sharing arrangements between allies are the product of bargaining. The stakes are especially high since politicians are accountable for the military commitment made under such coalitions. Similarly, Touval highlights the importance of combining aggregate power, perceived power and action power into any conceptualization of power that looks at bilateral relationships (among other types of relationships).[117] The cases presented in the next chapters show that the bilateral relationship coexists, and often overlaps, with regional or multilateral settings.

By focusing on the exercise of power, rather than aggregate material capabilities alone, I can then examine particular strategies deployed by the secondary allied states to overcome their asymmetric position vis-à-vis the dominant partner. Moreover, this definition allows us to concentrate on the perception of power as held by these states rather than on the more objective definition of power favoured by neorealists. Perceptions are important if we are to explain certain irregularities in how secondary states may behave. For example, there is a tendency for Canadian decision-makers to overestimate the extent to which the United States takes Canada into consideration when making foreign policy decisions. The implications of this misperception are important for my research question,

---

considerable resources to the negotiating effort, or the ability to deploy strategies or pressure tactics on the other negotiating partner. See Zartman and Rubin, "The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation", 14.

[117] Saadia Touval, "The Impact of Multiple Asymmetries on Arab-Israeli Negotiations," in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 155-173.

since I focus on the level of military participation, where commitments are made based on an evaluation of American expectations.

The degree of institutionalization is equally important, as shown by the selection of cases, because it creates mutual expectations of support. The presence of multiple and sometimes overlapping security institutions can be used to leverage alliance partners. For example, both the United Nations and NATO have a self-defence clause, through Article 51 and Article 5 respectively. However, the process of invoking one or the other entails different practical implications for the use of force. In sum, the durability and the highly institutionalized character of certain asymmetric alliances are due to complementary interests between the partners. Since the strong ally pursues autonomy and the weaker ally pursues security, the asymmetric partners have strong incentives to favour of a formal commitment, namely an alliance.

A final comment to be made here relates to the level of interdependency between partners. Scholarly work done on international negotiation and coalition formation use models where the players are interdependent: they both need each other to achieve a satisfactory outcome.[118] The level of interdependency varies across dyads. It is arguably different from one state to another or from one context to the next. Therefore, I find this assumption problematic and choose to do away with it altogether, since we are dealing with a sub-set of alliance partners: special allies. Although the UK, Canada and Australia, all

---

[118] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960); Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston, MA: Scott Foresman, 1989).

have important resources that make their involvement desirable to the US, it is reasonable to expect that their participation is unlikely to alter the course of American decision-making in one way or another. Therefore, in the decision-making model I propose, which focuses on the decision-making matrix of secondary states alone, moves made by these allies do not alter the options available to the dominant power. However, there are opportunities to adjust alliance expectations.

Despite the presence of complementary interests, as embodied by the aforementioned security-autonomy trade-off, alliance partners may choose to renegotiate the alliance when particular issues arise. It is reasonable to expect that, when contemplating joint military action, allies undergo such re-evaluations of their interests and motives according to specific circumstances. Thus, within the broader framework of the alliance, where the overarching goals are complementary, there might be sequences when the motives vary (alignment vs. non-alignment on security portfolios). This will be reflected in my theoretical argument. What should be clear from the above discussion is that perceptions of threat matter and change over certain issues. Moreover, by dichotomizing alliance benefits, as either autonomy or security, preferences are built-in to the definition where secondary states are seen to prioritize security at the expense of autonomy. I propose an approach which allows for more flexibility to account for instances when secondary states favour autonomy over alliance requirements.

By choosing threat perception as the point of departure for my argument, I recognize the potential conceptual and operationalization pitfalls of the term. Threat

perception has been said to be "one of the most primitive areas of statecraft," as it can only offer a partial assessment of potential harm.[119] Similarly, Robert Jervis has observed that "there is no easy way to determine the accuracy of perceptions."[120] There are multiple impediments to an accurate assessment of international threats, stemming from a lack of information, misperception, sudden changes in capabilities, preconceptions held by leaders and a host of bureaucratic proclivities. Threats can be overestimated or underestimated, confirmed or disconfirmed. The process of threat assessment is even more complex in the context of alliance relationships, as different states may come to different readings of international threats.

How allies with different power capabilities overcome these disagreements about threats in crafting their foreign and defence policy is the central focus of this analysis. Although it is possible to rely on material indicators to evaluate and rank threats, it is important to recognize that non-objective factors blur these assessments. Schweller provides a useful subdivision of perceived threats, broken into three categories: actual, potential, and imagined.[121] While actual threats are made unambiguous by the clarity of an opponent's signals; imagined threats are identified, but not supported by the evidence. Finally, potential threats are early signals drawn from a change in an opponent's capabilities or intentions that may materialize into an actual threat. Threat perception, in

---

[119] Knorr, "Threat Perception", 97.

[120] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 7.

[121] Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*, 38.

sum, is "… an assessment of the actor's capabilities and intentions but also an evaluation of its resolve and risk-taking propensities."[122]

A different approach is offered by Carter and Perry, who rank threats in terms of severity. The degree of severity is divided into three categories, where A-list threats threaten survival, B-list threats affect important strategic interests and C-list threats are important but bear no direct impact on core interests.[123] A-list threats are unlikely to cause disagreements between allies because if survival is at stake for the United States, its closest allies are equally threatened. World War II corresponds to this first category. C-list threats, on the other hand, are particularly ambiguous because there is no direct strategic interest at stake. Instead, intervention is couched in terms of values or moral imperatives. It is unlikely that the US will opt for a unilateral response, since concerns for burden-sharing are more salient when there is no national interest involved. Interventions in Somalia and Bosnia are examples of this second category.

B-list threats are the most interesting from a theoretical standpoint because they are likely to elicit disagreements between asymmetric allies, since these threats will be perceived primarily through the lens of the United States' global responsibilities. Dominant allies, like the United States, have a qualitatively different assessment of threats given the global nature of their interests. As Renato and Dixon suggest, "The multiplicity of their interests leads major powers to perceive some utility even in other states' conflicts and

---

[122] *Ibid*., 43.

[123] Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

makes them more likely to intervene in those quarrels."[124] Such interventions have included the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001 War in Afghanistan and the War in Iraq. For these wars, the United States was the leader in building a coalition to respond to a regional threat to its interests. In these cases, the UK, Canada and Australia appreciated these threats on a different scale: as a test of alliance reliability rather than a direct threat to their strategic interests. Alliance expectations would thus strongly influence the types of military commitments that were be made, but the analysis should be complemented by including domestic-level variables. The selected case studies all belong to this latter category of strategic but non-vital threats (B-list). I will offer an explanation for allied responses to such threats when contemplating military cooperation with the United States.

Another concept that deserves clarification is military cooperation. By focusing on the allied participation in US-led military interventions, the goal is to understand the conditions under which a commitment is made and to shed light on the nature, scope and implementation of that commitment. The first component of the concept is fairly straightforward: by military, I mean that there is coordination between the armed forces of the United States and other countries. The second part, cooperation, deserves more attention. Cooperation occurs "when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or

---

[124] Corbetta Renato and William J. Dixon, "Multilateralism, Major Powers, Militarized Disputes", *Political Research Quarterly* 57, 1 (2004), 5-14.

anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination."[125] Cooperation can be the result of a natural convergence of interests, it can be a negotiated outcome, or it can be imposed.[126] In the context of asymmetric military cooperation, all three types of cooperation can arguably occur, although negotiated cooperation would be more frequent among special allies, since they have established channels to engage in negotiation and bargaining.

Conclusion

This chapter offered a discussion on the topic of asymmetric alliances in IR. By looking at the three main schools in IR, realism, liberalism, and constructivism, the intent was to define the main research question: military cooperation under conditions of asymmetry. Through this discussion, I recognize that IR theories have made important contributions that shed light on asymmetric security cooperation. However, macro-level theories may prove insufficient in studying foreign policy decisions. Understanding the decision-making processes leading to military cooperation thus requires a shift to a more micro-level approach, where domestic-level variables are introduced in the analysis. Combining these levels of analysis, as suggested by neoclassical realists, is the appropriate framework for the research question under investigation.

---

[125] Quoted in Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Stregths and Weaknesses", 467. Also see Keohane, *After Hegemony;* and Charles Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1965).

[126] Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Stregths and Weaknesses", 469.

In this chapter, we also considered theories on bargaining in order to clarify the dynamics of asymmetry and how weaker parties can deploy strategies to overcome structural disadvantages. A recurring puzzle for scholars in alliance theory is to identify the situations and attributes that enable secondary states to influence their dominant alliance partner. My interest is in how secondary states engage in military cooperation with a more powerful allied state. How alliance partners negotiate the parameters of military cooperation represents a theoretical challenge. The literature on international negotiations presents the advantages that can be gained by a weaker party engaged in asymmetric bargaining. The issue at hand, the specific context of the negotiation, and the skills of negotiators, may redress the underlying power asymmetry.

Beyond these context-specific factors, can we generate testable hypotheses about alliance decision-making between asymmetric partners? The next chapter will outline the theoretical framework and research design employed to address asymmetric military cooperation between the United States and its closest allies: the UK, Canada, and Australia.

-2-

A Theory of Asymmetric Security Cooperation

This study examines the effects of power asymmetry on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies: the UK, Canada and Australia. More specifically, the main objective is to explain the foreign policy behaviour of these alliance partners by looking at their level of participation in military cooperation with the United States. It explores how threats, as perceived by central decision-makers, are mediated by both alliance expectations and domestic constraints. Special allies, due to the proximity of their security relationship with the US, make military commitments according to US expectations, but face domestic constraints set by the level of government cohesion and available military capabilities. Examining the decision-making processes leading up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the research will also show how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome the effects of power asymmetries. Previous analyses may have overestimated the extent to which the United States holds a "leash-like grip" on its allies.[127]

Why focus on these states? These special relationships are characterized by a high level of dependence, a high degree of institutionalization and a well-established tradition of cooperation. By either realist, liberal or constructivist accounts, military cooperation between the United States and its special allies should produce an aligned foreign policy when the use of force is at stake (whether coercion-based, interest-based, or value-based). However, history shows us that these special allies have sometimes proven to be unreliable

---

[127] Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment", 29.

partners to the United States. Why did the UK opt out of Vietnam, Australia turn its back on Kosovo and Canada refuse to send troops to Iraq, while in some instances, they joined hands with the US? Why is their behaviour so unpredictable when these states rely on, thrive under, and support American leadership? This project addresses these questions by investigating the UK, Canada and Australia's level of participation when contemplating military cooperation with the United States after 9/11.

In chapter 2, I presented a discussion of the major contributions in the IR literature on the topic of asymmetric alliances. The theoretical approach presented in this chapter will build on these contributions by introducing a decision-making model of asymmetric security cooperation from the perspective of secondary states. The goal is to map out the decision-making matrix of allied states that are militarily engaged with the United States to gain insights on asymmetric alliance interactions. I have examined the UK, Canada and Australia, traditional US allies, to control for a host of political, cultural, and identity-based factors.

Before moving on to the core argument, it may be useful to summarize key points as they relate to the United States and its special allies. First, there is a profound asymmetry between the United States and its closest allies, which can translate into different evaluations and responses to the international security environment. Second, when such disagreements arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the stronger power. To investigate this dynamic, I must take into account that close US allies face an additional hurdle in the realm of foreign policy decision-making: weighing the trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner and not

appearing weak when dealing with the United States. In other words, secondary states must manage both the United States' expectations and those held by their domestic audiences. It is important to consider both domestic and international factors when explaining the foreign policy options of the UK, Canada and Australia when they are contemplating military cooperation with the United States. While the political decision on participation is strongly influenced by US expectations, the level of military cooperation appears primarily driven by the domestic constraints we have previously identified: the level of government cohesion and military capacity. By breaking down the decision-making stages in this way, we can understand the relative importance of domestic and international factors.

Table 3.1 Military expenditure of the USA, UK, Canada and Australia

Military expenditure in constant (2005) US$ m.

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
USA	344, 932	387, 303	440, 813	480, 451	503, 353	511, 187	546, 786
UK	48, 786	50, 963	57, 140	60, 018	60, 003	59, 595	59, 705
Canada	11, 709	11, 771	11, 984	12, 441	12, 986	13, 588	15, 155
Australia	11, 038	11, 609	12, 008	12, 638	13, 122	13, 885	15, 097

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (Consulted March 3, 2009).

By all material indicators of power, the relationship between the United States and its closest alliance partners is asymmetric. Whether one looks at quantitative or qualitative measures of power, the United States by far outmatches any other country in the world.[128] Comparing military assets alone offers a telling portrait. American military expenditures (Table 3.1) have grown steadily in the period after 9/11, dwarfing even the UK, America's

[128] Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World"; Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony", *International Security* 28, 1 (2003), 5-46.

strongest military ally. In 2001, UK military expenditures were about 15% of US military expenditures, while in 2007, they fell below 11%.

Table 3.2 Military personnel for the USA, UK, Canada and Australia

Military Personnel

	USA	UK	Canada	Australia
2000	1,372,352	207,620	59,360	50,755
2001	1,385,116	205,650	58,852	49,763
2002	1,411,200	204,680	59,249	51,365
2003	1,423,348	206,920	61,595	51,791
2004	1,411,287	207,020	62,012	52,242
2005	1,378,014	201,100	61,715	51,185
2006	1,371,533	195,850	62,779	50,887
2007	1,368,226	190,400[p]	63,779	51,187
2008	1,402,227	187,060[p]	64,403	53,149
2009	1,412,529	188,370[p]	65,890	54,748[e]

p Provisional number
e Estimated number

Sources : US Department of Defense. 2009. "Active Duty Military Personnel by Service, by Region/Country". Military Personnel Statistics. Online. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm (Consulted September 17, 2009);
United Kingdom. Defence Analytical Services and Advice. 2009. "TSP 1 –UK Regular Forces Strengths and Changes". Historical National Statistics Publications. Online. http://www.dasa.mod.uk/applications/newWeb/www/index.php?page=67&pubType=1&thiscontent=30&date=2009-05-28 (Consulted September 18, 2009); Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. 2008. "National Defence" Departmental Performance Report.Online. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2007-2008/index-eng.asp?acr=50 (Consulted September 21, 2009); National Defence and the Canadian Forces. 2009. "Recruiting and Retention in the Canadian Forces". Backgrounder. Online. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2865 (Consulted September 18, 2009); Australian Government Department of Defence. 2009. "Budget". Statutory Reports. Online. http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/index.htm (Consulted 18 September 2009)

Australian and Canadian military expenditures are between 2% and 3% of American military expenditures. Comparing the data on the size of the armed forces (Table 3.2), the asymmetry between the US and its special allies is equally astounding. The United States has over 1.4 million in military personnel in 2009, compared to less than 200 000 military

personnel for the UK. Canada and Australia have much smaller numbers, with 65 890 and 54 748 military personnel respectively.

Table 3.3 GDP for the USA, UK, Canada and Australia

National GDP (2008 est.)

	USA	UK	Canada	Australia
GDP (official exchange rate)	$14.26 trillion	$2.67 trillion	$1.51 trillion	$1.01 trillion
GDP – Per Capita (PPP)	$46,900	$36,500	$39,100	$38,100
GDP – Real Growth Rate	1.1%	0.7%	0.4%	2.3%

Source: CIA World Factbook
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (Consulted September 28, 2009).

Table 3.4 Population in 2008 for the USA, UK, Canada and Australia

USA	UK	Canada	Australia
304,059,724	61,383,000	33,441,300	21,644,000

Sources: United States Census Bureau. Population Division. 2002. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 (NST-EST2008-01). Online. http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (Consulted October 5, 2009); United Kingdom. National Statistics.2009. Population Estimates: UK population grows to 61,4 million. Online. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?ID=6 (Consulted October 5, 2009); Canada. Statistique Canada. 2008. "Estimations de la population canadienne". Le Quotidien (Ottawa). December 19, 2008. Online. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/081219/dq081219b-fra.htm (Consulted October 5, 2009); Australia. Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2009. Australian Demographic Statistics (3101.0). Online. http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3101.0Mar%202009?OpenDocument (Consulted October 5, 2009).

Non-military values are consistent with the profound asymmetry in capabilities. Gross domestic product (GDP) figures put the United States, the most powerful economic power, far ahead of its special allies (Table 3.3), with a value of $14.26 trillion for 2008, more than six times the UK's GDP. Finally, comparing the data shows that, even when we account for population size (Table 3.4), material indicators of power for the United States are impressive, outmatching its strongest ally by far.

The point of presenting this comparative outlook of military and economic power is to represent the asymmetry quantitatively. Even if the UK is a great power, which is apparent when we compare the figures with Canada and Australia, there is a sizeable difference between British and American economic and military power. To refine the concept of asymmetry we also need to look at other indicators which may mitigate, increase or decrease the effects of asymmetry on alliance partners. Looking at the interactions between the United States and its special allies, we cannot exclude their history of military cooperation from our understanding of asymmetry. For example, the Canada-US dyad is sufficiently dissimilar from the Pakistan-US dyad, that it precludes any meaningful comparison. In contrast, this project proposes a careful account of special alliances which belong to a specific sub-set of formal alliances.

Special alliance relationships are characterized by a history of integrated military cooperation through interoperability, common military exercises and intelligence sharing. Alliance theory teaches us that such alliances have been particularly enduring because they are based on complementary interests.[129] While asymmetry between alliance partners provides a solid basis for longstanding cooperation, it is also responsible for basic differences in foreign policy priorities. How these differences are negotiated in practice is not well understood and deserves further analysis.

Asymmetry can translate into different assessments of international threats on the part of allies. Gideon Rose argues that the scope and ambitions of a state's foreign policy

---

[129] Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances", 908.

are first and foremost influenced by relative power.[130] However, recognizing that relative power is only part of the story, he points to neoclassical realism which emphasizes that state power has a very indirect and complex impact on foreign policy. Thus, we must uncover how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. In the context of special relationships where security concerns are also operationally linked, there is an expectation of mutual support when the use of force is considered. In this regard, the United States has arguably more raw leverage potential over its allies than the other way around. How secondary states respond to the expectations of their dominant alliance partner while managing domestic constraints is thus the central question.

Decision-making and Asymmetric Military Cooperation

This section expands on the core claim: that special allies, due to the proximity of their security relationship, have strong incentives to engage in military cooperation with the United States. Decision-making processes solicit evaluations of US expectations and domestic constraints. Secondary states engage in bargaining and can resort to strategies to overcome power asymmetries. When allied states choose to forgo participation altogether, they can look to compensatory strategies in an effort to salvage their reputation with the dominant ally. This section on decision-making and asymmetric military cooperation has two parts: the first focuses on threat perceptions, showing how asymmetric alliance partners may disagree over security priorities; the second presents the main variables, alliance

[130] Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy".

expectations and domestic constraints, with the resulting hypotheses on asymmetric military cooperation.

To uncover the decision-making matrix of secondary states, I refer to threat perception as an important contextual variable. Threat perception is understood here in a way consistent with Walt's, as outlined in *Origins of Alliances*, where "…states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone."[131] Walt also recognizes that dominant states and secondary states hold different conceptions of threat perception. By comparing the behaviour of the United States and the USSR with the behaviour of regional powers in the Middle East, he finds that regional powers are generally not preoccupied with the global balance of power.[132] Another important point which speaks to the asymmetry between alliance partners pertains to bandwagoning. Walt argues that weak states are more prone to bandwagoning behaviour because they can seldom affect the outcome in the resolution of international security issues and they are particularly prone to pressures, given their relatively limited capabilities.[133]

The UK, contrary to Australia and Canada, possesses the military capabilities to alter such an outcome. Cooperating closely with the United States and making sizeable contributions to US-led coalitions at least hold the promise of influence on their American partner. Although benefits in influence are elusive, opting out of military cooperation with the US implies unacceptable exclusion costs. Although the UK's behaviour can still be

---

[131] Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, 5.

[132] *Ibid*., 159.

[133] *Ibid*., 173.

characterized as bandwagoning, this explanation comes up short when trying to explain the behaviour of long-standing allies. First, special allies are partially shielded from the pressures discussed by Walt, since they do not risk the survival of the alliance by staying on the sideline. Second, following this logic, one could argue that the UK, Canada and Australia have been bandwagoning since the end of World War II, diluting the explanatory power of an approach that so heavily focuses on relative capabilities in the causal mechanism. As Evelyn Goh points out, realist thinking is indeterminate when it comes to explaining the behaviour of secondary states.[134] To analyze decision-making processes under asymmetric conditions**,** one must first examine how alliance partners may sometimes disagree over security priorities.

Asymmetry and Threat Perception

For intra-alliance bargaining, it is important to differentiate between conditions that motivate alliance formation and conditions that shape subsequent interactions. Walt's discussion on the sources of threat highlights four factors to consider that are important for alliance formation and future interactions. Indeed, allied states appraise aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions beyond the initial decision to ally.[135] Therefore, both commitments and threats are re-evaluated over time when states contemplate the use of force.

---

[134] Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies", *International Security* 32, 3 (2007/08), 116. See also, Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing", *International Security* 29, 2 (2004), 159-201; and Stephen R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment", *World Politics* 43, 2 (1991), 233-256.

[135] Walt, *The Origins of Alliances,* 21-26.

Allied states may have different assessments of threat, especially when it comes to identifying aggressive intentions. I argue that this is amplified by power asymmetries.[136] The United States, for its part, has the status of a superpower and global interests to match. As a dominant state in the international system, it has the capacity to project its power across different regions of the world.[137] Global interests translate into a more expansive definition of what could constitute a threat to the United States.[138] A state of secondary rank, on the other hand, is not necessarily driven by global ambitions and may perceive international threats accordingly by ordering security priorities differently.

Even within the United States, there is no foreign policy consensus on threat assessment and threat response. Barry Posen, writing shortly after 9/11, outlined four American grand strategy alternatives which represent competing strategies to approach the threat of terrorism (see Table 3.5).[139] The first approach, labeled "neo-isolationist", stands

---

[136] In the case of symmetric allies, shared threat perception should lead to a joint cooperation plan, where the command structure reflects the relatively equal standing of the partners. When there is disagreement over threat perception, a general stalemate is likely, due to the parity of power between the allies; or the alliance might also break down (Zartman, "The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation").

[137] Following the same line of argument, Posen describes this global reach as the 'command of the commons,' where the United States dominates sea, land, air, and space. See Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony", 8.

[138] Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Problems of National Security* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1976).

[139] Barry R. Posen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics", *International Security* 26, 3 (2001/02), 53. In the same issue, Walt also proposes an agenda to combat terrorism and highlights the wider debate about engagement vs. retrenchment in US foreign policy. See Stephen Walt, "Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy", *International Security* 26, 3 (2001/02), 56-78. Kupchan proposes a fifth alternative grand strategy, enacted by a concert of great powers, where regional powers would act to preserve piece in their region, permitting a partial American retrenchment from its global commitments. See Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Knopf, 2002). For an argument against neo-isolationism and in favour of selective engagement as the optimal grand strategy guiding American foreign policy, see Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

for a strong retaliatory response through military means, but is generally non-interventionist and cautious when it comes to post-conflict nation-building projects and limited international involvement.

Table 3.5 Post- 9/11 American Grand Strategy Alternatives

Grand Strategy	Description
Neo-Isolationists	- Strong military retaliation for 9/11 attacks - Limited international involvement
Liberal Internationalists	- UN-driven strategy against terrorism - Favours diplomacy over military action
Primacists	- Broader campaign against enemy states - US should act unilaterally if necessary
Selective Engagement	- Extended counterterror war, with al-Qaeda as the main target - Limited, balanced objective

Source: *Posen, The Struggle against Terrorism, 53-55.*

The second approach, labeled "liberal internationalist" argues for an UN-driven campaign against terrorism and minimizes military action in favour of a trial-based strategy to apprehend individual terrorism and diplomacy. The third approach, labeled "primacist" advocates a broader, all-or-nothing strategy whereby the United States should confront all of its enemies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf simultaneously to consolidate American primacy in the region. The fourth approach, labeled "selective engagement" would lead to a campaign against al-Qaeda but does so according to limited objectives, adopting a long-term strategy of "extended counterterror war."[140]

Although this is not a perfect categorization of foreign policy alternatives, this typology is useful to compare the foreign policy inclinations of the United States with those

[140] Barry Posen, "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics", 53-55.

of its allies. By studying the parliamentary debates and official policy statements in the London, Ottawa, and Canberra, it is possible to carve out which strategy these three governments favoured and how closely their positions match the American assessment and response to international terrorism, as well as other threats in the period following 9/11. In reality, what has emerged is a modified version of the primacist approach, whereby the US national security strategy argued for an aggressive and American-driven (read unilateral-if-necessary) war against terror where nation-building efforts could be delegated to coalition partners or a UN initiative.[141]

The UK's behaviour is most consistent with selective engagement, as it balanced a sizeable response to the War on Terror, but appealed to other states and international institutions in an attempt to rein in the superpower.[142] Canada opted for a strategy that maximized the role of the UN and emphasized the procedural and legalistic aspects of the War on Terror.[143] Australia, for its part, matched the American primacist grand strategy with an ambitious agenda to control rogue regimes, especially North Korea, and also demonstrated full support for regime change in Iraq, and an adherence to the Bush Doctrine and its emphasis on pre-emption.[144]

---

[141] To say that nationbuilding was delegated to allies may be overstated since many of the individuals that were interviewed acknowledged that the US had no clearly defined plan, following the military invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq.

[142] Alastair Campbell, *The Blair Years: The Alastair Campbell Diaries* (London: Random House, 2008).

[143] Stefanie von Hlatky, "What US Allies Learned from the War on Terror," (Paper presented at the ISSS/ISAC Annual Conference, Vail, Colorado, October 15, 2008.)

[144] Greg Sheridan, *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance under Bush and Howard* (Sydney: The University of New South Wales, 2006).

The preceding discussion illustrates how allied states may perceive and rank international threats differently because of underlying power asymmetries. How allied states overcome these differences remains unclear. This would appear especially challenging for secondary states in the alliance, as they must cope with an influential partner. US expectations are indeed important in the decision-making matrix of secondary states but are mitigated by domestic-level constraints.

Alliance Expectations and Military Cooperation

For the United States' special allies, the choice between participating in an American-led coalition and opting out bears important consequences. Whereas participation entails autonomy costs, non-participation can lead to exclusion costs, where the ally is temporarily sidelined.[145] Given the asymmetry in power, joint action translates into a substantial curtailment of the alliance partner's autonomy, due to its reliance on the United States' overwhelming material capabilities. It is not a decision based on convenience, but rather on necessity.[146] As a contextual variable, threat perception gives us clues on the likelihood of participation or non-participation, but cannot explain the content of specific policies. It is necessary to look at how threat perception interacts with alliance expectations and domestic constraints to produce a given foreign policy response when military cooperation is on the table. It is also important to differentiate between substantial and token military

---

[145] Drawn from interviews conducted in the UK, from June 18 to July 2, 2008, with senior officials from the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

[146] Lloyd Gruber, *Ruling the World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

commitments, by evaluating the type and scope of military commitments made by allies. Depending on the level of military cooperation, from no military cooperation to a substantial commitment of troops, decision-makers can engage in strategies to minimize the drawbacks of the chosen option, whether these are felt at the domestic or alliance level.

Furthermore, by focusing on domestic-level constraints, we can refine our understanding of how burdens are shared. As discussed in chapter 2, smaller alliance partners are often portrayed as free-riders, where the stronger partner bears the brunt of alliance costs.[147] An alternative hypothesis is that burdens are shared according to the benefits received by each allies.[148] Given substantial power differentials, weaker allies can minimize the appearance of free-riding through certain concessions on their territory, like agreeing to the foreign use of military bases.[149] Access to strategic territory, for instance, has been especially prized by the United States in its efforts to combat terrorism abroad.[150] The point is that asymmetries can be mitigated by interdependence, going beyond a narrow definition built on power differentials.[151] When looking at security cooperation between the United States and its allies, it is clear that the US will take on a disproportionate share of the costs. However, focusing on power alone obscures the valued contributions of secondary states, making every ally look like a free-rider. To have a more balanced and operationalizable concept of burden-sharing, we must examine how individual

---

[147] Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*.

[148] Sandler, "The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey".

[149] Sakurada, "Why We Need the US-Japan Security Treaty".

[150] Donnely and Serchuk, "Transforming America's Alliances".

[151] Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence, 3rd Edition*.

commitments are negotiated and how they measure up to US operational needs in a given context.

What are the factors driving the level of participation of allies? Literature on the topic is strongly influenced by Putnam's two-level game, where allies can maximize their bargaining leverage by using domestic constraints at the international level and emphasizing international constraints when facing a domestic audience.[152] Domestic dissent can be used as a resource in bargaining, where allies can appeal for concessions from the dominant ally by citing unfavourable public opinion. It becomes apparent that a complex political game illustrates intra-alliance dynamics, where alliance expectations and domestic constraints impact the level of participation of allies in US-led military intervention. These domestic constraints are the level of government cohesion (GVT cohesion) and available military capabilities (MIL capabilities).

How are American expectations understood by decision-makers in allied countries? The United States' closest allies are confronted with the weight of American actions, which, to a considerable extent, structures their foreign policy options. When the use of force is on the line: 1) There are strong incentives to act as a reliable partner when the United States calls for allied support; 2) At the domestic level, there are two sets of constraints: a) There is pressure not to appear submissive to American will. A strong executive with the backing of government will determine the extent to which there will be deferral to American leadership in military cooperation. This variable is labeled

---

[152] Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of the Two-Level Games".

government cohesion; b) Military options are limited by a state's available capabilities, a variable la beled *military capabilities*. In general, the nature and scope of military commitments appear relatively shielded from public discussions preceding the initial decision on military cooperation. Decision-makers tend to rely on the advice of the military when weighing these options out. Through the combination of these important variables, we can specify the main causal mechanism which will be tested through the case study analysis (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Causal Mechanism



Turning to the application of this decision-making model, the situation that emerged after 9/11 is mystifying: several allies volunteered military contributions which were not used by the United States in the early phases of the war in Afghanistan. Traditional burden-sharing explanations are indeterminate in such cases, because far from free-riding, allies are being turned away and asked to temporarily wait on the sidelines. In order to evaluate allied troop commitments, it is imperative to consider the United State's propensity to delegate to allies and its operational needs. Kreps addresses this issue by arguing that short-term security

challenges and the nature of the intervention influence the role given to allies in US-led military coalitions.[153] Looking at the case of Afghanistan, she notes that:

> With regard to the allies it [the United States] did incorporate, it did so bilaterally and almost exclusively after or outside combat operations rather than multilaterally and during the early phases of combat. U.S. military and civilian commanders made it clear the United States was unwilling to engage in the vagaries of coalition warfare while still in the midst of combat operations.[154]

The 2002 and 2006 US National Security Strategies provide further support for the United States' new attitude toward its allies, arguing for coalitions of the willing rather than deference to international institutions or consensus-based decision-making. The 2006 NSS states that "international institutions have a role to play, but in many cases coalitions of the willing may be able to respond more quickly and creatively, at least in the short term".[155] Instead of investigating why the US intervened unilaterally, my research question focuses on the incentives of allied states in providing a military contribution that reflects American expectations. The main argument translates into the following three hypotheses so as to make specific predictions about the timing, scope and type of military commitment by allies:

> **Decision-makers' assessment of US expectations determine the type of military commitment made by allies**

---

[153] Kreps, "When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan", 533.

[154] *Ibid.,* 542.

[155] George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006), 48. For the 2002 NSS, see online version: George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (2002) Online. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ (Consulted September 22, 2009)

The more cohesive the government, the more allies defer to the dominant ally

Available military capabilities determine the scope of military cooperation

In sum, I begin with the observation that threat perceptions, a contextual variable, illustrate how secondary states have their own assessment of international threats which may differ from their dominant alliance partner, the United States. This poses a dilemma when having to contemplate military cooperation: join the US on its terms, bearing the domestic costs, or take an autonomous course of action and suffer reputation costs with the US. I suggest that allied commitments are a function of American demands, or how decision-makers perceive expectations from the alliance. Alliance expectations are then mediated by domestic constraints. As we have seen, the two domestic-level variables are the level of government cohesion and available military capabilities.

Strategies

When states participate in US-led coalitions, they deploy different strategies to maximize their autonomy; when they opt out, they deploy compensatory strategies to minimize the impact of their choice on their bilateral relationship. When allies share the same perception of threats, it is to the secondary state's advantage to reveal its support for the US early on, to negotiate concessions and communicate conditions bilaterally. When allies hold divergent perceptions of threat, they have incentives to postpone publicly stating their position, to minimize diplomatic frictions with the dominant alliance partner. Whether there is disagreement or agreement on the perception of threat, allies will seek strategies that will

increase their freedom of maneuver, either with their dominant alliance partner, or domestically.

Table 3.6 Typology of Allied Strategies

	PARTICIPATION (political support and military cooperation)	**NON-PARTICIPATION** (opting out of military cooperation)
ALLIANCE-LEVEL	• Taking the initiative or demonstrating leadership (expertise edge) • Issue linkages: through concessions, side payments, or agenda-pushing	• Attention-getting: resistance, appealing to rules; • Use of third parties or "soft balancing" coalitions; • Stalling, or failing to articulate a clear position on military cooperation.
DOMESTIC-LEVEL	• Negotiating high-profile role in intervention, key posts • Capitalizing on timing, maximizing or minimizing visibility of commitment.	• Rhetoric evoking moral principle, international norms and procedures; playing public opinion at home

In other words, strategies can be used by secondary states to mitigate the effect of power asymmetries. To illustrate this, I propose a typology (Table 3.6) of strategies for asymmetric security cooperation. Having a typology will allow for a more systematic comparison of the cases.[156]

In the case of participation, allied states provide political support and military cooperation. The strategies are geared to maximize the visibility of military cooperation for both international and domestic audiences by negotiating a high-profile role or key posts at the alliance level. The allied state may also obtain side payments or succeed in agenda pushing. In cases of participation, where states are caught between either pleasing the US or pleasing their domestic audience, officials will opt for strategies that allow them to

[156] Salacuse, "Lessons for Practice".

minimize the visibility of the commitment while reassuring the United States about their reliability as an ally and their ability to make concessions. Non-participation is a particularly vulnerable position. In such situations, states must justify their decision at the alliance level; they are likely to deploy strategies such as stalling, appealing to rules and uniting with other dissenting states. On the domestic level, the non-participating ally is likely to play up the rhetoric at home for political gain.

Competing Hypotheses on Asymmetric Security Cooperation

As stated in chapter 2, states join alliances as a strategy to counter external threats, but alliances can also live beyond the threat that motivated their creation.[157] Enduring and deeply institutionalized alliances represent a unique challenge for alliance theory, since the patterns of military cooperation of the world's closest and most interdependent allies are uneven at best. In this section, I introduce competing hypotheses on asymmetric security cooperation. Two neorealist explanations address regional insecurity and changes in the international security environment. Another hypothesis from liberal institutionalism is presented to assess the importance of institutional norms when states appeal to the UN for the use of armed force. A final hypothesis deals with domestic politics, focusing on the political opposition and public opinion. The alternative explanations discussed will be tested against my theory through the hypotheses presented below. The cases show that these competing factors are not decisive in the decision-making processes leading to

---

[157] James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security", *International Organization* 47, 2 (1993), 207-233.

military cooperation. Let us now turn to each hypothesis as they relate to the specific cases under investigation.

The United Nations: Constraints on the International Use of Force

The United Nations proceedings in the fall of 2002 attracted a lot of international attention. Deliberations leading to the achievement of Resolution 1441 giving Saddam an ultimatum on WMDs combined with the process of the UN weapons inspections team led to a period of optimism. This momentum came to a halt with France's threat to use its veto should a second resolution be put on the table, explicitly authorizing the use of force.[158] That the UN became an important tool of international bargaining is evident. Did the UN process directly influence decision-making of state leaders in favour or against participation? The following hypothesis suggests that UN support does influence military cooperation:

> **When the use of force is not supported by a UN resolution, states are less likely to commit troops to military cooperation**

Looking at official statements made by leading figures such as UK Prime Minister Tony Blair or his Ambassador to the UN, Jeremy Greenstock, it seems fairly obvious that going to the UN was a tool to bring other states on board, rather than the final arbiter on the possibility of using force against Saddam's regime.[159] Going to the UN was a strategy to buy more time for bilateral bargaining with the United States. On the German side, Chancellor Gerhard Schroëder had made strong statements against the use of force in Iraq

---

[158] Judith Kelley, "Strategic Non-Cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq Was not Just about Iraq," *International Politics* 42, 2 (2005), 153-173.

[159] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview with Jeremy Greenstock" (London, June 2008).

long before the UN process was underway, hinting at other important factors in the balance. Past behaviour can also cast doubt on the constraining effects of norms, such as US-led NATO operations in Kosovo, where these same allied states assisted the United States without appealing to the UN process in the forceful manner that they did in 2002. The UN mainly seems to provide leverage for secondary states when their policy positions differ from those of the United States. This competing hypothesis is discussed in the Canadian case, as the Chrétien government refused to commit troops to the war in Iraq, making constant references to the UN.

Domestic Politics: Government Opposition and Public Opinion

The argument on domestic politics states that certain foreign policy decisions are based on the political calculations of the decision-makers. Certain domestic factors are likely to impede government efforts to build a foreign policy consensus, such as the presence of a minority government, a strong and influential opposition, upcoming elections, or low approval ratings. A basic hypothesis can be stated as follows:

> **Strong dissent, as expressed by the opposition and public opinion, will undermine a state's ability to support military cooperation**

Several of these factors were present in Germany in 2002. Indeed, that the German opposition to the Iraq War was primarily driven by domestic factors is a convincing argument. Chancellor Schröder was preparing the ground for his electoral campaign, capitalizing on a German public opinion that was already vocal about its opposition to a potential war in Iraq. Similarly, Canada's role at the UN, which attracted a lot of criticism from the United States, is often presented as being primarily driven by domestic

concerns.[160] Not only was Canadian public opinion generally opposed to a war in Iraq, but opposition was especially strong in Quebec where a provincial election was looming. Although Prime Minister Chrétien has always firmly denied basing his foreign policy on domestic concerns, these factors may have placed additional pressure on the government to withhold its support on the use of force in Iraq.[161]

Although the domestic explanation is convincing for the German case given Schröder's precarious position, the same cannot be said for Canada. Chrétien's position was nowhere near precarious, despite internal divisions within his government. In the Canadian case, it was not domestic politics, but the level of government cohesion that had a bearing on foreign policy-making. Moreover, decisions related to military cooperation, like in the UK and Australia, are largely the prerogative of the executive and thus, not often submitted to a vote in Parliament unless it is at the Prime Minister's own initiative as in the British case. The domestic politics explanation does not appear to hold much water in the three cases under study, especially since the British and Australian governments supported the US notwithstanding growing manifestations of dissent at home.

In sum, several factors undermine the domestic politics hypothesis. One is the claim that decision-makers are more likely to shape public opinion than the other way around, as demonstrated by the literature on foreign policy and public opinion.[162] Another factor is that the three countries studied are parliamentary democracies, where there is strong

---

[160] Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2007).

[161] Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2007).

[162] Entman, *Foreign Policy and Public Opinion.*

tradition of executive leadership on foreign policy issues. Also, in the case of Afghanistan specifically, commitments were made early on, leaving little time for the public or the opposition to express dissent. Furthermore, the post-9/11 climate generated displays of solidarity for the United States, rather than criticism against joining the military effort in Afghanistan.

Regional Insecurity

The literature on the topic is built on the proposition that an alliance is asymmetric to the extent that there is no disagreement about which member-state is dominant.[163] The condition of asymmetry may then interact with both internal and/or external factors that can exacerbate the initial condition of asymmetry between alliance partners. For example, Womack argues that asymmetry, combined with geographical proximity, exacerbates the asymmetric dynamic because of the relationship's salience for each state.[164] The case of Canada comes to mind. Canada has been extremely sensitive to intrusive security measures imposed by the United States at their common border since 9/11. Since 80% of Canadian exports are bound for the American market, Canada is generally more vulnerable to changes in border security management, bearing a disproportionate share of the cost when security measures take precedence over trade.[165]

---

[163] Brantly Womack, "How Size Matters: The United States, China and Asymmetry", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24, 4 (2001), 123-150.

[164] Brantly Womack, "Asymmetry Theory and China's Concept of Multipolarity", *Journal of Contemporary China* 13, 39 (2004), 351-366; William Walters, "The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective", *Geopolitics* 9, 3 (2004), 674-698.

[165] Stefanie von Hlatky and Jessica Trisko, "La frontière américaine du Québec: la sécurité avant tout?", in Guy Lachapelle (ed.), *Le destin américain du Québec* (Montreal : Septentrion, forthcoming).

On the other hand, geographic isolation may exacerbate the fears of abandonment felt by the weaker party. Turning to the Australian case, the ANZUS treaty, shared by Australia and the United States, is often interpreted as a mutual defence treaty, while its formal provisions only stipulate an obligation to "consult" if a common threat arises in the Pacific region.[166] Alternatively, geographic isolation may exacerbate the fears of abandonment felt by the weaker party. The implications of geography can be tested if formulated in a way that allows for variance. Geography can be best understood as a state's regional environment, where security concerns vary according to threats posed in the immediate vicinity. To measure the effect of regional security concerns on the special allies' willingness to support the United States through military cooperation, I propose the following hypothesis:

> **As regional security concerns rise, special allies will be more inclined to lend support and resources to a US-led coalition.**

Regional security concerns can be more or less salient when we consider the following factors: (1) the involvement or presence of the United States in the immediate region of the ally where a strong presence would alleviate these concerns and disengagement exacerbate them; (2) the level of threat understood as the number of criminal and/or hostile incidents close to the state's borders; and (3) fluctuations in military expenditure which can impact the degree of reliance on American security guarantees.

---

[166] William T. Tow and Henry Albinski, "ANZUS – Alive and Well After Fifty Years", *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 48, 2 (2002), 153-173.

Looking at regional security makes for an interesting comparison because the three states under study have very different security concerns in their vicinity. According to Kelton, regional security concerns contribute to an explanation of Australia's unambiguous support for American foreign policy.[167] I would add a note of caution to how one analyzes the impact of regional security concerns on alliance dynamics. There should be an attempt to distinguish between a state's long term goals, its strategic posture, and short term requirements, such as the secondary state's capabilities and ongoing military operations elsewhere in the world. In the Australian case, it is worth noting that its traditional reliance on the UK as a guarantor of its security shifted in favour of the United States after World War II. Providing for its regional security autonomously has also been part of the national discourse on defence because of the great geographical distance between Australia and its closest allies.[168]

Canada's relatively quiet neighbourhood on all sides of the border has made these security concerns manageable and may influence decisions related to military cooperation with the United States outside the realm of continental defence. The Cold War made Canada's perimeter less secure because of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Canadians were concerned about Russian missiles coming from the North.[169] Similarly, the UK also relied on the United States to face the threat posed by the USSR. After the end of World

---

[167] Maryanne Kelton, "Integrated Threat Perception and the Intensification of the US Alliance", in Maryanne Kelton (ed.), *'More than an Ally': Contemporary Australia-US Relations* (Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008).

[168] Hugh White, *Beyond the Defence of Australia: Finding a New Balance in Australian Strategic Policy* (Double Bay, Australia: Lowy Institute Paper Longueville Media, 2006).

[169] Stefanie von Hlatky, "Is It Time to Revisit Traditional Security Approaches in the Arctic?" *Norteamerica* 2, 2 (2008), 211-223.

War II, these concerns were promptly voiced by Winston Churchill who advocated a strong American role to deter the Soviet Union and to prevent another devastating war in Europe.[170] For both Canada and the UK, their respective security concerns were answered by strong security guarantees on the part of the US, which were institutionalized through NORAD. Such guarantees mitigated the fears of abandonment felt by the Unites States' allies, as these states sought and prioritized American security guarantees over autonomy concerns.

Dependence on the United States

Despite the potential for both abandonment and entrapment, alliances also provide important benefits. For secondary states, the major benefit of military cooperation with the United States is an increased ability to "punch above [their] international weight."[171] In other words, the alliance acts as a power multiplier, enhancing security through better deterrent capabilities and providing access to intelligence and military technology. Drawbacks include minimal input when the asymmetry is pronounced, no guarantees on American protection, and finally, intelligence sharing which can be intrusive and a way for the dominant power to control its weaker allies.[172] In sum, the more closely a state engages in military cooperation with the United States, the more constrained it becomes. There are opportunities to influence the United States by extracting certain concessions from

[170] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[171] John Dumbrell, "Working with Allies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and the War on Terror", *Politics and Policy* 34, 2 (2006), 452-472.

[172] William T. Tow, "Deputy Sheriff or Independent Ally? Evolving Australian-American Ties in an Ambiguous World", *The Pacific Review* 17, 2 (2004), 271-290.

participation, but generally speaking, the relationship is highly asymmetric and dependent. Influence yielded by allies over the United States, if any, is context specific.[173]

Dependence of secondary states on the United States is difficult to assess in a period where international tensions are low for Western states. The likelihood of major interstate war appears unlikely, but certain indicators can provide useful information about asymmetry understood as security dependence between alliance partners. The degree of dependence on the United States can be measured as a function of systemic conditions where secondary states will rally in favour of the dominant power when the security environment is uncertain or threatening. As stated in chapter 2, a change in the security environment can increase or decrease an ally's dependence on its dominant partner.[174] Indicators for the nature of the security environment include the density of institutional security arrangements, the scope of American security guarantees through the existence of bilateral and multilateral treaties, as well as reliance on American military technology. This leads to a hypothesis on dependence leading to an increase in the probability of support, when military cooperation is solicited:

> **When special allies rely heavily on the security provisions of the United States due to an uncertain or threatening security environment, they will be more likely to engage in military cooperation in times of war.**

All three countries, the UK, Canada and Australia, rely strongly on the security provisions of the United States. It is important to look at the evolution of this variable since the end of

---

[173] Bennett, Lepgold and Unger, "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War".

[174] Skidmore, "Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy".

the Cold War, and try to identify the causes of these changes and their implications for the overall alliance relationship. The events of 9/11 represent a significant shift in the security environment and precipitated major changes in the United States' strategic posture. As such, allies had to react to these changes and respond to updated alliance expectations and requirements.

This section has addressed the merits of alternative explanations to explain asymmetric military cooperation. Two explanations appear particularly convincing from the preceding discussion: hypotheses on regional security and the level of dependence, which feature in the case study chapters. Turning to the individual level of analysis, the cases being studied display strong leadership on the part of key decision-makers when contemplating the drastic foreign policy options offered to them.[175] Byman and Pollack argue that certain conditions cause an individual leader to have more influence on the course of events. These conditions are the concentration of power in the leader's hands, conflicting institutions, and changes in the international system.[176] If two of these three conditions are present, there should be an attempt to identify idiosyncrasies or exceptional domestic processes, which could account for residual variance. In the cases studied, conflicting institutions and systemic change are both present. This is a point I will take up in the case study chapters with the method of structured, focused comparison. While I will

---

[175] Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making: Foreign Policy Actors Viewed Psychologically", in Ole R. Holsti, *Making American Foreign Policy* (NY; London: Routledge, 2006): 33-51; Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", *The American Political Science Review* 63, 3 (1969), 689-718.

[176] Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In", *International Security* 25, 4 (2001), 107-146.

not engage in a description on the decision-making style of individual state leaders, I will identify how disruptions in the policy-making process can lead to an enhanced exercise of leadership, especially given the parliamentary democratic systems of the UK, Canada and Australia.

Evidence

The next three chapters are in-depth comparative case studies. To test my main argument, I focus on key decisions involving the United States and its allies. To narrow the range of options, I have selected foreign policy decisions with a high degree of salience, namely, the urgency of the issue at hand, the degree of public awareness and the high stakes involved in the decision, broadly understood as blood and treasure.[177]

The selection of cases was further motivated by the following two criteria: First, I have chosen US-led coalitional initiatives, where opting out was a credible outcome.[178] These are rare occurrences, generally speaking, but they represent high constraint situations for close allies since there are expectations of participation on the part of the United States when building a coalition of willing states. The fact that special allies have a high degree of interoperability with the United States makes their contribution particularly attractive, since it implies lower transaction costs than with other allied states. Although specific promises

---

[177] Low priority issues, such as routine surveillance activities, are typically handled by standard operating procedures, already agreed-upon through common institutions. In terms of my research, this level of cooperation, which is highly technical (and consensual) in nature, is of lesser relevance because it is not unique to asymmetric alliances.

[178] Even if the decision to go to war is legitimized by multilateral approval, both the initiative and the leadership of the coalition must be American-driven to be considered. The potential for entanglement must be present.

and obligations ratified within the framework of an alliance treaty are reliable indicators for what is expected on the part of alliance partners, special allies achieve their privileged status through close integration with the United States and the pursuit of interoperability.[179]

The second criterion is the prospect of troop mobilization for war. This possibility results in substantial costs for the ally both in terms of investment and sovereignty. When the deployment of troops is involved, we can expect that an implicit recognition has been made on the part of allied decision-makers, namely that *their* troops might fall under US command. The size of the commitment made is the result of a trade-off between alliance expectations and domestic constraints. Even when these factors are considered, the wars which occurred after the Second World War are all limited wars for the United States, meaning that they did not threaten its survival. This will have implications at the domestic level, where these asymmetric wars are not perceived as vital and so, are subject to the guns-vs.-butter trade-off debate.[180]

I have identified the universe of cases for the United States' special allies, the UK, Canada, and Australia (Table 3.7). These cases, involving participation (substantial or token) and non-participation in US-led military interventions, offer considerable variation on the dependent variable given the broad range of military commitments offered by allies. Despite the limited number of cases, variation on the dependent variable can improve

---

[179] Leeds and al., "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944".

[180] Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict", 181.

small-N research designs by increasing the number of observations.[181] In three of the cases, allies decided to opt out, not sending troops to these coalition war initiatives. In the other cases, there seems to be considerable support on the part of American allies, including troop contribution. Still, the variation in terms of the level of participation is key.

Table 3.7 Universe of Cases

	Participation	**Non-participation**
Korea (1950)	Australia; Canada; Britain	---
Vietnam (1965)	Australia	Canada; Britain
Gulf War (1991)	Australia; Canada; Britain	---
Kosovo (1999)	Canada; Britain	Australia
Afghanistan (2001)	Australia; Canada; Britain	---
Iraq (2003)	Australia; Britain	Canada

I will provide in-depth case studies of the most recent cases: British, Australian, and Canadian decisions leading up to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Future research is needed to broaden the analysis to the universe of cases, or alternatively, to study other allies as additional case studies. In order to multiply the number of observations, I will disaggregate decision-making according to different phases of military cooperation. By looking at different phases of military deployment, there are more observations to test the hypotheses. To analyze the selected case, I use the method of structured, focused comparison, which can be summarized as follows:

> The method is "structured" in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that these questions are asked of each case under

[181] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

> study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is "focused" in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined.[182]

Thus, to compare is to control "whether generalizations hold across the cases to which they apply" and the comparative method is well suited for small-N analysis, where the researcher is confronted with many variables but few cases.[183] This comparative method has the advantage of allowing maximum flexibility in considering ideas and data because it allows investigators to "combine causal analysis, interpretive analysis, and concept formation in the course of their studies."[184] In sum, this approach demonstrates that the theory-building enterprise is an iterative process.

Looking at the vast literature on alliance theory, it is apparent that the number of potential explanations to address intra-alliance decision-making is infinite. This research design, based on a careful case selection, is meant to address this challenge by controlling for an important number of conditions. These conditions are not assumed to be absent, but they are assumed constant, meaning that they do not vary. This most-similar research design shows that the UK, Canada, and Australia are similar in most respects but for the

---

[182] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004): 67.

[183] Giovanni Sartori, "Comparing and Miscomparing," in David Collier and John Gerring (eds), *Concept and Method in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori* (New York & London: Routledge, 2009), 152. See also, Arendt Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65 (1971), 682-693.

[184] Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 51.

explanatory variables, with variance on the dependent variable.[185] The dependent variable, the level of participation in military cooperation with the United States, is understood as a continuum: non-participation, political support with no troops, minimal military contribution, and full military cooperation. In my view, this comparative case study approach strikes the right balance between generality and context-specific understanding, considering the research question driving the inquiry.

In carrying out the case studies, I analyze primary sources of data concerning security policy between the United States and its special allies, namely, diplomatic statements, the original text of alliance treaties and defense policy statements, as well as secondary sources, in order to contextualize each decision. I also rely on interviews to clarify the link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints. The interviews reveal important negotiation strategies of asymmetric alliance interactions. Some of the key questions under investigation are: Do decision-makers mention the United States when justifying a certain course of action? Are concerns over alliance requirements and domestic audiences justified in terms of a trade-off? If so, how does this trade-off play out in practice? How do they define their own perceptions of threat?

Although I recognize that the selected cases each have unique characteristics, I proceed with a common set of questions for the comparison which can yield valuable causal inferences about asymmetric alliances and the conditions under which the weaker partner can increase its leverage domestically and internationally:

---

[185] Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds), *Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-137.

- **What was the perceived balance of interests between the allies?**
- **What motives did the weaker partner have in opting for the chosen course of action?[186]**
- **What were the anticipated costs/gains from the chosen course of action (reinforcing the alliance vs. provoking reprisals)?**
- **What are the specific strategies pursued by the ally?**
- **What specific conditions favoured compliance or non-compliance with American requests?**
- **How do the alternative explanations measure up in each case?**

In the parliamentary political systems of Great Britain, Australia, and Canada, the executive plays a strong role in foreign and defence policy decision-making, while the legislative branch plays a minor role.[187] Senior civil servants from the Foreign Service and Defence are equally important actors in decision-making when the use of force is contemplated. The comparison is structured in a way that leaves this variable constant. Ultimately, British, Australian or Canadian prime ministers can go their own way with or without the full support of government, providing they are heading a majority government. This is in sharp contrast to the American system where, according to the 1973 *War Powers Act*, the President must get the support of Congress for any military action.[188] The case studies

---

[186] For more on conditions of intervention, see Bruce W. Jentleson, Ariel Levite, and Larry Berman, *Foreign Military Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) and Andrea Kathryn Talentino, *Military Intervention after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2006).

[187] Donald J. Savoie, *Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and the Parliament* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003).

[188] Also known as the *War Powers Resolution*. President Bush obtained the support of Congress on October 11, 2002.

investigate the interactions within government and between governments (US vs. ally) to show how international threats are processed by state actors into specific foreign and defence policies, and to illustrate the policy trade-offs between alliance and domestic expectations.

Overview of Case Studies

The three case study countries, the UK, Canada, and Australia, provide a unique comparative context for making sense of American foreign policy following 9/11. These states, often referred to as special allies, share close military, political, economic, cultural and historical ties with the United States. Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the dominant and most important partner for all three states. American security guarantees are of particular interest, as they have been formalized through alliance treaties and practice. Although the bilateral relationships between the United States and its closest allies are asymmetric, there are mutual expectations of support on key issues. How these allies respond to US military action is the main focus in the following case study chapters.

Several scholars have commented on the unilateral turn in American diplomacy under the Bush administration.[189] The first term of this administration was characterized by a display of unlimited goodwill by the international community, following 9/11, and, then, a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment during the lead-up to the Iraq War. This period is important in making sense of the complex relationship that was negotiated between the

---

[189] Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*; Art, *A Grand Strategy for America*; Walt, "Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Forein Policy". For an assessment of the NSS' performance, see Jeremy Pressman, "Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East", *International Security* 33, 4 (2009), 149-179.

United States and its allies for two very different wars. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq should not be conflated. Although both can be conceived of as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), allied support for the invasion of Afghanistan was justified as a treaty obligation under NATO. The war in Iraq can be seen as an application of the Bush Doctrine. The elaboration of the Bush Doctrine as a national security strategy is a different response to the new security environment that emerged after 9/11. Some scholars have argued that the Bush Doctrine represents a shift in American foreign policy, insofar as "...it adheres to a vindicationist framework for democracy promotion, in which the aggressive use of U.S. power is employed as the primary instrument of liberal change"[190].

The overarching threat for the United States since 9/11 is undoubtedly the threat of international terrorism. In comparing allied perception of threat, it is not clear if each individual state shares the American interpretation of the GWOT, or the national and international responses devised to implement it. In general though, the threat of international terrorism has been identified as an important strategic concern by NATO allies since the 1990s, following terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kenya and Yemen.[191] For instance, de Nevers argues that the American approach to counterterrorism is offensive, while NATO's is defensive, pointing to its role as a supporting organization to the United States.[192]

---

[190] Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy", *International Security* 29, 4 (2005), 141.

[191] de Nevers, "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era", 37. The threat of international terrorism is also mentionned in every NATO Strategic Concept since 1999.

[192] *Ibid*., 38.

Another important consideration relates to burden-sharing, as mentioned in the theoretical discussion on alliances. Sometimes, accounts of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have belittled allied contributions. It is argued that the initial military campaign in Afghanistan was mainly a U.S. effort with a handful of Special Forces from other allies.[193] In fact, the American presence in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 was limited to Special Forces with airpower support. The bulk of conventional forces were actually provided by the Afghan army.[194] Therefore, allied contributions should be understood in this specific context, with a balanced view of the campaign's operational needs and the demands placed on alliance partners. On a separate but related note, the Afghan model became possible as a result of dramatic improvements in military technology since the Gulf War, where precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were introduced successfully on the battlefield in a conventional confrontation. The combination of high-tech airpower and Special Forces could have been carried out by the US alone. To the extent that allies did participate, the only allies that were interoperable enough to fit this model were the UK, Canada and Australia. Andreas describes the early successes of Operation Enduring Freedom, by emphasizing this synergy: "Coalition airpower transformed the Northern Alliance into a

---

[193] Accounts of military operations in Afghanistan, during the early phases of *Enduring Freedom* highlight that this was primarily a US operation. Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Meyers, "U.S. Plans to Act Largely Alone", *New York Times* (New York), October 7, 2001, A1.

[194] Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model", *International Security* 30, 3 (2005/06), 126. For a discussion on the preconditions for a successful application of the Afghan model and a response to Andres, Wills, and Griffith, see Stephen Biddle, "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq", *International Security* 30, 3 (2005/06), 161-176.

lethal fighting force […] In short, new technology available to SOF [Special Operating Forces] and airpower transformed the nature of conventional war in Afghanistan"[195].

Conclusion

As one would expect, an asymmetric military alliance involves much higher stakes for the weaker partner. Perhaps this is not reflected in burden-sharing, but certainly in terms of what the alliance entails. The weaker partner must acknowledge the possibility that security cooperation might be under US control. Transferring authority in such matters requires strong justifications. The worst fear is automatic involvement in any US conflict, the fear of entrapment referred to earlier. Therefore, secondary states must manage expectations held by the dominant ally about their level of commitment. The following three chapters are detailed case studies of the UK, Canada and Australia's foreign policy following 9/11. The theoretical argument focuses on decision-making processes leading up to the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The argument presented in this chapter offers several contributions to alliance theory. First, it presents decision-making leading to military cooperation from the perspective of secondary allied states, rather than that of the dominant alliance partner. Alliance theory affirms that secondary states can engage in balancing and bandwagoning behaviour but is indeterminate with regards to foreign policy decision-making. Second, the literature on burden-sharing, to the extent that it discusses participation by secondary states, oversimplifies the benefits of military cooperation between asymmetric allies. My

---

[195] Andreas, Wills and Griffith, "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model", 140.

argument emphasizes the need to take into account the United States' operational needs and willingness to delegate to its allies and the comparative advantages inherent in a state's contribution. In other words, contributions must be assessed qualitatively, not just quantitatively. Third, the case studies will contribute to the development of the typology on asymmetric strategies. By identifying the range of alliance-level and domestic-level strategies for both instances of participation and non-participation, the typology clarifies the foreign policy options of asymmetric security cooperation.

-3-

Exceeding Expectations: the UK's Role in the War against Terror

From the time Churchill made reference to it in 1946, the Anglo-American Special Relationship (AASR) has been an enduring concept for Britain. Even with the growing influence of the European Union, the UK has continuously reinforced the transatlantic link and its commitment to the United States. Is there a natural convergence of interests between the two states? One observer notes that "it is remarkable how routinely British and American leaders have found that their nations' self-interests were parallel, if not identical."[196] During the Cold War, episodes such as the Suez crisis or the Vietnam War posed serious challenges to this view, but the real test to the relationship came in 1991, as the main common threat disappeared, along with the Soviet Empire. Still, the special relationship was reaffirmed, despite a more European orientation of British foreign policy, and reinforced with the arrival of Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1997. Throughout the 1990s, the UK retained a relatively independent foreign policy, though never completely autonomous from the United States. The UK has carefully managed periods of disagreements with the United States, never compromising their long-standing alliance. Yet, the relationship is still asymmetric and characterized by a strong degree of reliance on American security guarantees.

---

[196] Warren F. Kimball, "The 'Special' Anglo-American Special Relationship: A Fatter, Larger Underwater Cable", *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, 1 (2005), 1-5.

Between 2001 and 2003, the threat posed by terrorism and Saddam Hussein's regime dominated the foreign policy agenda. The perception of threat was closely aligned between the UK and the US, which translated into early signals of support by the British. In the case of Iraq, Britain answered American expectations but also had a vested interest in increasing the pressure on Saddam Hussein's regime. US expectations, as perceived by British decision-makers, structured London's response to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Concerns over being the first among allies drove the UK to make a substantial commitment, having impressive military capabilities, but to leverage its contribution to the benefit of its bilateral alliance with the United States. Pledging British support early on can be understood as a strategy to maximize the visibility and impact of the military commitment made.

In the early phase of the War on Terror, in 2001-2002, there was strong deference to the United States for the conduct of the military response due to the level of government cohesion. The UK took part in the early combat operations in Afghanistan and was in charge of the initial postwar reconstruction of the country, coordinating allied efforts. Available military capabilities translated into British involvement in every facet of the conflict: the bombing campaign, special operations, as well as stabilization and nation-building. As internal divisions within government came to the fore in the fall of 2002 and early 2003, the Blair government increasingly imposed conditions on its participation to the US-led coalition. For the Iraq war, the Blair government pushed ahead with a very public demonstration of support in favour of the American position, while managing an increasingly fragmented government. Domestic politics played a greater role here than

acknowledged by my theory. This is due to Blair's public relations campaign on Iraq: the use of public dossiers, the initiation of Parliamentary debates, and submitting the decision up for a vote are anomalous when looking at past decisions to commit British troops. The case study analysis reveals another anomaly: the circumvented nature of the policymaking process leading up to Iraq, which made possible the adoption of this controversial policy stance, as the government's high level of cohesion began to erode, a point which will be addressed in a separate section.

This chapter is divided into six parts: the first section discusses the Anglo-American security relationship to discuss the systemic variables relevant for the posited causal mechanism; the second section discusses the variables on US alliance expectations and domestic constraints in the context between 2001 and 2003; the third deals with the decision-making processes leading up to the British commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq; the fourth considers the aforementioned anomalies in the decision making process; the fifth explores alternative explanations, while the concluding section addresses British strategies of asymmetric security cooperation.

The Anglo-American Security Relationship

It is important to consider the broader context of the Anglo-American alliance in order to understand how systemic conditions influence the two countries' security priorities. How allies perceive and respond to threats is informed by their relative standing in the international system. Underlying power distribution and changes in the security environment can lead to changes in alliance commitments. As mentioned in chapter 3,

watershed events, such as 9/11 are opportunities for secondary allies to update information about their commitments vis-à-vis their dominant ally. From a comparative standpoint, this examination also provides an assessment of foreign policy trends leading up to the period under study. The UK stands apart as an ally that has repeatedly adjusted its foreign policy to meet the requirements of its alliance with the United States.

Although the UK is a great power in its own right, the US-UK special relationship evolved through a consistent belief expressed in British foreign policy, that the American alliance was of utmost importance for its national security. This point was constantly reiterated in British Defence white papers since the end of World War II and is evidence to why such a close alliance has been desirable from the British point of view. At the basic level, the security-autonomy trade-off applies, as the UK has made some concessions to the United States through the use of air bases on British soil or on protectorates throughout the Cold War. For the UK, its alliance with the United States represents a power multiplier through which "British policy makers have traditionally sought to enhance British international prestige and influence."[197] Stated differently, the Anglo-American relationship has served to prop up Britain's declining power after the end of the Second World War.

The UK, being dependent on the United States to uphold its great power status, has invested heavily in the Anglo-American alliance. It has responded to several American demands since the end of the Cold War. For instance, Britain has maintained its military capabilities when other European states were cutting theirs and it has played a strong role in

---

[197] Dumbrell, "Working with Allies", 457.

NATO, when the relevance of the alliance was being put into question in the 1990s. The UK values the idea of being a reliable partner to the United States because it is a way to manage omnipresent fears of abandonment, or of lessening American interest. As Walt notes, with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the threat that led to the creation of NATO, close US allies may question the credibility of US commitments abroad.[198]

Maintaining great power status is thus an important consideration when looking at the benefits of the alliance for the United Kingdom. This is also a constant feature of British foreign policy, despite the occasional and rare rift in the relationship like the Suez crisis. A recent account of British foreign policy argues that the UK is a pivotal power, comparable with powers such as Australia. "Pivotal powers," according to Tim Dunne, "are regional great powers with the capacity to project their military forces in their near abroad."[199] This definition offers a more narrow reading of British influence than the traditional term "great power." In addition, an increasing reliance on the United States since World War II, and more definitely, after the Suez Crisis, has anchored the importance of the special relationship for British international security policy. How does this general inclination translate into specific foreign policy decisions? Are the English and Americans perfectly in tune when it comes to evaluating their interests and corresponding threats?

---

[198] Stephen Walt, "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apar", *The National Interest* 54 (1998/99), 3-11.

[199] Tim Dunne, "Britain and the Gathering Storm over Iraq", in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 342.

Watershed events, such as 9/11, represent critical junctures where alliance expectations are updated.

The events of 9/11 were of momentous importance to the world community with major consequences for the future of American foreign policy. That certain states saw these events as a window of opportunity to reassess their strategic relationship with the United States has been confirmed by history. The UK's posture, acting as the transatlantic link is unique in this regard, bridging European and American views through diplomatic interactions.[200] Britain has taken some credit for its leadership in getting NATO to invoke Article V on October 4, 2001, with the caveat that NATO did not appear as a strong player for the United States in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.[201] Britain, for its part, wanted to be seen as a strong player by the United States. Blair undertook a European diplomatic tour to enlist the unconditional solidarity of other European leaders, with moderate success. With time, there is no doubt that deep divisions emerged in Europe, especially on the matter of Iraq. Blair's diplomatic efforts with France and Germany never produced a durable alliance at the UN after the adoption of UNSCR 1441. The significance of British foreign policy between 2001 and 2003 is dominated by its bilateral interactions with the US.

---

[200] Tony Blair, "Speech by the Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor's banquet", (November 10, 1997), Online. http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1070.

[201] United Kingdom, Foreign Affairs Committee, *British-US Relations*, House of Commons, HC327, 2nd Report of Session 2001-02, December 11, 2001, 24, par.132. On the matter of NATO's military role after 9/11, five NATO AWACS were dispatched to patrol American airspace, as their own were used in Afghanistan.

The predominance of American influence over British foreign policy-making evolved from a "strategic belief in working with the United States as a necessity to the U.K."[202] The cost of not supporting the US appeared higher than risking political backlash at home. British decision-makers "were strategically and politically not prepared to go against the United States".[203] This belief was clearly heightened with 9/11 as Britain reverted to its Cold War stance of committed Atlanticism.[204] Quoting the Second Report of the British Foreign Affairs Committee in 2001, after 9/11, the importance of the United States for the UK is unequivocal: "…There is no more important relationship for the United Kingdom…The United States is the United Kingdom's foremost political and military ally, its single greatest trading partner, its largest source of investment, its largest recipient of investment, and the world's remaining superpower."[205] The tone of this report expresses the longstanding and far-reaching nature of the US-UK relationship, as well as the UK's unmatched response to 9/11, as a testimony of the special relationship.

The report is also blunt in acknowledging the benefits of being the first to act in favour of the United States: influence. While influence is intangible and certainly difficult to measure, it is cited as a goal of British foreign policy and as the prime motive for identifying closely with the US on high security matters. The report states: "Influence on important decisions, then, is suggested as the main consequence for the United Kingdom of

---

[202] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview with Sir Stephen Wright" (London, June 2008).

[203] *Ibid*.

[204] Tim Dunne, "'When the Shooting Starts': Atlanticism in British Security Strategy", *International Affairs* 80, 5 (2004), 895. Atlanticism is defined by Dunne as the propensity to favour the bilateral relationship with the United States above all other.

[205] United Kingdom, Foreign Affairs Committee, *British-US Relations,* 3, par.4.

its decision to identify its interests with those of its ally."[206] To achieve this, building a consensus on international security policy is deemed to be the strategy for tackling the threat of terrorism, and for keeping the United States engaged multilaterally. The most senior civil servant at the British Ministry of Defence (MOD), Kevin Tebbit, asserts that the UK needs the US to remain a global power, but that influence operates mostly indirectly and through informal bilateral channels.[207]

This perception is prevalent in the academic literature as well. The inherent trade-off between the costs and benefits of the special relationship is also acknowledged by academic experts in British foreign policy. Dunne summarizes the underlying bargain of the Anglo-American security relationship: "... Britain pledges its loyalty to the United States in return for influence over the direction of the hegemonic power's foreign policy."[208] How can one gain insight on the extent of British influence over US foreign policy? It is arguably imperceptible where security policy between the US and UK is perfectly aligned. Areas of divergence can potentially shed light on the UK's special relationship. An important area of disagreement between the two countries relates to the war plans drawn up by the Pentagon, for both Afghanistan and Iraq. It has been reported that the UK insisted on there being a post-war phase, but that British officials were met with resistance.[209] Brian Burridge, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Strike Command in 2002-2003 and Commander-in-Chief of the RAF Strike

---

[206] *Ibid.,* p.6, par. 22.

[207] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview with Kevin Tebbit" (London, June 2008).

[208] Dunne, "'When the Shooting Starts': Atlanticism in British Security Strategy", 898.

[209] Campbell, *The Blair Years.*

Command from 2003 to 2006, states that the UK did at least exert some leverage over the US on the ground, vetoing certain targeting decisions, for example.[210] Overall, the UK appeared to influence the timing of the decision rather than having any substantive impact on US policy.[211] At first glance, it seems that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq placed incredible demands on the UK. Going beyond systemic factors can help to uncover what drove the UK to make such high-stake military commitments. How did British decision-makers perceive US expectations and how did this mould Britain's engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Balancing Alliance Expectations and Domestic Constraints

This section will first analyze in detail how the main variables are operationalized in this case study analysis. Since this is a comparative exercise, a set of common questions will lead to an evaluation of each variable in the proposed causal mechanism when critical decisions on military cooperation are made. To gain insight into intra-alliance dynamics between asymmetric partners, actions undertaken by American allies should be judged according to American expectations in the period between 9/11 and the Iraq War. Alliance partners also face important constraints at the domestic level. States can only actualize alliance commitments to the extent that they have the military capabilities to do so and that the government has support to implement such a policy, as measured by the level of government cohesion.

---

[210] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview with Brian Burridge" (London, June 2008).

[211] Dunne, "'When the Shooting Starts': Atlanticism in British Security Strategy", 907.

Alliance expectations are defined first, by prevailing treaties between allied states. In the British case, both the UK-USA security agreement on intelligence sharing and the North Atlantic Treaty, the founding treaty of NATO, reveal information about the expectations of mutual support.[212] Second, expectations are defined by past experiences. British commitments to past American-led coalitions offer some cues on the likelihood of UK support for a particular initiative. The UK's role in Iraq, from the Gulf War in 1991 to Desert Fox in 1998, demonstrates its engagement with the US against Saddam's regime. Finally, alliance expectations are defined by operational requirements. As states embark on military cooperation, the dominant partner will create a division of labour according to its operational needs.

In structuring the comparison between the UK, Canada, and Australia, we have to adjust for disparities in their capabilities which affect US expectations in a general way. Accordingly, the expectations placed on the UK may be greater than for other allies. Britain is, by a considerable extent, the most militarily capable ally when compared with Canada and Australia. Though Britain's military expenditures have remained constant as a percentage of GDP, strong and consistent economic growth resulted in considerable increases in defence spending (Table 4.1):

[212] UKUSA's core members are the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the United States.

Table 4.1 Comparative Military Expenditure of the UK [2000; 2008]

	2000	**2008**
Local Currency m.pounds	23,301	35,320
US $m.	47,778	57,392
As Percentage of GDP	2.4	2.4

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (Consulted March 3, 2009).

There are also qualitative indicators of military power which are important for the Anglo-American alliance. Previous campaigns have revealed the extent to which military interoperability is an important consideration for the United States when contemplating military cooperation with allies. For example, the Kosovo campaign in 1999 showed some European states incapable of working alongside the Americans, because of the technological incompatibility of their militaries.[213]

The UK, beyond having a high level of military interoperability with the United States, has other great power assets of value to the Americans. Britain has been a strong supporter of the United States in the Security Council, possesses nuclear weapons, and has interests that span beyond its immediate region, due to its colonial past. Élie, for example, has argued that the US-UK special relationship has contributed to American soft power in Europe.[214] The value of Britain as an ally is thus high. American officials made this point clearly, as they tried to recruit the support of other states for their War on Terror, according

---

[213] Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

[214] Jérôme B. Élie, "Many Times Doomed but Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special Relationship," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, 1 (2005), 72.

to the British ambassador to Washington at the time Christopher Meyer.[215] The UK also took the leading role in the implementation of the International Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF) in December 2001. The UK directly addressed and fulfilled US expectations and demands, by taking on a role US troops did not want in Afghanistan, heading nation-building efforts, and, then, by providing key political support and troops for the War in Iraq.

The next section explores the interaction between the American and British governments, emphasizing perceived expectations on both sides to assess how military cooperation was negotiated between the two alliance partners for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The analysis of domestic-level constraints is also introduced: first, I show that the level of government cohesion declines if we compare the period from 2001-2002 with the period of 2002-2003. This led London to impose greater conditions on its involvement rather than defer to the US. Second, available military capabilities led to military cooperation with the US which was broad in scope in both cases.

The War on Terror: British Foreign Policy Responses

The UK was a high profile partner in the American War on Terror. Between 2001 and 2003, British officials were party to frequent bilateral interactions with their American counterparts and were able to communicate British interests accordingly. As explicitly stated in government documents, being the first among allies is an end in itself, as the

---

[215] Quoted in Dumbrell, "Working with Allies", 459. See also Christopher Meyer, *DC Confidential: The Controversial Memoirs of Britain's Ambassador to the U.S. at the Time of 9/11 and the Iraq War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005).

benefits are often hard to identify in the short term. Indeed, many British demands placed on their American ally were met with some resistance. For example, the Bush administration was not keen on delaying the war in Iraq in favour of a second resolution at the UN, which was first and foremost, a British initiative. In this section, I detail the most important allied interactions between the United States and the UK, between 2001 and 2003 (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Decisions on Initial Military Deployments of British Forces: 2001-2003

Date	Decisions
October 7, 2001-ongoing[216]	Operation Enduring Freedom Initial commitment: 6000 British troops
December 20, 2001- ongoing	Creation of ISAF (under British command) 1800 British troops
March 2003-April 2009	Operation Iraqi Freedom: Iraq War begins 45 000 British troops

My intent is to look at the impact of alliance interactions on specific military commitments. Another related goal is to uncover British strategies used to leverage their military commitment in the context of their bilateral alliance with the US. Strategies will be discussed in the concluding section of the chapter.

Afghanistan

To understand the motives of British decision-makers in committing troops to Afghanistan, American expectations must be weighed against the domestic constraints faced by the Blair

[216] On December 5, the Bonn Conference was held, to plan for reconstruction and nation-building activities in Afghanistan.

government. Domestic constraints are defined as the level of government cohesion and military feasibility. These factors were crucial in determining the extent of British military cooperation with the United States as of October 2001. How can we make sense of British participation in Afghanistan and the evolution of the UK's commitment from 2001 to 2003, as American attention shifted toward Iraq?

Parallel to British diplomatic efforts, the international community's response to 9/11 was immediate both within the UN and then through NATO. Responding to alliance requirements, the British gave its support to a UN Security Council Resolution drafted by the French condemning the attacks. This Resolution was voted unanimously within 24 hours of the attacks. NATO's article V, invoked on October 4, 2001, entailed allied retaliatory measures against the perpetrators. Both versions, the first emphasizing the right to self-defence, and the second, the clause of mutual defence, are significant in the immediate timing of their adoption. The process unfolded almost automatically and achieved broad consensus. The British strategy after 9/11, the first priority was to quickly reach out to the Americans. The UK's ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, concedes that the British chose to closely align with the American strategy, noting that it would "put us immediately in the front line where we wanted to be".[217] The UK's emphasis on Blair's bilateral diplomacy translated into more consultations, but not necessarily more influence

[217] von Hlatky, "Interview with Jeremy Greenstock".

At the outset, the intervention in Afghanistan proceeded in two phases: 1) the military campaign to overthrow the Taliban regime, the American-led campaign code-named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); 2) the UN multinational force to bring stability to the capital of Kabul, through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). OEF was initially aimed at the twin goal of overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying al-Qaeda's training camps. ISAF was introduced in December to initiate postwar stabilization in Kabul and to coordinate nation-building tasks. The two missions had very different aims for the US administration, wanting to focus exclusively on combat operations under OEF and expressing reluctance over the necessity of ISAF: "U.S. government officials also want[ed] to maintain U.S. military flexibility to operate in Afghanistan with minimal non-U.S. interference. The administration limited ISAF operations to Kabul, where the force is removed from immediate contact with the ongoing U.S. war effort and staffed by personnel from other nations."[218] Britain, for its part, participated in both US-led military operations and the international peacekeeping force, which was placed under its command during its inception.

Fresh from an electoral victory in the fall of 2001, Tony Blair's government enjoyed a solid position. The level of government cohesion was at its highest, with few constraints to implement the quickly drawn-up plan for Britain's contribution to military cooperation. There was a strong degree of deferral to the US in defining the UK's role in OEF. The government was also held together by necessity. Government ministries and agencies were

---

[218] Kimberly Zisk Marten, "Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan", *The Washington Quarterly* 26, 1 (2003), 47.

forced to adapt and often, accept new positions in response to 9/11. Ad hoc structures were created to deal with the novel challenges presented by the rapidly unfolding events. As military operations evolved in the fall of 2001, there was little public scrutiny over the decision-making process, as the British government, whether in the Ministry of Defence (MOD), or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), was still in "emergency mode," circumventing many of the normal policy-making procedures.[219] Furthermore, strong bipartisan support for the war in Afghanistan shielded the British commitment from any controversy.[220]

From September 11 on, frequent emergency meetings between British Cabinet ministers, officials, and the Prime Minister were held in Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (COBRA). COBRA meetings delineated the contours of the British response to 9/11, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. COBRA meetings were preferred over Cabinet meetings and the Prime Minister exerted strong executive leadership and relied on his close advisors.[221] The Chief of Defence Staff, Michael Boyce, outlined the military options. It was decided that the initial contribution would consist of the British submarines *Triumph* and *Trafalgar* armed with Tomahawk missiles, and access to bases in Pakistan which was being negotiated. These capabilities would be readily available for fast deployment. The rest of the commitment would require more planning and a better understanding of American operational needs. The British government also published a dossier on the

---

[219] von Hlatky, "Interview with Simon Webb".

[220] Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*.

[221] Campbell, *The Blair Years,* 565.

Taliban, in order to bring the public on board.[222] This document, entitled "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States," was prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to make the case against the Taliban regime and to justify military action in terms of self-defence. It establishes the link between Bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, confirming their capability to undertake major terrorist attacks worldwide, and claiming that they are seeking acquisition of nuclear and chemical materials for their terrorist activities.[223] This response was launched in a matter of weeks. The use of public dossiers is a distinctive feature of the Blair government and New Labour. This initiative was a first attempt to make foreign policy more transparent and available to the public.

In the months following the September 11 attacks, the main priority was to offer assets to the Americans and deploy them in a very narrow timeframe. The commitment to OEF was enlarged to include "reconnaissance and air-to-air refuelling flights; troops on the ground engaged in operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban elements; and Royal Navy participation in submarine and interdiction support operations in the Arabian Sea."[224] Ground troops, the deployment of a Commando group totalling 1700, represented the largest deployment for war fighting operations since the Gulf War.[225] The British commitment to OEF in Afghanistan was executed in a way true to the strategy of being the

---

[222] Seldon, *Blair Unbound*, 62.

[223] United Kingdom. Prime Minister's Office. *September 11 attacks – Culpability document*, May 15, 2003. Online. http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3682 (Consulted October 6, 2009).

[224] United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. "The Secretary of State for Defence's statements in the Commons" (House of Commons, London, March 18, 2002).

[225] *Ibid*.

first ally to stand by the United States. Military contributions to OEF were announced as a response to formal requests by the United States for particular assets.[226] The UK's contribution to the War against Terrorism is described by the US Department of Defence as "… the first nation to send military representatives and campaign planners to CENTCOM. They have deployed the largest naval task force since the Falklands War to support OEF. Additionally, they have provided the only coalition TLAM platforms to launch missiles during the commencement of OEF hostilities. Great Britain assumed the lead for the ISAF operation."[227] British military cooperation in early fall 2001 was driven by immediate concerns over military feasibility, rather than the product of internal debates. By having readily available assets in response to American operational needs, London made sure it was involved in every aspect of the war. It even took on a role the US did not want by assuming leadership for stabilization operations under ISAF, after the Taliban's demise.

The UK offered to lead ISAF in December 2001, setting out to patrol Kabul, train the new Afghan National Guard and undertake humanitarian aid projects.[228] According to Greenstock, Tony Blair pressed Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi to accelerate a UN-led peace building process. Greenstock recalls that "within six weeks at the end of military action an agreement passed. This was a remarkably effective piece of international and UN

---

[226] United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. "Defence Secretary and Chief of the Defence Staff: Press Conference" (London, October 23, 2001).

[227] United States Department of Defence, *Fact Sheet: International Contribution to the War Against Terrorism*, February 26, 2002. Online. http://www.fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/2002/fact_sheetintl.contr.pdf (Consulted October 6, 2009).

[228] United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. *International Security Assistance Force (Operation Fingal)*, December 3, 2001.

diplomacy".[229] The UK had a strong leadership role in implementing the Bonn Agreement which resulted from the UN consultation. The UK, in a sense, filled the vacuum left by the American administration. By 2002, Washington was not supplying the resources necessary for the administration of Afghanistan.[230] The British commitment to ISAF in Kabul, at that time, was of 1800 British troops out of a total of 4600 coalition troops from 18 different countries.[231] The US did not offer troops to ISAF, preferring to leave peacekeeping and nation building efforts to allies.[232]

As for OEF, the UK contributed air assets, which were particularly important in supplementing the United States' air refuelling capability, naval assets, and Special Forces. Special Forces were crucial to the military ground effort in the first phases of the war in Afghanistan and were in high demand by the United States. British Special Forces, along with the Australian and Canadian contributions, were integrated seamlessly within special operations conducted by the Americans with the Northern Alliance. Military feasibility is thus an important factor in determining the scope of allied commitments. The Americans were the main driving force, providing the bulk of air support for the Special Forces units on the ground, but were assisted by the UK, while other European powers were entirely absent from this phase of the war.

Within ISAF, asymmetric military cooperation was replicated with the UK acting as the dominant partner. British expectations over the self-sufficiency of other allied

---

[229] von Hlatky, "Interview with Jeremy Greenstock".

[230] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Telephone interview with Clare Lockhart" (September 2008).

[231] United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. "The Secretary of State for Defence's statements in the Commons".

[232] Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 310.

expeditionary forces show that expectations precede concerns over the availability of military capabilities, as laid out in the causal mechanism. Following the fall of the Taliban regime, Sir Stephen Wright, Director General for Defence and Intelligence in the FCO, notes that "ISAF became the principal focus of the foreign policy response by the U.K."[233] Not only was the UK in a leadership position to implement ISAF, in close coordination with the UN, but it imposed some conditions on the participation of other allies. Wright adds that "participating forces had to be self-sufficient in all capabilities, in logistics especially... Many countries had ground forces that were ready and available but they had nothing to carry them".[234] To that end, the UK turned down Canada's offer of military support after ISAF was created.[235]

It can be argued that the UK yielded some influence once the military operations were underway, but the overall plan for both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars was crafted by the Americans. In the case of Iraq, some authors have put it rather bluntly: "The decision to oust Saddam was an American initiative, not a joint decision."[236] This is not to say that recruiting allies was unimportant to the United States. It had appeal insofar as assent from allied states served a legitimizing function, but it was not viewed as a necessary condition for involvement.

---

[233] von Hlatky, "Interview with Sir Stephen Wright".

[234] *Ibid*.

[235] *Ibid*. Also confirmed in Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War*.

[236] Alan Doig, James P. Pfiffner, Mark Phythian and Rodney Tiffen, "Marching in Time: Alliance Politics, Synchrony and the Case of War in Iraq, 2002-2003", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, 1 (2007), 25.

To summarize the British commitment in the first phase of its involvement in the War on Terror, the immediate reaction of the government was to be the first on board, to demonstrate the significance of the Anglo-American alliance. In November and December 2001, the UK kept a close eye on the political compromise that would be the basis for nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. It then took ownership of ISAF and coordinated efforts among coalition countries for its first command. If one had to pinpoint when the post-9/11 consensus began to erode, it would be in early 2002, as American attention shifted away from Afghanistan and toward Iraq.

Iraq

In discussing the Iraq war, the focus will be kept on the political decision leading up to the initial commitment of troops by the UK, in March 2003. Several sources report that Bush successfully presented the case for invading Iraq to Blair on April 6, 2002 during a visit in Crawford, Texas, getting the Prime Minister's support on a forthcoming war.[237] The decision-making process was a long and controversial affair, playing out domestically, bilaterally and at the UN. By demonstrating political support early on, the UK obtained certain concessions but limited its autonomy with its dominant ally. The case study analysis reveals an additional variable at the domestic level, namely anomalies in the policy-process making that inadvertently served to strengthen the executive's leadership on decision-making over Iraq.

---

[237] John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 167.

Whether or not Saddam's WMD capabilities were really seen as an imminent threat by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair is secondary in understanding the interactions and decision-making processes that prevailed in 2002 and 2003. The roots of British foreign policy toward Iraq were based on a reading of the threat that closely matched the American view, as mentioned before. The framing of threat by Washington and London matched closely. Blair, like Bush, connected rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, as explicitly stated during Bush's speech at West Point Academy in 2002. Indeed, "according to people close to him, Blair, like Bush and many other Americans, concluded from the September 11th attacks that the potential linkage between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction was the strategic issue of our time and required decisive action".[238] The language of prevention became part of Blair's discourse on security threats.[239] Furthermore, the weight of Britain's involvement in the Middle East throughout the 1990's contributed to its stance in favour of making an important military contribution to the Iraq War. Such motives were absent from Afghanistan. This, combined, with the strategic significance of the Middle East created areas of convergence where the United States and the UK perceived Iraq and Saddam's WMD capabilities as an urgent security concern.

Consistent with my hypothesis on alliance expectations, the UK's involvement in Iraq throughout the 1990s fostered an expectation of support in Washington. It is

---

[238] William Shawcross, *The Allies: The US, Britain, Europe and the War in Iraq* (London: Atlantic, 2003), 106.

[239] Lawrence Freedman, "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat", *Survival* 46, 2 (2004), 7-50.

noteworthy that Britain resorted to the use of force several times between 1998, with Operation Desert Fox, and in 2003, during the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Middle East also has a strong strategic significance for the British. Britain's historic ties to the region can explain the attention given to Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War. Operation Desert Fox is a significant event that set the UK apart from other allies, such as Canada and Australia, which had also participated in the 1991 Gulf War. From 1996 to 1998, Saddam continuously denied access to the UN weapons inspectors, which brought about a series of UN Security Council Resolutions (1060, 1115, 1134, 1154) condemning Iraq's behaviour, and ultimately leading to the threat and the use of force. On August 5, 1998, Iraq announced it would cease to cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Three months later, on November 5, Resolution 1205 was passed in response to Iraq's declaration, ordering full cooperation with the UNSCOM and the IAEA. After failing to reach a diplomatic solution in the fall, the United States and the UK launched Operation Desert Fox on December 16, 1998. The air strikes targeted suspected WMD sites and were justified on the basis of existing UN Security Council Resolutions. Throughout this process, not only was the framework for weapons inspections in Iraq unravelling, but so was the political consensus. The Security Council began to be divided among two camps.

As the UNSCOM head, Richard Butler had reached an impasse with the Iraqi authorities. Tensions began to mount between the P5 countries.[240] As early as 1994, Russia, China and France were advocating that the sanctions that had been put in place after the

---

[240] For a more detailed account, see Richard Butler, *Saddam Defiant: The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Crisis of Global Security* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2000).

Gulf War be lifted. The US and the UK were adamantly opposed. Disagreements continued through to 1998 about Iraqi compliance and the possible use of force. Russia even denounced Desert Fox, creating a diplomatic fuss in Washington and London. After Desert Fox, the policy of containment was expanded by the US and the UK, maintaining the patrols in the no-fly zones, but also allowing British and American aircraft to respond in self-defence under any circumstances. Significant attacks were carried out from 1998 to 2002. The no-fly zones, established after the Gulf War, were patrolled by the US, the UK, and France, but were mostly enforced by the US and UK alone. They were meant to prevent air attacks by the Iraqis, thereby protecting the Kurdish areas in Northern Iraq and Shi'a areas in the South. In December of 1999, the Security Council was further divided when France, Russia and China abstained from voting on Resolution 1284, which replaced UNSCOM with the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), after allegations that UNSCOM had been cooperating with Western intelligence agencies. UNMOVIC started to map out the remaining disarmament tasks in 2001, in case weapons inspections would resume. As late as June 2002, the US and the UK engaged in Operation Southern Focus (OSF), a limited bombing campaign in Iraq.[241] OSF was justified as a response to violations of the no-fly zones, but was also meant to pave the way for the war, according to General Mosley, then Chief Allied War Commander.[242]

---

[241] Michael R. Gordon, "US Air Raids in '02 Prepared for War in Iraq", *New York Times* (New York), July 20, 2003.

[242] *Ibid*.

The policy of containment, as understood by the British government, was summarized in official documents as "enforcing the no-fly zone and supporting the sanctions against Iraq indefinitely if possible, thereby constraining Saddam's aggressiveness as well as the development and production of WMD".[243] This policy was later criticized by both Bush and Blair in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War. Due to close bilateral ties and frequent interactions between British and American officials on Iraq, US expectations on the type of military commitment that the UK could offer became clear.

Turning to the level of military capabilities, several options were feasible for the UK.[244] The first one was to continue with the status quo and to keep the strategy of containment. This is essentially a three-pronged strategy consisting of economic sanctions, the enforcement of no-fly zones and limited military action, avoiding any escalation. This is a low risk and low cost strategy that does not quite fit the rhetoric coming from the Bush Administration during 2002. The second option was the implementation of coercive weapons inspections, where UNMOVIC and the IAEA would have military assistance. The use of force would be authorized on the advice of the Security Council, making for a lengthy process to identify and respond to non-compliance. The third option was to launch a limited air campaign of the same scope as Desert Fox. Air strikes would be used to enforce compliance. Unlike the previous option, the decision to launch air strikes would remain in the hands of the Americans and the British.

---

[243] Christopher Bluth, "The British Road to War: Blair, Bush and the Decision to Invade Iraq", *International Affairs* 80, 5 (2004), 873.

[244] United Kingdom, Foreign Affairs Committee, *The Decision to Go to War in Iraq*. House of Commons, HC813-I, 9th Report of Session 2002-03, July 7, 2003, 38-46.

The next four options which were considered represent a shift away from the status quo to more ambitious retaliatory measures. The fourth option was an extensive air campaign to inflict serious damage to Iraqi military facilities and suspected WMD sites. This option relied on American military technology to deliver victory without any boots on the ground.[245] The fifth option was to replicate the campaign in Afghanistan and assist indigenous forces in Iraq to topple the regime. US and Allied air strikes would be launched in support of troops on the ground. Though the Afghan model was used to a certain extent, its merits as a successful approach are still debated.[246] The sixth option was to launch an air campaign with limited ground intervention. This was the option preferred by the Pentagon and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. This option would require less than 100 000 troops on the ground with the expectation that the regime would collapse in a matter of months. The final option would replicate *Desert Storm* of the Gulf war, with a massive air campaign and over 250 000 ground troops. It would differ from Desert Storm in that the aim would be to topple Saddam's regime.

Kevin Tebbit, the British Permanent Undersecretary (PUS) for Defence states that from the seven policy options, only two options were given serious consideration: the first was an enhancement of the containment policy and the second was forceful regime change.[247] This not only resembles the American assessment of options on Iraq, it also casts

---

[245] Philip H. Gordon, Martin Indyk and Michael O'Hanlon, "Getting Serious about Iraq", *Survival* 44, 3 (2002), 15.

[246] Andres, Wills and Griffith, "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model", 124-160; Biddle, "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq".

[247] von Hlatky, "Interview with Kevin Tebbit". Also in Butler Report.

doubts on the significance of the UN process, which was at the root of the original containment policy and deemed unsustainable.

The causal mechanism shows how US expectations are prior to concerns of military capabilities. Given Britain's already considerable role in Afghanistan**,** concerns were expressed about the sustainability of two wars for the British forces, especially with regards to the demands placed on the Special Forces and the resources needed for post-war reconstruction efforts in two unstable countries. On the Special Forces, the FAC report notes that: "It is feared that a major operation in Iraq could divert resources away from Afghanistan where the situation remains extremely fragile. In particular, Special Operations forces have been in heavy demand in Afghanistan and for operations against al-Qaeda in other countries across south and south-east Asia. They are expected to be used extensively in any military action against Iraq".[248] US demands prevailed.

A further constraint related to military feasibility can be identified here. Although the capabilities and operational tempo of British Forces could adapt to a second war, the main impediment was legal. The commitment of British troops needed assent from the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, on the legality of going to war in Iraq, a necessity for the British military. The military would strongly oppose any operation that had not been cleared by the Attorney General. The rationale for establishing a legal basis for the use of force in Iraq, as presented by Goldsmith, rests on previous UN Security Council resolutions, specifically, resolutions 678 and 687 from the first Gulf War in 1990 and 1991

---

[248] United Kingdom, Foreign Affairs Committee, *The Decision to Go to War in Iraq,* 52.

respectively. In Lord Goldsmith's view "resolution 687 suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under resolution 678".[249] Under these conditions, resolution 1441, unanimously adopted by the Security Council on November 8, 2002, revives the provisions on the use of force under resolution 678. Thus, Iraq's failure to comply with UNSCR 1441, as acknowledged by the Attorney General, provides legal justification for the use of force.

To complete the picture on the decision-making processes leading to the commitment of British troops in support of the US-led coalition, another set of domestic constraints impaired a swift implementation of the short-listed policy options: the level of government cohesion. Domestic constraints evolved simultaneously, in pace with the diplomatic tours of Blair, his advisers and his Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw and Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon. The two domestic-level variables of interest, the level of government cohesion and military feasibility stalled the decision-making process and led the Blair government to impose many conditions on British participation. First, although Blair was able to secure the support of his Cabinet, even after two resignations, divisions within the Labour Party undermined the cohesiveness of the government. As a result, the UK could not defer to the United States on Iraq; it was a politically unsustainable course of action.

In response to this position, the Blair government needed to stake conditions on British support of the US on Iraq. To this end, David Manning, Blair's special advisor, communicated to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and President Bush that:

---

[249] Lord Goldsmith, *Iraq: Legal Position Concerning the Use of Force* (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2003) A copy of this opinion and letter from Jack Straw, Defence minister, can be found in Annex 1.

"The UN would need to be part of that process as far as the UK was concerned".[250] The UK saw this condition as vital to achieve the support of NATO allies and the European Union, making its political position more manageable within government. Blair also pleaded for a commitment by Bush to a road map for peace in the Middle East.[251] As the UN process was coming to an end, in March 2003, this new condition was brought forth with the realization that the upcoming war in Iraq would not be UN-sanctioned. This was presented to the Parliament as an American promise of goodwill, along with a commitment that the UN would be involved in the postwar reconstruction plans.[252] These moves by the Blair government were primarily driven by the need to restore government cohesion.[253] Ultimately, Blair turned the decision over to Parliament and achieved a majority as the result of a vote on March 18, 2003, with the support of 412 votes vs. 149 dissenting.[254]

---

[250] von Hlatky, "Interview with Jeremy Greenstock".

[251] Clare Short, *An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2004). Also Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, 296-297.

[252] Tony Blair, United Kingdom, House of Commons, "Iraq", *Hansard,* March 18, 2003, Col 760. In May 2003, in the initial postwar phase, the UK and the United States participated in Security Council deliberations. UN Security Council resolution 1483, adopted on May 22, 2003, was the result of these deliberations. Three governing entities were set up locally in support of the transition process: the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the Governing Council of Iraq (CGI), and the UN, through the appointment of a special representative. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) had a more humanitarian mandate than a political one, but it served as a step toward the international recognition of the new Iraq. The intent was for the CPA to gradually transfer authority to the interim administration of the CGI, and to eventually withdraw altogether. The United States, however, expressed considerable opposition to make the United Nations the central body for the coordination of Iraq's political recovery and transition to democracy. See Thomas D. Grant, "The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice", *The American Journal of International Law* 97, 4 (2003), 838.

[253] Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 99.

[254] US Seeks Tough UN Motion on Iraq, *Financial Times* (London), September 14, 2002; Blair, "Iraq", Col 760-763; Seldon, *Blair Unbound,* 169; Woodward, *Plan of Attack,* 337.

Since 2001, Blair had undertaken a strategy that would strengthen the special relationship by making several symbolic visits to Washington. Recruiting supporters for the coalition against terrorism, and finally, by taking on a significant role in Afghanistan.[255] In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, prior to Bush's State of the Union speech of January 2002, where Iraq was singled out as a threat to international peace and security, the British position on Iraq had not changed since its pre-9/11 iteration. Commenting on its continued engagement in the Gulf alongside the United States, the Foreign Affairs Committee interprets the Anglo-American position in the following way: "We share the policy objective of re-integrating Iraq into the international community through compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions."[256]

American expectations may have been more difficult for the UK to decipher immediately after 9/11. What matters more is how the British government perceived these expectations and translated these expectations into policy. Insofar as specific policy initiatives are triggered by US actions, we can infer that they are shaped by US expectations, or how they are perceived by British decision-makers. These expectations, as the British government interpreted them, involved immediate support for OEF, strong actions against terrorism through domestic and international legislation and enforcement, and to display both the willingness and capabilities to engage in post-conflict operations in Afghanistan leaving the United States to focus exclusively on combat operations, as it

---

[255] Dan Keohane, "The United Kingdom," in A. Danchev and J. Macmillan (eds), *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 62-63.

[256] United Kingdom, Foreign Affairs Committee, *British-US Relations*, 84, par. 75.

preferred. Let us now turn to an additional variable to shed light on the nature of the decision-making process leading to the decision on Iraq.

Disrupted Policy Process

An additional variable was uncovered in the process of conducting the case study analysis: disruptions in the policy process leading to the British commitment in Iraq are studied here. The decision-making process can be heavily influenced by state-level processes, as pointed out by neoclassical realist authors.[257] In the British case, certain anomalies mitigated the impact from the loss of government cohesion. The literature on crisis decision-making points to contextual factors which may alter the normal channels of foreign policy decision-making. For the Iraq War, it is the informal nature of the policy process which tipped the balance in favour of a commitment in Iraq. Though Iraq was discussed many times within Cabinet, the Butler report notes that the normal policy process was circumvented, for example, by sidelining Cabinet committees. The report expresses these concerns directly:

> We are concerned that the informality and circumscribed character of the Government's procedures which we saw in the context of policy-making towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed collective political judgment. Such risks are particularly significant in a field like the subject of our Review, where hard facts are inherently difficult to come by and the quality of judgement is accordingly all the more important.[258]

---

[257] Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro (eds), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*.

[258] Butler Report, 148, par. 611.

The Butler Report is an important source of evidence, since it was compiled as a result of testimony provided by the key ministers and officials from 10 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and members of the intelligence community.[259]

Further evidence of irregularities in the decision-making process can be found in a report tabled by the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), which investigated the decision to go to war in Iraq.[260] The FAC is tasked with reviewing the policy and practices of the FCO. The report expresses concerns over the process which led to the publication of two public dossiers, detailing the evidence of WMDs in Iraq, by making reference to British intelligence. The first, referred to as the September dossier, was published in 2002 and was approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The dossier is described as using language that "… was in places more assertive than that traditionally used in intelligence documents".[261] The dossier is a description of Saddam's WMD capabilities and makes a series of threat assessments about them. Following its publication, the September dossier underwent much public scrutiny and was criticized for making exaggerated claims.

The second, referred to as the February dossier, or "dodgy dossier", was published in early 2003. The allegations made against the February dossier were more serious, since it

---

[259] Testimonial and opinions found in the Butler report were corroborated through interviews with senior officials. These interviews were conducted in June 2008 with Sir Jeremy Greenstock and Stephen Wright from the FCO, as well as Sir Kevin Tebbit and Simon Webb from MOD. All four were witnesses to the Butler inquiry.

[260] United Kingdom, Foreign Affairs Committee, *The Decision to Go to War in Iraq*.

[261] *Ibid.,* 32; par. 100.

was found that whole segments were plagiarized from an American scholar's work. Alastair Campbell, Chief of Communications for Prime Minister Blair later took sole responsibility for the dossier, which was meant as a briefing note for the media. The FAC report is very critical of the February dossier: "By producing such a document the Government undermined the credibility of their case for war and of the other documents which were part of it… […] it was fundamentally wrong to allow such a document to be presented to Parliament and made widely available without ministerial oversight."[262] This controversy suggests that the normal channels between the intelligence branches, the Foreign Service and the Cabinet were disrupted, since the dossier was not signed off by the JIC Chairman. The report is clear in establishing that there was a "lack of procedural accountability" in producing and publishing this dossier.[263]

That there were intelligence failures in building the case for war in Iraq is now a widely recognized fact. Not only was intelligence extremely hard to gather in Iraq after the UN weapons inspectors were indefinitely expelled from the country in 1998, but the UK may have been over-reliant on the United States for its intelligence. Because both countries share intelligence to the extent that they do, a unique feature of their special relationship, it is sometimes difficult to separate the source of raw intelligence data. These shortcomings are acknowledged both in the FAC report and in Minister Robin Cook's personal account of that period.[264] More damaging for the intelligence agencies were allegations of political

---

[262] *Ibid*., par. 138-140.

[263] *Ibid*., 37, par. 121.

[264] *Ibid*., 11.

meddling made against the JIC. To that effect, the report summarizes the Committee's impressions: "We are concerned that a meeting to discuss a document which Ministers had asked the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare was chaired by the Prime Minister's Special Advisor".[265]

Finally, beyond the scrutiny placed on the intelligence and security agencies of the British government, there is also evidence that Cabinet decision-making was not thorough in debating the options for war in Iraq. Some individuals who attended Cabinet meetings, such as International Development Minister Clare Short and a former senior FCO official Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, were especially vocal in expressing criticism about Cabinet meetings during 2002 and 2003. Both testified to the FAC and stated that Iraq was not discussed in great detail during this period.[266]

Alternative Explanations

In chapter 3, I outlined several explanations in the IR literature that address the topic of allied behaviour under conditions of asymmetry. It is also important to address explanations that come up in the case specific literature, for example, the individual-level explanation, which focuses on Blair's strong leadership qualities and his personal friendship with President Bush, as potentially confounding variables. In the British case, what stands out is Prime Minister Blair's insistence, along with Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, that the UN be the decision-making forum for the fate of Iraq. In this

---

[265] *Ibid*., 29.

[266] *Ibid.,* 44, par. 145.

section, I will first discuss the role of the UN: did it have an independent impact on British foreign policy, or, was it a platform used to sway domestic and international public opinion? The answer has important implications for both liberal institutionalist and constructivist theses, which stress the UN's importance in setting institutional constraints on states[267] or providing appropriate norms of behaviour.[268]

What can explain such unwavering support even in the face of opposition from domestic and international audiences? The argument for institutional norms was quite prevalent in the media and public debates during the time of the Iraq War. Since the United States was not successful in gaining a UN mandate for a war in Iraq, critics questioned the legitimacy and the legality of the intervention.[269] The same argument was made in Britain, where Blair suffered the political cost of an unpopular war. Did institutional norms constrain British foreign policy? Was the concern for legitimacy a predominant influence after 9/11?

There are many examples of P5 states acting forcefully without the authorization of the UN, of which the American interventions in Vietnam, Grenada and Panama during the Cold War. The 1991 Gulf War, and arguably, the end of the Cold War, marked a shift in how states resort to the use of UN Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII. As Voeten notes, only two such resolutions were adopted during the last fifteen years of the

---

[267] Ikenberry, *After Victory*.

[268] Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*.

[269] For a discussion on the UN as the leading legitimizing body for interstate relations, see Inis Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations", *International Organization* 20, 3 (1966), 367-379.

Cold War, compared to 145 such resolutions being adopted between 1990 and 1998.[270] The war in Kosovo and the war in Iraq stand as the two contemporary examples where military operations were carried out without UN authorization. Blair's argument was similar in both cases, claiming that one should not let the Security Council come to a standstill because a member of the P5 is bent on blocking a resolution. A reproach aimed at China and Russia in 1999, was aimed mostly at France in 2003. However, in both cases, there was a clear attempt to give the UN process a chance, by bringing the issue to the Security Council.[271] Voeten suggests that this may be more a reflection on the costs of a particular intervention rather than concerns over its moral legitimacy.[272]

For the British, resorting to the UN process was a condition of the UK's support of the United States, no matter the resulting resolution. Not only did Tony Blair invest a lot of personal effort in the process, but he can be given some credit for convincing the Bush administration to present its case for war to the international community, which it had previously shunned.[273] Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, for his part, had stated publicly that bypassing the UN was an acceptable course of action.[274] However, it is noteworthy that as the UN process unravelled, in March 2003, Tony Blair questioned the

---

[270] Erik Voeten, "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force", *International Organization* 59 (2005), 531. See also Sidney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

[271] Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000); Brian Frederking, "Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security", *American Political Science Review* 97, 3 (2003), 363-378; Ian Hurd, "Stayin' Alive: The Rumours of the UN's Death Have Been Exaggerated: Too Legit to Quit", *Foreign Affairs* 82, 4 (2003), 204-205.

[272] Voeten, "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force", 543.

[273] Seldon, *Blair Unbound*.

[274] Greg Sheridan, *The Partnership*.

legitimacy of the process by pointing the finger at France, which had threatened to veto any second resolution that would make an explicit reference to the use of force.[275] That the UK rejected the outcome of the UN process suggests that UN approval was not a necessary condition for the commitment of British troops in Iraq. Appealing to the UN became a platform for Blair's two-level game: the UN served to appease domestic public concerns over US unilateralism, while buying him more time to deal with the US over the war in Iraq. Thus, appealing to the UN is best understood as a strategy employed by the Blair government to increase its leverage at the alliance-level and the domestic-level.

In the case of Afghanistan, which was much less controversial, the UN served as an important lever for British leadership, especially in implementing the initial tasks of building the International Assistance and Stabilization Force (ISAF), in late 2001 and early 2002. ISAF gave the UK an important role in coordinating coalition troops in Afghanistan. Although the endorsement by the UN for the intervention in Afghanistan was immediate, following the attacks of 9/11, *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF) was not conducted by UN guidelines, as ISAF was. Between 2001 and 2003, OEF operations were in the hands of the US and allied troops had to conform to American demands.

While the decision to go to Afghanistan was immediate and taken amid public demonstrations of solidarity all around the world, the decision to invade Iraq dragged on and came under public scrutiny. Opposition on the domestic political front, especially when looking at public opinion constantly made headlines. Shifts in public opinion did not alter

---

[275] Mark Oliver, "Veto Deepens NATO Rift over Iraq", *The Guardian* (London), February 10, 2003.

the course of British foreign policy. In Britain, 79% of the population supported the first phase of the War on Terror, but quickly turned against Bush and Blair in 2002-2003.[276] Do these domestic-level factors have causal weight? In addition to massive public protests, there were resignations from Blair's cabinet and many defections from the government when the Parliament voted on Iraq.[277] If ever domestic pressure could have changed the course of foreign policy, those were such circumstances. That Blair submitted the decision to go to war to the Parliamentary vote is significant in that it is a unique occurrence in the British Parliament's history. The implications of the vote were grave but the outcome banal: failing to get a majority on the issue would have forced the Prime Minister to resign and would have *de facto* withdrawn the UK from the coalition of the willing and participation in Iraq, but Blair was able to secure a strong majority, despite 139 dissenting votes from his own party.[278] It is noteworthy that even President Bush would have been willing to let the British commitment go so as to safeguard Blair's political career.[279]

The Prime Minister was on his second term in office with a strong majority from the 2001 election. New Labour Party was enjoying popularity and Tony Blair's diplomatic response to 9/11 was well-received around the world. Moreover, the Conservative opposition, led by Iain Duncan Smith**,** supported British participation in the event of military action in Iraq. An Op-ed in the *Sunday Times* summarized his views, as he stated

---

[276] Philip H. Gordon, "NATO after 11 September", *Survival* 43, 4 (2001/02), 91.

[277] Campbell, *The Blair Years*.

[278] Nigel West, "Making War Controversial", *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17 (2004), 358-363.

[279] George Packer, *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

that a war in Iraq would be in Britain's interests.[280] Unlike Canada, Britain's governments, whether Labour or Conservative, have consistently recognized the primacy of the United States as an ally, with strong displays of bipartisanship.[281] In the final analysis, it appears that Blair was not dissuaded by public opinion. It should be reminded that the Prime Minister was also able to restore government cohesion.

Looking at the individual-level of explanation, certain analysts point to the close personal relationship that developed between President Bush and Prime Minister Blair.[282] It is argued that their sharing similar moral and religious convictions, rather than ideological similarity, were powerful bonds leading to an alignment of American and British foreign policy on Iraq.[283] Where Blair and Bush differed was in the importance given to human security as a motivation for intervention. For Blair, strong parallels were made between Iraq and Kosovo, where inaction in the face of a brutal dictator was equivalent to appeasement. In a speech delivered in Chicago in 1999, Blair declared that "many of our problems have been caused by two dangerous and ruthless men – Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic. Both have been prepared to wage vicious campaigns against sections of their own community. As a result of these destructive policies both have brought

---

[280] Iraq 'Growing Threat to Britain', *BBC News World Edition,* September 1, 2002. Online. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2228294.stm (Consulted August 25, 2009).

[281] This trend has been encouraged by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, according to Jane M. O. Sharp, "Tony Blair, Iraq and the Special Relationship: Poodle or Partner?", *International Journal* 59 (2003-04), 59-86.

[282] Dumbrell, "Working with Allies".

[283] Seldon, *Blair Unbound.*

calamity on their own peoples."[284] This doctrine of liberal interventionism has been described as a manifesto arguing for the moral superiority of liberalism.[285] Blair had previously outlined what the justification for any international military action should be for the international community:

> First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? […] Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? […] And finally, do we have national interests involved?[286]

Moreover, the dangers of appeasement were often reiterated and used as a justification for the NATO military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and the Iraq War.[287] Finally, another alternative explanation is situated at the individual-level, grounded in psychology. It suggests that Blair fell victim to "self-deception" whereby he would perceive events and facts according to his moral system.[288] This would explain Blair's seemingly disproportionate attention to foreign policy issues between 2001 and 2003, devoting much

---

[284] Blair, "Doctrine of International Community".

[285] Tim Dunne, "Britain and the Gathering Storm over Iraq", in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 340.

[286] Tony Blair, "Doctrine of International Community" (Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, April 22, 1999), Online. http://www. Number10.gov.uk/Page1297.

[287] Other military interventions involving British troops under the Blair government were in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in addition to aerial bombardments in 1998 during *Operation Desert Storm* in Iraq.

[288] Paul Hoggett, "Blair's Mission Impossible", *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 7, 3 (2005), 424.

effort to gather diplomatic support internationally and as he multiplied efforts to turn the tide of British foreign and defence policy. Though plausible, it is hard to submit this proposition to the empirical test.

Conclusion

With the shock of 9/11, Blair seized the opportunity to lay out an alternative grand strategy for the United States. He argued for an internationalist foreign policy and warned against an isolationist America. Britain would do its part in securing this outcome. This was consistent with Blair's approach to foreign policy throughout the 1990s, where he took the initiative to strengthen Europe's defence capabilities as a way to second the burden of international military involvement with the United States. The British perception of threat was more closely matched with that of the United States, than with the rest of Europe. Tony Blair relied on the same discourse in favour of decisive action, with an emphasis on seeking out terrorists and the states that harbor them. In fact, the British government had set a goal for itself to become the United States' closest ally in the war on terrorism.

The UK's military contribution to OEF began on October 7, 2001, a few days after Tony Blair declared his support for American military operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime. From that point on, the UK made it its priority to be the United States' closest ally in the Global Coalition against Terrorism. This point was explicitly stated in numerous official documents from the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence (MOD). This policy was also confirmed through various statements by British politicians and senior

officials.[289] Following the initial operations under OEF, the UK supported and invested in the process which culminated in the creation of ISAF. More than any other country, the UK carried the UN project through, setting the basis for reconstruction and nation-building efforts following the collapse of the Taliban regime. But UK officials were often disappointed by their inability to convey the importance of nation-building to their American counterparts.[290]

A prominent strategy was to be the first among allies. This was strengthened by speeches and statements immediately following 9/11, to show that threat perception was aligned between the United States and the UK. In fact, the UK worked hard to coordinate its message with the Americans. Prime Minister Blair also saw this time of crisis as an opportunity to shape American foreign policy. He is reported to have written a note to President Bush, after their first telephone exchange on September 12, to plan a response to the attacks.[291] Four main points stand out: delivering an ultimatum to the Taliban, building international support for action in Afghanistan, engaging diplomatically with Pakistan and Iran, and restarting the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).[292] In the months to come, it became clear that the United States would come up short in some areas: building international support, diplomatic engagement with Iraq and restarting the MEPP. The UK,

---

[289] von Hlatky, "Interview with Kevin Tebbit"; and Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview with Simon Webb" (London, June 2008).

[290] von Hlatky, "Telephone Interview with Clare Lockhart".

[291] Anthony Seldon, *Blair Unbound* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 50.

[292] *Id*.

under Tony Blair's leadership, attempted to compensate for these shortcomings, taking leadership where the Americans did not.

To advance the British position and strengthen its alliance with the United States, the Prime Minister made numerous high-profile public appearances in Washington and encouraged bilateral exchanges at all levels. Shortly after the event, Blair was the only world leader to appear at President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress. To the Canadian media, the UK had gained favour to the detriment of Canada, which spurred criticisms of Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. Chrétien later remarked on Blair's frequent visits to President Bush: "If Tony Blair wanted to be seen at Bush's side in order to strengthen his position in Europe as the United States' closest ally, that was his call, but it wasn't in my character to try to spin some political advantage out of the innocent dead."[293] Not surprisingly, Blair saw his role differently. Visits to Washington were part of a broader diplomatic approach to curtail Bush's reaction to 9/11. Rather than encouraging the United States to engage in multilateral forums, such as the UN or NATO, the UK acted as the intermediary, soliciting support from world leaders and articulating the main motive for action against the Taliban in Afghanistan: self-defence. From the outset, Blair spoke to his European counterparts, German Chancellor Gerard Schroeder, French President Jacques Chirac, as well as Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to Alaistair Campbell, the aim was to "mobilize solidarity for the US" against the current trend toward anti-Americanism that prevailed in reaction to the Bush presidency.[294] In November 2001, Blair

---

[293] Jean Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2007), 299.

[294] Campbell, *The Blair Years,* 561.

visited both Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon, showing his intention to tie the problem of terrorism with a solution for the MEPP, a point which was lost on the American side.

Did the UK reap tangible rewards from its military commitment? To assume so would be to overstate the impact of British influence on American foreign policy decision-making, in spite of a large military contribution. One author notes that "such hopes were generally disappointed, notwithstanding a few concessions on British citizens held in legal limbo at Guantanamo and on Blair's African aid agenda."[295] If influence there was, it was in setting certain conditions to its support on Iraq, like convincing the Bush administration to commit the US to the UN process in the fall of 2002. As previously noted, the UK also had some influence in the details of the military operations. Britain could use military channels to put its counterinsurgency experience to use in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In an effort to sort out the most important factors in British foreign policy decision-making, in response to the US agenda, this chapter tests the causal mechanism laid out in chapter 3. By recounting the events leading to the commitment of British troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, the goal is to provide an explanation to better understand British military cooperation with the United States. Moreover, the case study analysis reveals that there was an additional variable to complement my explanation on US expectations: the circumvented nature of the policy-making process on Iraq. When weighing the different options for military cooperation with the United States, from 2001-2003, the Blair

---

[295] Dumbrell, "Working with Allies", 466.

government was most concerned with being and remaining the closest ally in the War on Terror.

-4-

Canada-U.S. Relations and the War on Terror

Canada is in an enviable and unenviable position: it is geographically tied to the world's most powerful state and economically bound to it. Canada and the United States share the longest undefended border in the world. Since the creation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) in 1940, the two states have closely interacted on matters of national and international security. Bilateral defence institutions such as the PJBD and NORAD were created to ensure continental defence with a focus on interoperability, joint threat assessment and bilateral consultations and training exercises.[296] Canadian military cooperation with the United States has been strongly reactive to international events, but also incredibly routine, due to shared defence structures. From Pearl Harbour to 9/11, crises have precipitated arrangements to further institutionalize this bilateral security relationship. These arrangements have typically been accompanied by Canadian reservations and mild grumbling over the impact of such measures on the autonomy of its foreign policy. There are many examples of Ottawa going against the wishes of Washington, despite depending on its Southern neighbour for its economic livelihood and its physical survival. How do Canadian decision-makers cope with this asymmetry in shaping an autonomous foreign and defence policy?

Endowed with a relatively secure region, Canada's major military engagements are pursued through its alliance with the United States. Frequent interactions between the two

---

[296] Canada. Department of National Defence, *The Permanent Joint Board on Defence,* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2001).

countries' militaries are seen as a viable way to boost its special relationship with the US. Canada-US military cooperation has reinforced this tendency, as Canada strives to be increasingly interoperable with its American ally.[297] This case study chapter focuses on Canadian military cooperation with the United States between 2001 and 2003. I argue that low American expectations about Canada's ability to make a military contribution explain the level of Canadian military involvement in Afghanistan. The security priority for both states was at the border following the shock of 9/11. As such, systemic factors account for a great portion of alliance interactions. In the case of Afghanistan, few domestic constraints operated: Chrétien was heading a cohesive government and made military commitments that were proportional to the military capabilities that were available.

In the Iraq case, US expectations of allied support were considerably higher, and perceived as such by Canadian decision-makers. However, domestic constraints, defined here as the level of government cohesion and available military capabilities, had changed. Indeed, during the Fall of 2002, the Chrétien government received a request from the United States for a renewed commitment in Afghanistan.[298] Ottawa accepted, signalling that its remaining military capabilities would preclude further commitments in the short to medium term. During that same period, Chrétien's position was being undermined by his main competitor, Paul Martin, which undercut the government's cohesion. Chrétien's retirement seemed imminent. Given these circumstances, a Canadian commitment to the

---

[297] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview" (Ottawa, May 2009).

[298] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview with John McCallum" (Ottawa, June 2009); Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview with Eugene Lang" (Ottawa, May 2008).

war in Iraq appeared unlikely. Ottawa devised strategies to make the most out of its situation: playing the UN game for international prestige, publicly criticizing the Bush government for domestic political gain, and finally, rallying 'round the American flag, once the military engagement in Iraq began.

I will focus on the period from September 11, 2001 to the beginning of the war in Iraq, in March 2003, to analyze the key political decisions and interactions surrounding the possibility of Canadian military cooperation with the United States. The first section of this chapter details the systemic factors that explain the management of security priorities within the Canada-U.S. security relationship. The second section will examine the impact of American expectations and domestic constraints on the decision-making process between 2001 and 2003, when contemplating military cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq. The third section describes the Canadian response, in light of the main explanatory variables. The fourth section will discuss alternative explanations where the case-specific literature and the IR literature intersect, focusing on strategic culture, security communities, domestic politics, and the legitimizing function of the UN. The final section presents a summary of the chapter and focuses on Canadian strategies of asymmetric security cooperation. This chapter demonstrates that Canada has leveraged its bilateral relationship with the US to enhance its international influence and prestige, while acknowledging that acting independently from the United States has been immensely difficult.

Canada-US Security Relations

In this section, the focus is on the systemic factors underlying the Canada-US alliance and how these structure security priorities between the two countries. The United States and Canada's shared security concerns are a permanent feature of their alliance relationship. At the international level, the asymmetric capabilities of the two states are more palpable: the US manages international commitments around the world while Canada has more limited resources to invest in power projection. Canadian decision-makers sometimes have to contemplate the use of force abroad, though it is rarely, if ever, as a result of their own initiative. Military cooperation is mostly considered through the prism of their alliance relationship with the United States. 9/11 marks a turning point in Canadian foreign policy. As one Defence official notes "Canada could no longer sit on the sidelines. We needed to do more".[299] The climate that dominated Foreign Affairs and National Defence was one of nervous anticipation, waiting for the United States' response to 9/11 with the certainty that any shift in American foreign policy would impact Canada directly. There could also have been an opportunity for the Canada-US security relationship to be updated, according to new standards.

Surprisingly, the new contours of a clear foreign and defence policy have not been formulated through the publication of a white paper, even after the events of 9/11. Canada's international priorities have recently been defined as: the centrality of the Canada-US relationship in defining Canadian national interests, the issue of Arctic sovereignty and the

---

[299] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Private interview" (May 15, 2009).

threat of WMDs. In 2008, the Harper government published a Defence policy statement, *Canada First*, articulating post-9/11 security concerns with a budget to match.[300] As mentioned before, Canada steadily increased its defence capabilities since 2001 (See table 5.1) thereby improving its standing within organizations such as NATO. Canada had previously been labeled as "the odd man out," trailing behind other NATO allies in terms of defence spending and keeping a low-profile when American forces were deployed. For example, though Canada supported the Gulf War in 1991, it did not deploy ground forces, as part of the 500 000 strong American-led commitment. The Canadian contribution was exactly "26 fighter aircraft, three ships and a field hospital" with "some infantry, which provided security at the Canadian positions and some army gunners used to bolster the air defences of the Canadian warships".[301]

Table 5.1 Comparative Military Expenditure of Canada [2000; 2008]

	2000	**2008**
Local Currency m.dollars	12, 326	20,583
US $m.	11,412	15,940
As Percentage of GDP	1.1	1.2

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (Consulted March 3, 2009).

Overall, Canadian involvement in Afghanistan drove the increase in defence spending, as clear needs were identified by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), especially under the leadership of General Rick Hillier.

---

[300] Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canada First* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2008).

[301] Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO's Odd Man Out Steps Forward", *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 6, 1 (2008), 102.

Other military investments are planned for the next twenty years, as part of the *Canada First* strategy (See Table 5.1). A budget of 490 billion Canadian dollars is promised over a 20 year period, in order to increase the number of troops and update military equipment. By 2025, military spending should grow from 19 to 28 billion dollars. Even if we take into account this projected increase in defence spending, Canada could never realistically "catch up" with the United States.

Figure 5.1 Defence Funding

Fiscal Years 1986-2028



Source : National Defence, *Canada First*
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/focus/first-premier/defstra-stradef-fra.asp

Strongly reliant on the US to make up for this gap in capabilities, Canada is faced with a dilemma: it is dependent on the United States for its security and the protection of its territorial integrity, but does not necessarily share the global ambitions of its closest security and economic partner. International responsibilities are simply not measured on the same scale. In the various iterations of its foreign and defence policy, Canada has circumscribed its international commitments to the extent that these are first and foremost defined by American interests and its commitments abroad. Canada is generally inclined to

support American endeavours, but must manage American expectations due to its limited capabilities.

Canada has sought to enhance its international visibility through both bilateral and multilateral arrangements. For the defence of its territory, Canada has reinforced its own capabilities through regional security arrangements with the US that include comprehensive security guarantees. NORAD is the embodiment of the longstanding and deeply integrated security relationship between the two countries. With the addition of a new maritime dimension in 2006, NORAD has become emblematic of the dense security links uniting both countries. Canada and the United States also share more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements, over 250 defence memoranda of understanding (MOUs), and 145 forums to discuss defence issues.[302] Though Canada was publicly criticized at home and in the United States for cutting its defence spending in the 1980s and 1990s, 9/11 and Canada's involvement in Afghanistan turned things around, at least enough for Canadians to notice. Overall, Canada's priority is undoubtedly the North American perimeter and it has few objective strategic interests abroad.

In contrast to the British case, the cost of not supporting the United States internationally is relatively low. As seen in the previous chapter, the UK is not strategically inclined to go against the United States and seeks bilateral leverage by positioning itself as the first among allies. In Australia, discussed in the next chapter, there is a pragmatic

---

[302] George Macdonald, *Canada-U.S. Defence Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan*, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Ottawa, May 6, 2002, Online, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=1004 (consulted on 11 may 2009).

bilateral policy with the United States where a series of precise conditions are exchanged for Australian support on issues that matter to the United States. The Canadian strategy is different. What is striking about the Canada-US security relationship is how each issue is managed separately. There is no overarching approach to manage the bilateral relationship.

Other scholars have commented on this dynamic, implying that this is a conscious choice made by Canadian decision-makers. Richter argues that Canada has a preference for ad hoc institutions and issue-specific arrangements as a way to structure the bilateral relationship.[303] Kitchen points out that this administrative approach is chosen as a way to increase Canada's leverage in bilateral negotiations.[304] The case of NAFTA shows Canada to be a strong player in asymmetric negotiations.[305] What is intriguing from an IR standpoint is how Canada levelled the playing field through the use of various strategies. As Winham and DeBoer-Ashworth note, "Canada, as the weaker power, had an interest in engaging the United States in a rules-based rather than a power-based relationship, and it viewed a strong dispute settlement mechanism as one way to achieve this".[306] Also important is the comparatively greater amount of resources and time that Canada devoted to these negotiations, in contrast to the United States. Can similar tactics be applied to the

---

[303] Andrew Richter, "From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbor: Canada-U.S. Relations in a Changing Global Environment", *American Review of Canadian Studies* 35, 3 (2005), 471-502.

[304] Veronica Kitchen, "Smarter Cooperation in Canada-U.S. Relations?", *International Journal* 59, 3 (2004), 698.

[305] By citing the FTA as an example of the asymmetric relationship between Canada and the United States, I do not want to suggest that these can be generalized across issue-areas. International trade, as an issue-area, is arguably more amenable to compromise than security, for example. As such, one of the reasons that Canada was so successful in levelling the playing field is partly due to the nature what was being negotiated.

[306] Gilbert R. Winham and Elizabeth De Boer-Ashworth, "Canada-US Free Trade Agreement", in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 36.

security realm? When one looks at the Canadian stance on foreign policy issues, one is struck by the lack of consistency in the overall policy toward the United States. Furthermore, some leverage may be lost since the possibility of obtaining concessions from issue-linkages is foregone.

In other instances, Ottawa has had to simply adapt to Washington's policy changes. For Canadian defence, this was felt with the creation of Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in 2002 and the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 (DHS). These new structures challenged pre-existing arrangements: NORTHCOM now has overlapping jurisdictions with NORAD when it comes to the defence of North American airspace, while DHS has taken over centralized border management and enforces new security measures along the American border with Canada. In 2002, a Canada-US High Level Working Group was established to discuss North American security challenges in the post-9/11 environment. The Canadian representatives were tasked with presenting the Canadian position as these changes were being implemented, a mission which can be summarized as "protect[ing] the sovereignty of Canada and the policy independence of Canadian government..."[307]

Between 2001 and 2003, Canadian security concerns were dominated by the Canada-US border. After 9/11, Canada needed to take a more active part in the struggle against terrorism, as part of its bilateral relationship with the US. Following 9/11, both

---

[307] Macdonald, *Canada-U.S. Defence Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan*. The special representatives were Dr Ken Calder, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) from the Department of National Defence, Jim Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) for International Security Relations at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Lieutenant-General George MacDonald, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.

Canadian and American observers pointed to the Canada-US border as a gateway for terrorists.[308] Both the Canadian and American governments saw as a priority the enhancement of security on the North American perimeter. In Canada, billions of dollars were allocated for border security. There are powerful economic incentives for Canada to respond quickly to American security concerns on its border. Indeed, keeping the border open for business is a top priority for any Canadian government, crisis or not.[309] In this sense, Canada literally cannot afford to be perceived as a security liability to the United States. To uphold its commercial interests, Canada needed to address American security concerns. A related argument views Canadian and American interests as so intrinsically linked that opting out of defence arrangements or coalitions with the United States is more often than not detrimental to Canadian national interests.[310]

For some, close security integration with the United States translates into a loss of sovereignty.[311] The fear is that integration will undermine Canadian independence in foreign and defence policymaking to the benefit of American interests. A stronger argument in this camp maintains that, should Canada fail to provide adequately for its

---

[308] David G. Haglund and Michel Fortmann, "Le Canada et la question de la sécurité du territoire : l'exemption de Kingston tient-elle toujours?", *Revue militaire canadienne* 3, 1 (2002), 17-22.

[309] Andrew F. Cooper, "Waiting at the Perimeter: Making US Policy in Canada", in Maureen Appel Molot and Fenn Osler Hampson (eds), *Canada Among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders* (Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 2000).

[310] J. L. Granatstein, *Whose War Is It? How Canada Can Survive in the Post-9/11 World* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007).

[311] Stéphane Roussel, "Sécurité, souveraineté ou prospérité? Le Canada et le périmètre de sécurité nord-américain", *Options politiques* 23, 3 (2002), 16-17; Stéphane Roussel, "Canadian-American Relations: Time for Cassandra?", *American Review of Canadian Studies* 30, 2 (2000), 143-148. See also Nils Ørvik.

security at the border, the United States would then take on the task unilaterally.[312] This is known as the defence against help thesis. Roussel points out several features that can cause alarm in Canadian decision-making circles: the degradation of diplomatic relations with the US; the American perception of Canada as being part of their territory; American military presence in Canada and the coordination of national security policies.[313] What about Canada-US military cooperation abroad?

The initial commitment of Canadian troops in Afghanistan is almost a perfect embodiment of the foreign policy trade-off that asymmetric allies face: fulfill alliance expectations or pursue politically safe alternatives. The options are rarely dichotomized this way, but in the Fall of 2001, as the Chrétien government was reacting to the shock of 9/11, both options on the table reflected two familiar models of Canadian foreign policy. One, preferred by conservative elements, argues that Canadian national interests are fundamentally tied to the United States and should reflect this reality by being supportive of what our ally pursues. The other model is based on multilateralism, where Canada presents itself as an honest broker with a peacekeeping expertise and is consistent with Canada's strategic culture.

In sum, the fact that the 9/11 attacks occurred on American territory is of particular significance for an ally that is geographically tied to the United States. Not only did the event have important repercussions at the shared border, delaying the transport of goods

---

[312] Nils Ørvik, "Defence Against Help"; Donald Barry and Duane Bratt, "Defence against Help: Examining Canada-US Security", *American Review of Canadian Studies* 38, 1 (2008), 63-89; Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland Stewart, 2004).

[313] Stéphane Roussel, "Pearl Harbor et le World Trade Center: Le Canada face aux États-Unis en période de crise", Études internationales 33, 4 (2002), 685.

and services which are vital to the Canadian economy, but these events precipitated the reform of national and continental security arrangements. To be sure, Canada felt the need to increase its military capabilities as well, to keep up with Canada's growing involvement in the war in Afghanistan. This section has presented the Canada-US security relationship to show how changes in the security environment after 9/11 impacted Canada's alliance with the United States. Canada-US ties, through comprehensive agreements such as NORAD, make the relationship extremely responsive to security conditions in the North American perimeter. These concerns are closely tied to the two countries' security preoccupations in the North American region, but have deeper implications when military cooperation is being contemplated abroad.

Balancing Alliance Expectations and Domestic Constraints

Going back to one of the basic claims made in this dissertation, a state's international ambitions are first and foremost determined by its power, but state-level variables complete the equation.[314] As mentioned in the previous section, Canada's international interests are rather circumscribed. Major military commitments are usually made in response to American initiatives. Canada's relative power in the international system is important in understanding how decision-makers evaluate threats when contemplating military cooperation with the United States. Referring back to the causal mechanism, an explanation of asymmetric security cooperation draws on additional variables, as secondary states must balance US expectations with domestic-level constraints. Military cooperation for Canada

[314] Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy".

is thus a function of American expectations, as perceived by decision-makers or as expressed through formal requests for military support. The scope of military cooperation is driven or impeded first, by military feasibility, where available capabilities structure the commitment which can be offered and second, by the level of government cohesion which determines the political feasibility of taking part in an American-led coalition.

While Canada's strategic interests are dominated by border and continental security management, its international profile is raised by its close alliance with the United States. The contours of Canadian foreign policy are defined by both internal and external factors: there is a strong American influence, but Canadian decision-makers emphasize the autonomous facets of their foreign policy to their domestic audience. This is reminiscent of Ignatieff's comment about Canada-US relations, when he stated that "one of the great foreign policy challenges facing Canada is staying independent in an age of empire."[315] This statement is echoed by two Canadian political scientists who summarize the basic equation Canadian decision-makers must solve when military cooperation with the United States is at stake: "What is the minimum level of commitment needed to satisfy allies, avoid domestic opposition and make a useful contribution within budgetary limits?"[316] This is not an easy equation to solve by any government's standards. Even if the United States and Canada share many security interests, as is evident by their deeply institutionalized security relationship, disagreements have occurred over international military engagements.

---

[315] Michael Ignatieff, "Canada in the Age of Terror – Multilateralism Meets a Moment of Truth", *Policy Options* February (2003), 15.

[316] Jockel and Sokolsky, "Canada and the War in Afghanistan", 112.

Before assessing Canada's contribution to military cooperation with the United States, one must first determine how American expectations factor into Canadian decision-making.

How does Ottawa respond to Washington's expectations when military cooperation is at stake? The exercise from the previous chapter is replicated here. Three main indicators contribute to assessments of alliance expectations between the two countries: defence arrangements including treaties and MOUs; past experiences of military cooperation; and finally, operational requirements that are specific to military engagement being contemplated. The expectations from Washington are fairly minimalist with regards to Canadian involvement. The burden thus seems to fall on Canada, based on a set of estimated parameters, to assess the kind of commitment that would best fulfill these expectations. The goal is to improve Canada's international standing and its bilateral security ties with the US through politically feasible options. To that effect, the size of the commitment and the risks associated with a given mission are susceptible to raise the profile of an ally's role for a given intervention. However, the credit gained or improvements in standing are tenuous at best and difficult to evaluate. Canada's standing as a reliable ally for military cooperation was questionable after the 1990s. Several Defence officials mentioned that Canada had been deemed unreliable, or worse, a free-rider.[317]

In this sense, Canada's prolonged commitment in Afghanistan has challenged this view. If the War in Afghanistan was seen as an opportunity to redeem Canada's military reticence, in the eyes of the United States, the contributions of October 2001 have more

---

[317] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview" (Ottawa, February 2009).

meaning than the traditional burden-sharing approach would suggest. The next section will discuss the general treaty requirements that were invoked between 2001 and 2003, concurrently with requests made to the Canadian government by American officials. I will also refer to previous Canadian commitments to US-led coalitions. All these elements contribute to shaping American expectations of Canadian support and military contributions. I will focus on the decision-making processes leading up to the Canadian commitment in Afghanistan and examine why Ottawa opted out of the Iraq War.

Expectations and Results: Afghanistan and Iraq

The chronology leading up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq overlaps. Without conflating the two decisions or engaging in debates about the linkages between both wars in terms of burden-sharing, I have isolated three decisions for the exercise of structured, focused comparison. Since the focus of the study is on the initial decision-making process of the Canadian government leading to military cooperation, the period of interest is from 2001-2003. Subsequent deployments, like the redeployment of Canadian troops from Kabul to Kandahar, in 2005, are excluded from analysis for two reasons: first, American leadership in NATO operations is less apparent, making it harder to address the bilateral Canada-US dynamic; and second, as of December 2003, there is a minority government in Canada, under Prime Ministers Paul Martin and then Stephen Harper, a potentially confounding variable that cannot be controlled for with my set of case studies. As an additional consideration, evaluations of a state's reputation for reliability are best

undertaken if there is no change in leadership, since a reputation for reliability or unreliability may or may not outlive each individual leader.[318]

Table 5.2 Decisions on Initial Military Deployments of the CF: 2001-2003

Date	Decisions
Fall 2001-Winter 2002	OEF deployment: Naval taskforce, Air support, Special Forces and JTF2 in Afghanistan: 2000-3000 military personnel[319]
Winter 2003	Public stance against the War in Iraq by the Chrétien government.
Summer 2003	ISAF command: 1-year commitment in Kabul

Table 5.2 shows the timeline of these decisions. The deployment to Afghanistan in 2001 resulted in the contribution of 2000-3000 military personnel. The commitment leading to the one-year ISAF command in Kabul took place the following Summer. Finally, Ottawa's decision to opt out of Iraq was announced in March of 2003. Each decision is examined below. The first part of this section focuses on the Canadian commitment to Afghanistan, starting in October of 2001. The second part deals with Canada's decision not to participate to the war in Iraq.

Afghanistan

Following 9/11, there was strong support in Ottawa for the American perception of threat. The connection between the terrorist attacks, al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan was quickly recognized and government cohesion translated into an early signal of Canadian

---

[318] Alexandra Guisinger and Alastair Smith, "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46, 2 (2002), 175-200.

[319] The number 3000 represent Canada's peak commitment, as announced on December 27, 2001: Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canada Deploys More Forces to the Arabian Gulf Region,* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2001).

support for the American position and the potential use of force in Afghanistan. Solidarity with the US was expressed across political parties in an emergency parliamentary session following September 11. As the United States' neighbour, Canada felt the impact of the 2001 terrorist attacks directly, launching Operation Support to assist the American government on September 11 and the following days. The main task was to host travellers and aircrew from re-routed flights at CF facilities. The second task included emergency response and humanitarian assistance.[320] Canada also suffered economically from the attacks because of costly disruptions in commercial traffic at the land border. From the outset then, Canada was a committed partner to the US-led international campaign against terrorism.

Canadian involvement in Afghanistan took two forms. The first commitment was part of Operation Enduring Freedom and was under American leadership. OEF is geared toward combat operations and targeted against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The second commitment was part of ISAF, which was tasked with post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building, but later transformed into a combat role as security conditions worsened. Canada also oversaw the transfer of ISAF to become a NATO operation. Ottawa's initial commitment to OEF was to put 2000-3000 military personnel from the three services at the United States' disposal for early military operations in the fall of 2001 and the first half of 2002.

---

[320] Canada. Department of National Defence. *The Canadian Forces Contribution to the Campaign Against Terrorism,* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2001).

Were any specific requests made to the Canadians on the part of the Americans? The state of crisis meant that Canada had to broadly assess US expectations. Treaty commitments provided the first guide. By invoking Article V of its founding treaty, NATO identified the invasion of Afghanistan as an act of collective self-defence. As for the size of the initial Canadian commitment in Afghanistan, the scope of the military contribution "was not called into question, the US was happy with the contribution," according to the Defence Minister's chief of staff.[321] Beyond the legally binding obligations of support as set out by Article V of the Atlantic Charter (and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368), Canada was not solicited for a specific material contribution, but was left to decide the scope and significance of its commitment.[322]

As it turns out, a clear request may have been a lot easier to manage for Canadian officials. The Canadian government volunteered a contribution based on what the military advised to be operationally feasible. In the words of a defence official, "we were there with our thumbs out."[323] In essence, the Canadian contribution in the Fall of 2001 was there to fill the gaps and did not attract much attention. In fact, the presence of the Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), Canada's elite Special Forces, were only made public after their deployment.[324] The financial implications of the deployment were also an important consideration since the budget was mostly allocated from annual appropriations rather than the regular defence

---

[321] von Hlatky, "Interview with Eugene Lang".

[322] The link between UN and NATO endorsement of military intervention and international legitimacy is discussed in Alex Thompson, "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission", *International Organization* 61, 1 (2006), 1-34.

[323] von Hlatky, "Interview".

[324] Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War.*

budget. American expectations of its Canadian ally were strongly focused on the border immediately after 9/11. As for the initial military commitment in Afghanistan, there were few domestic constraints: Chrétien had the necessary support from his government to make a respectable commitment according to Canada's available military capabilities.

The debate over Canada's military engagement focused on the role that Canadian armed forces should take up in Afghanistan: the first option was to fight alongside the Americans in a combat mission in Kandahar. The second option was to side with the Europeans, engaged in peace support operations in the Afghan capital of Kabul. The ISAF mission was to take shape by December 2001 and though the outlines were not clearly set out, it seemed "tailor made" for Canada.[325] The ambivalence resulted in circumstances dictating the right option for Canada, which would be to join the Americans in the South for a clearly-defined period of six months, under the OEF umbrella rather than the multilateral and UN-mandated ISAF.

US-led military operations to destroy terrorist camps and Taliban military installations began early in October 2001. The Canadian and British responses were similar in many respects, with Britain's commitment being greater in scope and more visible. The Canadian commitment to the war in Afghanistan was codenamed Operation Apollo and was under the operational command of Canadian Joint Task Force South West Asia (CJTFSWA). The first American request made to the Canadian government concerned Canadian military personnel in exchange programs with the United States. In late

---

[325] Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War.*

September 2001, Defence Minister Art Eggleton authorized CF personnel to serve with their host unit in the campaign against terrorism.[326] On October 8, the first navy deployment was announced as the HMCS Halifax, operating with NATO, was directed to the Persian Gulf, with 230 personnel. In addition, a Canadian Naval Task Group of 1000, consisting of two frigates, a destroyer, a supply ship and Sea King helicopters was committed to the effort, along with HMCS Vancouver, to join the US Carrier Battle Group.[327] The Air Force provided surveillance and airlift with three Hercules, one Airbus and two Aurora maritime patrol aircraft. On the army side, the Canadian government contributed its JTF2, Canada's elite Special Forces. The Navy provided the first Canadian units to OEF, conducting operations in the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The Navy has benefited from a high level of interoperability working with the US Carrier Battle Groups in the Arabian Gulf in enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq for ten years. Moreover, the CJTFSWA is co-located with CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida.[328]

The second American request for OEF came in mid-November, asking coalition partners to provide ground troops for stabilization operations. Canada's contribution, 1000 members of its Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)), came mostly from the battalions of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the IRF(L). Government documents and statements from the Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) are

---

[326]Art Eggleton, *National Defence Press Conference: Canadian Military Contributions* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2001).

[327] *Ibid*.

[328] Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canada's Naval Task Group Arrives in Arabian Sea* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2001).

clear on the command of assets: "CF assets always remain under Canadian command, operating under Canadian rules of engagement, and in compliance with Canadian law," though daily tasking can be carried under coalition command.[329] Moreover, Canada's commitment of military support to the US-led coalition was justified in light of Article 51 of the UN Charter, citing collective self-defence, as well as UNSC Resolutions 1368 and 1373, condemning the September 11 attacks and restating the right to self-defence.[330] Once these commitments had been made, at the request of the United States, the Canadian government stood by for further details on a deployment schedule for its ground forces, as well as the precise role troops would undertake in Afghanistan. During that period, a high level of government cohesion translated into deferral to the United States. US expectations and requirements, along with the availability of Canadian military capabilities were the driving factors behind the type and scope of the military commitment under OEF.

Early on in 2002, the deployment of ground forces to Kandahar was confirmed by further American requests. For example, the capabilities of the Coyote were in demand for the planned operations. At this point the PPCLI Battle Group was to be deployed for a period of six months.[331] The JTF2 was already in theater, engaging in combat operations in Afghanistan, but was low on the public radar, with little information available publicly. Canada's Air Force, for their part, deployed a Strategic Airlift Detachment with one CC-

---

[329] Canada. Department of National Defence. *The Canadian Forces Contribution to the Campaign Against Terrorism*.

[330] Art Eggleton, *Minister of National Defence Statement in the House of Commons,* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2001).

[331] Canada. Department of National Defence. "Canada Deploys Ground Forces to Afghanistan", *News Release* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002).

150 Polaris (Airbus A310) strategic lift aircraft, a Long-Range Patrol Detachment, with two CP-140 Aurora long-range surveillance and maritime patrol aircraft and a Tactical Airlift Detachment in late January, from 8 Wing Trenton, consisting of three CC-130 Hercules transport aircraft to transport military personnel, equipment and cargo within Afghanistan.[332] Further requests were made by the US throughout this period. For example, in March 2002, Canada added another infantry company to the 3 PPCLI Battle Group, for a total of 880 soldiers in the Kandahar region.[333]

The first phase of Canada's military engagement in Afghanistan, from 2001 to 2002, was a contribution of almost 3000 military personnel, representing two-thirds of Canadian troops deployed worldwide, by far Canada's biggest commitment abroad.[334] In March 2002, the 3 PPCLI Battle Group engaged in combat operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban factions moving from its Kandahar-based operations to Tora Bora for Operation Anaconda.[335] Canadian soldiers had been part of the US Army task force, consisting of the 187th Brigade Combat Team (187 BCT) from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault),

---

[332] Canada. Department of National Defence. "Canada Deploys Three Transport Aircraft to the Arabian Gulf Region", *News Release* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002); Canada. Department of National Defence. *The Contribution of the Tactical Airlift Detachment to Operation Apollo* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002); Canada. Department of National Defence. "The Canadian Forces Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism", *Backgrounder* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002).

[333] Canada. Department of National Defence. "Canada to Send More Ground Troops to Afghanistan", *News Release* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002).

[334] Canada. Department of National Defence. "Canadian Forces Ground Troops Departing for Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf Region", *News Release* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002). Canada's second biggest military contribution was to Operation Palladium, in support of the NATO mission in Bosnia Herzegovina.

[335] Canada. Department of National Defence. "Canada Battle Group Moving Forward for Combat Operations", *News Release* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002).

assisting in tasks ranging from airfield security to combat.[336] After Operation Anaconda, a new mission was launched codenamed Operation Harpoon, described as "a joint Canadian –American assault using land and air forces to eliminate a specific pocket of Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance."[337] This was followed by Operation TORII in May 2002, also in the Tora Bora region, to gather intelligence and destroy enemy cave complexes.[338] These American requests, and Canada's ability to respond to them, are a fulfillment of allied expectations and a testament to interoperability across services. On May 21, 2002, the Canadian government announced that the 3 PPCLI Battle Group would return to Canada in late July or August with no replacement.[339] This reduced the Canadian commitment to about 1300 military personnel by late 2002.

The next phase of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan was to begin in July of 2003 with Operation Athena, the Canadian contribution to ISAF in Kabul. With a commitment of approximately 2000 military personnel, the timing of the decision, Fall 2002, is auspicious. The announcement was made in February of 2003 at which time the Chrétien government had not yet announced that it would opt out of the Iraq War. Defence Minister McCallum made a connection between the new Canadian commitment under ISAF noting that, under such a high operational tempo, other engagements would be unlikely: "Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld welcomed the initiative, stating on February

---

[336] Canada. Department of National Defence. "The Canadian Forces Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism".

[337] *Ibid*.

[338] *Ibid*.

[339] Canada. Department of National Defence. "Canadian Troops to Return to Afghanistan", *News Release* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2002).

19th that 'Canada has been a solid ally in the global war against terrorism, and we thank the Canadian people for their support in defending freedom around the world. Mr Rumsfeld, I might add, is fully cognizant of the fact that this mission limits the deployment of Canadian land forces to other parts of the world for well over a year."[340] On March 25, 2003, a week into the war in Iraq, John McCallum announced the deployment of a Strategic Reconnaisance Team (SRT) to Kabul, three days earlier, in preparation for Operation Athena.[341]

Iraq

There is clear overlap between the second commitment in Afghanistan, decided in the Fall of 2002, and the Canadian decision to opt out of Iraq, in March 2003. How can we make sense of the decision-making processes over this period? Overall, the decision to go to Iraq did not motivate the loyalty of American allies in the same way the Afghanistan war did, which signals a break with the prevailing security framework which focused on the threat of terrorism as the overarching priority. The portrayal of Saddam Hussein as evil, the relentless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the impasses suffered at the United Nations all strained the United States' ability to garner support for an intervention in Iraq. The perception of threat differed greatly on several issues: "…. The Bush team's allegations of an operational relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq, in its insinuations that

---

[340] John McCallum, "Speech at the Conference of Defence Associations Annual General Meeting" (February 27, 2003).

[341] Canada. Department of National Defence. "Strategic Reconnaissance Team Departs for Afghanistan", *News Release* (Ottawa: Government of Canada, March 2003).

the latter bore some responsibility for the September 11 attacks, and in its charges that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear weapons components".[342] Few states adhered to this interpretation of the intelligence evidence.

Canada's response to the War in Iraq stands apart when compared with the British and Australian cases. Referring back to our causal mechanism can account for the variation in outcomes. By looking at US expectation, there is a noticeable shift in emphasis when Canada is concerned: while the United States and Canada were cooperating closely on issues of border security and management, Washington did not expect much from Ottawa in terms of international military commitments. As the scope of the War on Terror broadened and the possibility of war in Iraq became increasingly clear, secondary allies felt additional pressure to increase their commitment to assist in American efforts. For the Iraq War specifically, US expectations of Canada were minimal. In fact, no formal request was made by the United States for a Canadian commitment, according to Defence Minister John McCallum.[343] It seems the only precise request which was made by the Americans to Canada was channelled from Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld to McCallum and concerned Afghanistan rather than Iraq. "It caught us off guard."[344] It represented the optimal solution for Canada: acquiescing to American demands by taking a leading ISAF role, something that would play well domestically. In terms of the trade-off between expectations and feasibility, this option presented a perfect equilibrium. Moreover, the

---

[342] Ronald R. Krebs and Chaim Kaufmann, "Selling the Market Short? The Marketplace of Ideas and the Iraq War", *International Security* 29, 4 (2005), 196.

[343] von Hlatky, "Interview with John McCallum".

[344] von Hlatky, "Interview with Eugene Lang".

Defence Minister McCallum made it clear that through this commitment, no troop contribution to Iraq would be possible.[345] This option thus quickly garnered internal momentum in the Canadian government.

At this stage, during the Fall of 2002, domestic constraints intervened. The first set of constraints, available military commitments changed quickly: by the end of the summer in 2002, Canadian troops were returning from their deployment in Afghanistan. However, not long after, new requests were placed on Ottawa for a renewed commitment in Afghanistan. As previously mentioned, the Americans alluded to the possibility of a Canadian command of ISAF planned for 2003.[346] In that context, Canada would not have available capabilities for a new concurrent commitment, in Iraq or elsewhere.

Further domestic constraints complicated the equation as the level of government cohesion was undermined by changes within the ruling party: the Liberal Party of Canada. Prime Minister Chrétien was in the midst of a third term in office and his political successor was eager for the transition. At the end of the summer 2002, observers were predicting a fierce battle between the two camps: "Who will win? Liberal history may be with Chrétien, but the hard numbers are with Martin. No sitting prime minister has ever been done in by an inside job, none have faced a popular rival with unlimited resources who's been organizing for this moment the better part of a decade".[347] On both fronts, the

---

[345] Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War*.

[346] Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War*.

[347] Julian Beltrame, "Martin, Chrétien Gird for Battle", *Maclean's*, 17 June 2002.

level of military capabilities and government cohesion, domestic constraints influenced the Canadian decision to opt out of a commitment in the Iraq War.

One wonders why Canada's refusal to support the military in Iraq came as a surprise to some American observers.[348] One explanation lies at the bureaucratic level, as there were conflicting messages in the many bilateral channels of Canada-US interactions. The Canadian military was involved with the American military at the US Central Command in Tampa Bay, Florida, making for close contact between Canadian and American officials. When referring to Canada's military capacity should the political commitment be made, it was mentioned by Canadian officials that 600-800 troops could be deployed.[349] This assessment may have fueled American speculations that Canada would participate.

Beyond the failures of the political campaign led by Bush to garner international support in Iraq, the expectations placed on Canada between 2001 and 2003 were squarely expressed in terms of providing legitimacy for the operation, rather than to fill operational needs. In situations when support is withheld, as made clear by Canada's very public refusal to participate in Iraq, allies are likely to face diplomatic consequences. Though short-lived, the Canadian government suffered some backlash for coming out against the American intervention in Iraq: diplomatic lashings, door-slamming at the military level, and withholding privileges on intelligence sharing.[350]

---

[348] Paul Cellucci, *Unquiet Diplomacy* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2005).

[349] Jockel and Sokolsky, "Canada and the War in Afghanistan", 104.

[350] von Hlatky, "Interview".

Furthermore, it seems that Canadian intentions were not properly communicated to the Americans, making for unpleasant diplomatic exchanges in March and April of 2003. As will be discussed in a subsequent section which addresses the domestic political structure in Canada at the time, it becomes evident that the government's policy was not clearly articulated between 2002 and 2003. Not only were politicians making contradictory statements but the leadership was undermined in its ability to confirm what Ottawa's position would be. This left Cabinet ministers in the dark about Chrétien's true position on Iraq.[351] This seems to have been a consequence of worsening government cohesion, a context which could easily lead to contradictory signals from politicians.

Canada's refusal to lend diplomatic support to the war is more puzzling. As one commentator suggests, Canada "… could have supported the American action without involving any troops at all, only those that are already in the region."[352] Facing strong diplomatic pressures, Canada did not exactly stand firm on the issue.[353] Ottawa appealed to several strategies to redress the situation: by making a financial contribution to the American effort, by pledging its support initially after the beginning of the hostilities and by making a contribution to stabilization operations, as part of Operation Iolaus.[354]

---

[351] von Hlatky. "Interview".

[352] John J. Noble, "Canada-US Relations in the Post-Iraq-War Era: Stop the Drift Toward Irrelevance", *Policy Options* May (2003), 19-24.

[353] With the initial active participation of Great Britain, Poland, Australia and Denmark.

[354] This contribution was made up of exactly one CF officer, to be part of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) in October of 2004.

Alternative Explanations

This section draws on the theoretical discussion of chapters 2 and 3. It presents an overview of alternative explanations to test their significance in the Canadian case. There have been volumes of academic writing on the topic of Canada's military role in Afghanistan and its refusal to commit troops or lend support to the war in Iraq. Several analyses focus on the role of the UN, the special relationship between Canada and the United States, and the role of public opinion in swaying Jean Chrétien's Liberal government, especially on the Iraq question. Various alternative explanations will be discussed with the main research question in mind: understanding asymmetric military cooperation in times of war.

A prominent view in the study of Canadian foreign policy focuses on Canadian strategic culture and identity as important factors of decision-making. Canada, according to political scientist Stéphane Roussel, is guided by a strategic culture all of its own, which has been evolving constantly since the end of World War II. Canada behaves like a middle power, with good international intentions, with a preference for multilateralism, and a tailored expertise for peacekeeping.[355] This presence of Canadian values in foreign policy seems well anchored in the general public's perception of Canada's international role. This view was most closely associated with two Canadian politicians: Lester B. Pearson and Lloyd Axworthy. Lester B. Pearson was Foreign Affairs Minister and then a Prime Minister in 1963. At the UN he is credited with mediating the consensus for the creation of the UN peacekeeping forces and on the domestic front he is recognized as having initiated the

---

[355] Stéphane Roussel (ed.), *Culture stratégique et politique de défense : L'expérience canadienne* (Montréal : Éditions Athéna, 2008).

peacekeeping turn in Canadian foreign policy. Following his mediation of the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957. Lloyd Axworthy, who became Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996, for his part, is well known for his emphasis on human security as a pillar of Canadian foreign policy as a cost-efficient way of promoting Canada's role abroad in a period of severe fiscal constraints and cuts in the defence budget.[356] With their penchant for peacekeeping missions**,** both Pearson and Axworthy framed Canadian foreign policy as a quasi-moral enterprise, which appealed to the Canadian public.

In terms of developing a theory of foreign policy, how do culture and identity measure up as independent variables? The constructivist school in IR has devoted attention to these topics.[357] In the Canadian context, such arguments have emphasized the importance of being identified as a good international citizen as an important motivation in foreign policy decision-making.[358] There are important payoffs to this approach which are measured in the currency of international prestige. The thorny issue of distinguishing between prestige as a motivator or as a result of foreign policy dilutes its appeal as a workable hypothesis. For example, both military power and the restraint of military power can be prestige-enhancing actions. Prestige can also be one of the main motivators for both types of behaviour. Another reason which makes such accounts of foreign policy

---

[356] See Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership", *International Journal* 52, 2 (1998), 183-196 and Lloyd Axworthy,*Navigating a New World* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

[357] For example, see Finnemore and Sikkink, "International norm dynamics and political change".

[358] Srdjan Vucetic, "Why Did Canada Sit Out of the Iraq War? One Constructivist Analysis" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 13, 1 (2006), 133-153; Lana Wylie, "Valuing Reputation and Prestige: Canadian Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court", *American Review of Canadian Studies* 39, 2 (2009), 114.

unconvincing is the fact that no state, except in extreme cases of rogue states, will purposefully attempt to become a bad international citizen. This predisposition would be particularly strong among American allies which have material interests in being seen as good international citizens.[359]

Thus the fulfillment of Canada's identity as a good international citizen, or the quest for prestige, produces few independent effects on Canadian foreign policy decision-making. At best, it acts as a macro-level theory, defining the context within which certain decisions can be made politically acceptable.[360] Consequently, the internationalist identity of the Canadian population appears as a constant, rather than a variable which can account for specific foreign policy decisions. The importance of the identity-based or cultural explanations is made more salient when instrumentalized for political purposes, as was done during the Pearson and Axworthy eras. Claims about good citizenship are perhaps not as significant if they are not backed up by a certain level of hard power to enable the implementation of the international ideals promoted. Therein lies the third weakness of this approach: if Canadian foreign policy were strongly determined by the humanitarian imperative, we would have seen a steady increase in the financial allocations to human security rather than human security emerging in times of financial constraints**.** Indeed, when defence budgets soar, Canadian officials are singing a different tune.

---

[359] Gareth Evans, "Australian Foreign Policy: Priorities in a Changing World", *Australian Outlook* 43, 2 (1989), 1-15.

[360] For a discussion of Canadian public opinion and internationalism, see Parkin, "Pro-Canadian, Anti-American or Anti-War? Canadian Public Opinion on the Eve of War", 5-7.

A related but separate point concerns the role of the United Nations in Canadian military involvement internationally. Disregarding the fact that Canada participated in the war in Kosovo without UN approval, one could argue that Canada has made UN approval a condition to military cooperation with the United States. This seems consistent with the record: Canada chose to participate in the war in Afghanistan but opted out of the Iraq War. Referred to as the Chrétien doctrine, this strategy implies that Canadian foreign policy decisions involving the use of force should have the UN seal of approval.[361] The mythology of Canada as the quintessential peacekeeper is consistent with this vision, but has been outdated at least since the mid-1990s. Canada's initial military commitment in Afghanistan, as part of OEF, rather than ISAF, illustrates this point. I argue that insisting on drawing out the UN process was a strategy rather than a causal factor in Canadian decision-making. Canada, instead of siding with France at the UN, attempted to rival the British in proposing a second resolution.[362] Furthermore, public statements show that the option of going to war without a second resolution was kept open. Chrétien only confirmed his position in the very end, in March 2003.

Another popular interpretation for Chrétien's decision to withhold support for the war in Iraq is based on domestic public opinion. This argument is less relevant for the case of Afghanistan, since the initial commitment of Canadian troops was made almost immediately.[363] Moreover, opinion polls following 9/11 clearly indicated that Canada was a

---

[361] Allan Gotlieb, "The Chrétien Doctrine", *Maclean's*, March 31, 2003, 42.

[362] Paul Heinbecker, cited in Stein and Lang, *The Unexpected War.*

[363] Bill Graham, Canada, House of Commons, *Debate*, December 2001.

full partner in the "war on terror," and supportive of the military use of force.[364] In the case of Iraq, however, the decision-making timeframe was much longer, giving ample time for domestic political forces to build their position on the issue. It is well known that public opinion in Canada was not favourable to Canadian involvement in Iraq without the approval from the UN Security Council. Opposition was especially strong in Québec, which may be of significance because there was a provincial election underway where the sovereignist Parti québécois was engaged in a tight race with the Liberal Party of Québec.[365] This argument has several shortcomings. First, elections are rarely fought on the basis of foreign policy in Canada, and even less so in a provincial election. Second, there is no other evidence supporting this argument beside the fact that both events, the election and the public debate over Iraq, happened simultaneously. Finally, the claim has been vigorously denied by the Prime Minister and also dismissed by his close advisors.[366]

Though not directly related to my research question, the Canadian experience nonetheless lends support to certain findings on public opinion and the use of military force. Indeed, we can observe an increase in the level of public support for the Iraq war immediately after the beginning of the hostilities. This is consistent with the thesis that both the objectives of the military mission – in this case, the removal of Saddam and the early

---

[364] Andrew Parkin, "Pro-Canadian, Anti-American or Anti-War? Canadian Public Opinion on the Eve of War", *Policy Options* April (2003), 6.

[365] Jockel and Sokolsky, "Canada and the War in Afghanistan", 105.

[366] Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*; Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview" (Montreal, May 2009).

military successes in Iraq- determine public support.[367] During this period, it seems that result was more important than the process, since the war could hardly qualify as being a multilateral effort. Public opinion can be characterized as reactive to such international events, rather than as an independent driver of foreign policy.

Finally, we must consider the shift in Canada's security environment in the new strategic importance given to the Arctic region. The end of the Cold War liberated the Far North from Russian ICBM threats but with the publication of alarming scientific models showing the accelerated melting of the Arctic ice cap, a host of new concerns have surfaced. These predictions, announcing the opening of Arctic Passages much sooner than expected, have prompted Canadian policymakers to come up with a Northern strategy, involving the military, to prepare for a navigable North West passage sometime before 2050. Both the United States and Russia have already stepped up their presence in their respective (and overlapping) Arctic spheres. Whether or not the more alarmist accounts are borne out, policymakers have acted on this perceived threat in the circumpolar neighbourhood with plans to strengthen Canada's military presence in the region. For Canada, as America's Arctic neighbour in the North, this puts their special relationship to the test, as diplomatic tensions with the United States have been recurring on this issue.[368]

---

[367] Richard C. Eichenberg, "Victory Has Many Friend: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005", *International Security* 30, 1 (2005), 141.

[368] Oran R. Young, "Canada and the United States in the Arctic: Testing the 'Special Relationship'", *CARC* 15, 2 (1987) Online. http://www.carc.org/pubs/v15no2/2htm (Consulted in May 2005). For Cold War accounts on the strategic significance of the Arctic, see Oran R. Young, "The Age of the Arctic", *Foreign Policy* 61 (1985-86), 160-179; R.B. Byers and Michael Slacks (eds), *Strategy and the Arctic* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986); John Kirton, "Beyond Bilateralism: United States-Canadian Cooperation in the Arctic", in William E. Westermeyer and Kurt M. Shusterich (eds), *United States Arctic Interests: The 1980s and 1990s* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1984).

The increasing security concerns in the Arctic are relevant for the proposition on regional security mentioned in chapter 3. This proposition states that when regional security concerns increase, Canada should be more inclined to lend support and resources to US-led coalitions. The Arctic's strategic profile was spotlighted by the Harper government with its decision to invest in Canada's military capabilities to defend the Far North. In terms of Canada-US relations, the record is mixed. On the one hand, there have been several public statements on the Arctic, especially regarding US access to the waters of the Canadian archipelago, which have caused diplomatic tensions between the allies. On the other hand, growing Arctic concerns encouraged the expansion of NORAD to include a maritime dimension. Overall, although the Arctic may have encouraged greater exchanges and dialogue between the US and Canada, so far, these have not resulted in Canada showing greater deference to the United States.

Conclusion

Given Canada's status in the international state system, holding the rank of middle power, certain strategies must be deployed to maximize Canadian power and leverage within bilateral and multilateral settings. As Robert Keohane points out, smaller states have a range of strategies at their disposal: using international organizations to lobby on particular issues, ad hoc building coalitions, or to negotiate concessions bilaterally.[369] Different tactics hold different advantages. For example, on issues that are peripheral to American interests, Canada might apply pressure bilaterally because the United States is more likely to make

[369] Keohane, "Lilliputian's Dilemmas".

concessions. When the issue is high on the American agenda, Canadian officials should prefer multilateral channels where they can build on the support of other states to influence the United States.

What should we make of situations where the United States values something more than the Canadians? Can it coerce its weaker partner into going alone with its plans? A first look at the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, suggest that these events represented high-constraint encounters for Canada. Framing by Canadian politicians was aimed at narrowing the scope of the new War on Terror. Official speeches, both by Prime Minister Chrétien and Defense Minister Art Eggleton, framed the campaign against terrorism as a Canadian project, but remained cautious in revealing specifics about the military commitment. On the American side, rhetoric of bringing about justice presupposed a military solution. When President Bush spoke to the United Nations on November 10, 2001, he made his position clear: "The United States, supported by many nations, is bringing justice to the terrorists in Afghanistan. We're making progress against military targets, and that is our objective".[370]

In contrast to Bush's recurring promise of bringing terrorists to justice, Chrétien offers a Canadian echo, in pledging "…to bring them before the courts".[371] John Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, seems to concur with his leader in emphasizing the role of international law in the war on terrorism: "…it is consistent with the policy of the Government of Canada to seek orderly and judicial ways to resolve matters of international

---

[370] United States. White House. *President Bush Speaks to the UN* (Washington, DC: White House Papers, November 2001).

[371] Canada. House of Commons. *House of Commons Debate* (Ottawa, September 18, 2001).

importance, including ensuring that there is not impunity for international crime".[372] The Canadian approach is reminiscent of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan call for "bringing the perpetrators to justice, in a clear and transparent process that all can understand and accept".[373] Overall, the government appears reluctant to identify the September 11 attacks as an act of war. More attention to international law is given by the government in its appeal to just war principles, but more specifically, to the proportionality of any military response. To put things in perspective, reports from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade show that the Canadian government has been mostly preoccupied with keeping the border open and the future of North American integration in the age of terrorism.[374]

Finally, Canada has been a strong advocate of the UN as a way to engage with the United States. Using its diplomatic skills, it seeks out the role of a mediator to promote its international status. This was made apparent by the Canadian role in the international negotiations that unfolded at the UN in 2002 and 2003 over Iraq. Canada stayed involved in the UN-led process until the very end, apparently believing that French and American positions could be reconciled through a second resolution. In fact, two versions of this resolution were drafted in March 2003 by the Canadians but were unceremoniously rejected

---

[372] *Ibid*.

[373] Kofi A. Annan, "Address by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the United Nations General Assembly" (New York, September 24, 2001).

[374] Canada. House of Commons. *Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade* (Ottawa, November 27, 2001).

by both France and the United States. Without the United States on its side, one can wonder about the international reach of Canadian influence.

From the beginning, Chrétien was adamant about a UN resolution. However, when pressed for clarifications, he would often avoid a definite answer in one way or another: "throughout this period [Fall 2002-March 2003], the Canadian government's position was poorly articulated and inconsistently applied, some days indicating support for the U.S. while on other days suggesting the opposite."[375] Chrétien was pushing for different strategies in manifesting Canada's autonomy: stalling, vague terms, ambiguous stances, and alliance-seeking through the UN, all geared to achieve greater leverage when opting for non-participation. When the decision reached, why was Canada's refusal to participate in the war in Iraq announced with such fanfare and so indelicately handled? This is puzzling on the alliance-level because what amounted to a series of political blunders aggravated the Bush administration unnecessarily. There was Carolyn Parrish's indiscretion, Chrétien's press secretary calling President Bush a "moron", and the fact that the actual decision was announced in the House of Commons without giving any notice to the Americans. Then, after the initial phase of the war in Iraq, in April 2003, Chrétien suddenly adapted his discourse, offering political support for the coalition of the willing. Looking back to Canada's experience during the Vietnam War, Bothwell mentions that Chrétien's conduct in March 2003 could have used a dose of "quiet diplomacy," not offering any military support to the US, but sitting quietly as the United States pursued its policy of regime

---

[375] Richter, "From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbor", 478.

change.[376] These tactics make sense if we consider them as part of a broader strategy. In situations where Canada withholds support from the US, as was the case in Iraq, politicians play up the moral impetus of the decision by appealing to principles. At the same time, they opt for compensatory strategies, such as offering political or material support to the United States. This was the case in Iraq, but also in Vietnam, where Canada provided millions of dollars in aid and equipment to the Americans.

For some commentators, Canadian foreign policy is more the product of ad hoc decision-making than a clear vision of its national interests.[377] Although there are some advantages to this approach, it fails on issues that are most important to the United States. The degree of independence afforded to Canada, as a special ally, is partly due to its geographic location. If we think back to the framework outlined by Ikenberry where alliance relationships invoke both fears of entrapment and abandonment, Canada is seems immune to both. Since it shares strategic territory with the United States, it does not risk abandonment, and since it can withhold support for American initiatives without fearing the threat of abandonment, it has done so without lasting consequences to the bilateral relationship. These systemic conditions are important to understanding how Canada and the United States assess international threat and order their security priorities. To explain specific foreign policy decision, the causal mechanism based on US expectations is well-

---

[376] Robert Bothwell, "Back to the Future: Canada and Empires", *International Journal* 59, 2 (2003-04), 416. See also John Herd Thompson, "Playing by the New Washington Rules: The U.S. –Canada Relationship, 1994-2003", *American Review of Canadian Studies* 33, 1 (2003), 20.

[377] For example, see Charlotte Gray, "New Faces in Old Places: The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy" in Fred Osler Hampton and Christopher J. Maule (eds), *Canada among Nations 1991-1992: A New World Order* (Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1992).

suited and addresses the different foreign and defence policy paths special allies have taken between 2001 and 2003. For secondary powers like Canada, balancing US expectations with domestic constraints determines the scope and type of military commitments they can make. In the cases of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, military capabilities and the level of government cohesion are important to explain how Canadian responded to US military actions and calls for support.

Australia: Regional Power, Global War

Situated in the Southern Hemisphere of Southeast Asia, Australia faces unique security challenges far from its closest ally. In its immediate vicinity, Australia is willing to accept the lead responsibility in military interventions as it did in East Timor, for example. Australia is a major player in its region, a regional power, but a state of secondary rank in the global environment. For military interventions beyond the Asia-Pacific, Australia will invariably follow another state's lead, in all likelihood the United States, and contribute by offering smaller and more tailored commitments. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is structured to respond to crises in its neighbourhood, as Indonesia and several smaller states cause constant security concerns. Part of Australia's regional strategy is devoted to strengthening the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific, as the keeper of the Asian balance of power. The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS) treaty, for instance, binds the United States to security commitments in the Pacific region.[378] The bilateral relationship is vital to Australia: the United States is its most important partner for both security and trade, which is also the case for the UK and Canada.

The ANZUS alliance has been interpreted as a promise of mutual assistance in the Pacific region, but its original text is vague on the specific requirements.[379] With the events of September 11, the treaty's interpretation was expanded, as Prime Minister John Howard

---

[378] New Zealand is not longer part of ANZUS. The United States suspended its alliance ties with New Zealand in 1985 after it declared it would no longer allow nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships to use its ports.

[379] Desmond Ball, "The US-Australian Alliance", in Barry M. Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (eds), *US Allies in a Changing World* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), Chapter 12; Mark Beeson, "Australia's Relationship with the United States: the Case for Greater Independence", *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38, 3 (2003), 393-395.

moved to support the United States on grounds of collective self-defence even though the attack occurred outside of the Pacific region. Even during the Cold War, Australia has been a reliable ally to the US, fighting with the Americans in Vietnam, when the UK and Canada both refused to commit troops. Australia has consistently supported military cooperation with the United States. By doing so, it has been able to leverage its military commitments with the United States to further entangle its American ally in the Asia-Pacific, making it an interesting case for the study of asymmetric alliances.

Indeed, unlike the UK and Canada, Australia has acute regional security concerns. Australia has traditionally relied on a strong outside power to provide security guarantees for its protection. Prior to World War II, those guarantees were provided by Great Britain. But when Japan attacked Australia during World War II, it became clear that Australians would have to fend for themselves. This marked a turning point for military thinking in Australia and sparked a debate on how best to structure the ADF in the post World War II era. With time, Australian defence policy turned to the United States to replace Britain as the great power guardian raising the profile of the Australian-American alliance and culminating in the signing of ANZUS in 1951. This is not to say that Britain did not remain one of Australia's closest allies, only that the balance of power was taken into account as strategic thinking evolved in the 1950s and beyond. Australia now needed to factor in American expectations in crafting its new strategic posture, a reality that is just as relevant today.

As a coalition participant in both the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq, Australia has had its own political objectives for its alliance with the United States. Some

of these objectives have gone above and beyond the context of military cooperation, as in the case of the Free Trade agreement, which was implemented on January 1, 2005. Other goals focused on the Australia-US security relationship specifically, in an effort to deepen the ties and connections between the two countries' military and intelligence communities. The Australian decision to participate in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was strongly influenced by its regional security concerns and threat perceptions having also experienced a terrorist attack during the 2002 Bali bombings. Being simultaneously engaged in two wars has proven challenging for a country of relatively small size with a population of a little over 20 million people. It should be noted that the ADF was also committed in East Timor and the Solomon Islands during the same period of time. The Australian commitment to the East Timor peacekeeping was 1250 strong, while the ADF contribution in Solomon was estimated at 1400.[380] When taken together, these commitments and Australian contributions to the War on Terror imposed a high operational tempo on the ADF and represented a real strain on the country's resources.

This chapter discusses the decision-making process leading up to the commitment of Australian forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, focusing on the period between 2001 and 2003. I discuss Australia's response to American expectations as the main driver of military cooperation between Australia and the United States between 2001 and 2003. By drawing on key decisions leading to Australian commitments, I can determine the impact of perceived expectations on the type of military commitment made by Canberra. I also show

---

[380] Robert Hill, "Asia Pacific Security after September 11 – Continuity and Change" (Speech to C.E.W. Bean Foundation, Canberra, September 25, 2002); Australia. Department of Defence. *Defence and Justice Ministers to Visit Solomon Islands* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003).

that Australia was successful in leveraging its commitments to the War on Terror with the United States through various strategies, such as privileging the bilateral level of interaction to push its own list of security and economic priorities. These strategies are addressed in the conclusion of this chapter. The evidence demonstrates that the Howard government was careful in determining the scope of Australia's military involvement, even refusing the American request for additional troops. Domestic-level constraints are part of the analysis to explain these shifts in the scope of Australia's military cooperation with the United States. By examining the level of government cohesion and fluctuations in Australian military capabilities, due to concurrent military commitments, it is possible to explain the rationale for foreign and defence policy decisions taken between 2001 and 2003. The next section discusses the systemic factors underlying the Australia-US alliance and how these structure security priorities and threat perceptions.

Australia-US Security Cooperation

The overlapping security interests of Australia and the United States are less obvious than in the Canadian case. Yet, Australia can be introduced as the United States' most reliable partner. Australia has fought with the United States in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Though many of these commitments have been described as token, with the notable exception of the Vietnam War, the objective has been to establish an expectation of mutual support between Australia and the United States. Australia depends on an American presence in Asia to uphold the regional balance of power. In fact, the alliance commitments and obligations of the United States are explicitly stated as reasons

for the Australian position on Afghanistan and Iraq.[381] The Foreign Minister, for instance, justified Australia's participation in the Iraq War as consistent with the security 'insurance policy' provided to Australia by the United States.[382] This justification was also behind Australia's support for American ballistic missile defence in 2003 which was formalized into a 25-year commitment as part of a 2004 MOU with the United States.[383] This section examines Australia's foreign policy options, relative to its American ally, shedding light on the system-level parameters of their asymmetric security relationship.

The recent debates over Australia's new defence policy, the 2009 White Paper, has focused on two options: structuring the ADF according to the precepts of the Defence of Australia doctrine or tailoring the ADF as an expeditionary force to enhance Australia's ability to assist the United States in distant operations. This has been a recurrent debate in Australian defence policy. The Defence of Australia doctrine has been dominant since the Vietnam War but has been increasingly scrutinized as a result of the changed strategic environment and the open-ended nature of the War on Terror. Unlike Britain and Canada, Australian defence policy mentions the risk of an attack on its own shores as a probable, if not likely, contingency.[384]

---

[381] Alexander Downer, "Statement to Parliament on Iraq" (Parliament House, Canberra, February 4, 2003).

[382] Matt McDonald, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2004", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59, 2 (2005), 155; Joseph A. Camilleri, "A Leap Into the Past: In the Name of the National Interest," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, 3 (2003), 431-453.

[383] This benefits of Australia's alliance with the United States have increasingly come under scrutiny, see Mark Beeson, "American Hegemony: The View from Australia", *SAIS Review* 23, 2 (2003), 113-131.

[384] Australia, Department of Defence, *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000).

ANZUS is the core treaty managing the security relationship between the two countries. Australia also benefits from privileged access to American defence technology and intelligence, as enshrined in the UKUSA Agreement (along with the UK and Canada).[385] At the time the treaty was created in 1951, it signified a shift away from Britain as Australia's foremost alliance partner, in favour of the United States. The US had not only become the world's preeminent power**,** but was also increasingly engaged in the Asia-Pacific region. American alliances with South Korea and Japan are often described as the linchpin of stability in the Asian theatre.[386]

In terms of military cooperation, the War in Vietnam is a significant landmark in Australian-American relations and started with a successful request for troops by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The Australian commitment to the war was substantial. Sending nearly 50 000 troops, between 1962 and 1972, was a major achievement for a self-proclaimed middle power.[387] Britain and Canada, though offering tacit political support, refused to commit troops. By performing well in counterinsurgency warfare, the Australian perspective on Vietnam is different from the American Vietnam syndrome: the United States, not Australia, lost the war in Vietnam.[388] Vietnam is significant because it marked a shift in America's approach to defending Asia. Nixon's Guam Doctrine pushed Australia to

---

[385] Tow and Albinski, "ANZUS – Alive and Well After Fifty Years".

[386] Ashton Calvert, *The United States Alliance and Australian Foreign Policy – Past, Present and Future* (Sydney: University of Sydney, June 29, 2001).

[387] Stewart Firth, *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy* (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2005).

[388] Paul Ham, *Vietnam: The Australian War* (Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007).

self-reliance, the Defence of Australia doctrine, which meant that Australia would abandon the idea of a great power protector.

The other issue that has defined the relationship is the question of joint facilities, essentially satellite installations on Australian territory designed for ballistic missile early warning. Issued through the 1966 Pine Gap Agreement, these facilities have been controversial because of sovereignty concerns. Defending these as part of Australia's burden-sharing responsibilities to its American ally, Kim Beazley, Defence Minister between 1984 and 1990**,** outlines the importance of these facilities for the Australian-American security relationship:

> The three major facilities were incorporated into a logic which ran roughly as follows: North West Cape communicating with SSBN assisted an invulnerable American second strike capacity and therefore aided deterrence: Nurrungar's early warning function was essential for crisis stability as it enabled correction of false alarms elsewhere in the system and gave a US President time to think in the event of Soviet attack: Pine Gap was crucial for arms control verification and any hope of arms reductions. Whatever other purposes the facilities served, these purposes were robust enough to sustain an argument for their presence.[389]

Australia thus benefits from the protection of American extended nuclear deterrence. Beyond sovereignty concerns over these joint facilities, Australia's strategic posture has abided by the concept of defence self reliance. The United States is only expected to intervene on Australia's behalf in a situation where a major power would threaten the

---

[389] Kim Beazley, "Thinking Security: Influencing National Strategy from the Academy: An Australian Experience" (Coral Bell Lecture, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, March 2008), 11.

territorial integrity of Australia, providing that this major power's capabilities outweighed Australia's.[390] Nevertheless, Australia can rely on American security guarantees and benefits from the bilateral relationship through shared intelligence arrangements and by having access to American military technology.[391]

As of 2001, terrorism is identified as a top security priority for Australia, expecially given its regional context. From the 2000 edition of the Australian Government's Defence White Paper, entitled *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*, to the 2003 defence update *Australia's National Security*, there is an important shift in terms of the threats which are identified as priorities. These documents focus on three major threats: terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and security concerns in Australia's immediate region. Though regional security has consistently been featured as a preoccupation for Defence, the emphasis on terrorism and WMDs is clearly a response to the changed strategic environment following 9/11. Like the United States, Australia has inherited a responsibility, albeit at the regional level, to respond to the threats of terrorism, WMDs and the instability of weak and failing states in the Asia Pacific. Although each state holds a different power position in the international system, they both rely on their ability to project power to address security threats. In this sense, their perception of threats often overlaps, especially in upholding the Asian balance of power. When their perception of threats does not concur, Canberra's approach is pragmatic - pursue the goal of solidifying an

---

[390] Australia, Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030,* 50.

[391] Alexander Downer, "Security Australia's Interests – Australian Foreign Policy Priorities", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59, 1 (2005), 7-12.

expectation of mutual support - while underscoring its reputation for being a reliable alliance partner. Coalitions of the willing have proven to be a convenient tool for Australian military cooperation with the US, offering greater flexibility to respond to international threats. Referring to the War in Kosovo, Defence Minister Robert Hill (2001-2006) praised the efficiency of such coalitions: "We allowed President Milosevic to murder Kosovars until the US-led coalition of the willing put a stop to it."[392] Even under the Rudd government, coalitions are emerging as a worthy alternative to other types of multilateral engagements where the ADF can make a tailored commitment according to Australian strategic interests:

> Coalitions are becoming increasingly important means of dealing with many security challenges, including insurgencies, terrorist networks and outbreaks of political and ethnic violence. Such coalitions are vehicles by which different countries can pool their resources according to their comparative military strengths and capacity to contribution. Being willing to contribute – even modestly at times – sends a message to allies and others alike that we are prepared to shoulder common strategic burdens.[393]

Australia has also emphasized its bilateral relationship with China, especially in its 2009 Defence White Paper where it is acknowledged as a security partner of rising importance. Economic interests are an important driving factor in the relationship. The 2003 DFAT white paper encouraged the trend toward regional economic integration of Australia with Asia. A related concern is China's rise and its impact on the regional balance

---

[392] Downer, "Statement to Parliament on Iraq".

[393] Australia, Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, 47.

of power. In Australia's latest iteration of its Defence policy, there are references to the possibility of a shift in the regional balance of power, resulting in eventual American withdrawal from its commitments in the Asia-Pacific. Specifically it states that, a redistribution of strategic power would be of concern insofar as it could lead to "...a diminution in the willingness or capacity of the United States to act as a stabilizing force."[394] Not only is American power important in the region but its alliance with Japan and the security guarantees it confers to its allies are seen by Australia as pillars in the security architecture of the Asia Pacific. If the US were to withdraw from the Southwest Pacific region, Australia could turn to China in upholding a new balance of power. In the event of a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, the idea that Australia would be expected to align itself with the US should hostilities arise is not longer accepted at the Russell Offices.[395]

In sum, the regional balance of power is an important consideration when assessing the security priorities underlying the Australia-US alliance. In terms of explaining Australian foreign policy and decision-making processes that lead to military cooperation, systemic factors need to be complemented with other variables. In the next section, I build on my theoretical argument, showing that perceived alliance expectations drove the Howard government to make a strong commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the ability of Australia to respond to US expectations was mitigated by domestic-level

---

[394] *Ibid*., 28.

[395] Malcolm Fraser, "An Australian Critique", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55, 2 (2001), 225-234.

constraints: while the level of cohesion of the Howard government remained high between 2001 and 2003, concerns over military feasibility were caused by acute regional insecurity in Australia's own neighbourhood. The Bali bombings, by targeting Australians, and the intervention in the Solomon Islands for peace support operations, as well as ongoing peacekeeping operations in East Timor, translated into an increased regional role for Australia, which competed with its military participation in Afghanistan and Iraq, regions of little strategic importance for Australia.

Balancing Alliance Expectations and Domestic Constraints

In the previous section, I outlined how American and Australian perceptions of threat overlap despite having dramatically different power capabilities due to shared regional security concerns in the Asia-Pacific. Building on this general claim, other variables must be introduced to explain specific foreign policy decisions. Canberra turns to Washington for cues on what is expected as a contribution to military cooperation. These assessments are mitigated by two domestic-level constraints: the level of government cohesion and available military capabilities.

How do Australian decision-makers assess American expectations of them regarding international security concerns? The first criterion is the Australian-American expectation of mutual support as enshrined in their defence treaty, ANZUS, the foundational document of the alliance. Another alliance-level factor rests on past experience. Because ANZUS has endured over fifty years, there is a historical legacy of military cooperation between the two countries. Although the treaty was evoked for the first

time on September 11, 2001, the ADF has fought with the US military on several other occasions, from the Vietnam War to the first Gulf War. Past experiences thus provide decision-makers with cues on areas of mutual importance and general expectations about each state's strategic interests. Finally, alliance expectations are driven by US operational need. Contextual factors which are specific to a given security challenge will shape the nature of Australian military commitments.

Prime Minister Howard invoked Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in response to 9/11. A Defence media brief dating back to September 18, 2001, states that "In accordance with Article IV, the Government will continue to consult closely with the US in relation to any response, military or otherwise, the US may deem appropriate."[396] For the first time, much like NATO's article V, it was used as a pledge of allied support in the event of an attack on the United States. Indeed, the expectation was that ANZUS' raison d'être was to protect Australia, rather than the United States. Furthermore, the security guarantees enshrined in the treaty were limited to the Pacific region. In the broader War on Terror, the threat of terrorism had appeal in Australia, as a central preoccupation for its national security apparatus. The October 2002 Bali bombings made Australia's adherence to the GWOT that much stronger, considering that of the 202 casualties, 88 were Australian.[397]

By invoking ANZUS in response to 9/11, Howard expanded the interpretation of the treaty above and beyond its original formulation. This represents an important precedent for

---

[396] Australia. Department of Defence. "ADF Support to the United States", *Defence Media Release* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001).

[397] Bali Bombs 'Were Suicide Attacks', *BBC News*, October 2, 2005. Online. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4301630.stm (Consulted October 7, 2009).

alliance expectations. Despite a long tradition of security cooperation through ANZUS and subsequent arrangements in intelligence, security and defence, Australian and American strategic interests are not as fundamental as those the US shares with Canada because of its contiguous border, or the UK through its deeply entrenched transatlantic relationship. In the Asian theatre, it is increasingly acknowledged that Australian and American interests may differ.[398] This has led Australia to opt for a self-sufficient defence force while still benefiting from American military technology and a close overall security relationship. In terms of specific security challenges, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the Australian disposition has been accommodating of American security concerns, rather than being driven by strategic imperatives.

Furthermore, American operational needs must also be considered through different phases of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. More specifically, it is important to differentiate between the types of military deployment, whether for combat operations or stabilization operations. For combat, the need for allies has been downplayed and contributions have been accepted only if the military resources are self-sufficient and interoperable. For stabilization operations, the United States has a greater propensity to delegate, preferring a division of labour approach, where American troops do the heavy lifting in combat operations and allies could take charge of certain reconstruction and nation-building tasks. Thus, assessing the specific needs of the American-led coalition sheds light on the resulting American expectations of allied commitments.

---

[398] White, *Beyond the Defence of Australia*, 12-13.

Australia seems to benefit from a realist appraisal of American operations in the Middle East.[399] Though it has consistently offered political and military support to the United States in its Middle East endeavours, it has rarely made significant troop contributions, nor has it been expected to. In fact, one particular account notes that an Australian general sent to Iraq was given a title, deputy-chief of staff for operations with the Multi-National Force in Iraq but no job to match. In Major General Jim Molan's own words, "The coalition was oversupplied with foreign generals who were there to show their countries' interest in the war but little else."[400] Australia must assess the strategic return of its military commitments and also determine how these can best serve their American ally. An important criterion is thus self-sufficiency which infers that coalition forces should not depend on the American resources because they could be perceived as an impediment rather than as an asset. To this end, Australia has preferred to send Special Forces as its contribution to the US-led coalition with appreciated contributions from the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR).

By studying Australian military cooperation with the United States in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, between 2001 and 2003, I draw on evidence for Australian perceptions of American expectations. The causal mechanism is further specified with domestic-level constraints, defined as concerns over military feasibility and available capabilities, which determine the scope of military cooperation with the United States. The

---

[399] The term Middle East is meant to include both Afghanistan and Iraq, as it is done in Australia's official documents, and scholarly work for the sake of simplicity.

[400] Jim Molan, *Running the War in Iraq: An Australian General, 300,000 troops, the Bloodiest Conflict of Our Time* (Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008), 65.

level of government cohesion also influences the extent to which Canberra will defer to Washington in implementing military plans.

Australia in the War on Terror: Afghanistan and Iraq

The events of 9/11 and the threat of terrorism have profoundly altered not only the thrust of American foreign and defence policy but the entire strategic environment. For Australia, assessing the expectations of its American ally about what the Australian response should be to these threats represents an essential element in the process of decision-making. On the issue of terrorism, there is strong congruence over the perception of threat between the United States and Australia, in part because of the Bali bombings where Australians were targeted and killed. The threat of WMDs is presented in similar terms in American and Australian political discourse. For Australia, this threat is of particular concern in the Asian theatre with North Korea. Finally, instability in the Asia Pacific neighbourhood represents a paramount preoccupation in foreign and defence policy. This regional insecurity is a dominant factor in understanding the Australian context compared to the relatively stable environment of the UK and Canada.

A separate section will be devoted to Australia's regional security concerns from 2001 to 2003. Contrary to the competing hypothesis in chapter 2, it is an important mitigating factor that tempered rather than increased Australia's response to the War on Terror and its military commitments to the war of Afghanistan and Iraq. The analysis of the decision-making processes leading to Australia's engagement in the International Coalition against Terrorism is divided into three key phases reflecting the initial military deployment

of Australian Forces from 2001 to 2003 (Table 6.1). The Australian contribution to OEF in Afghanistan began in the Fall of 2001. By the Spring of 2003, attention had shifted to Iraq: the ADF had deployed 2000 military personnel to Operation Iraqi Freedom and would maintain a presence for stabilization operations.

Table 6.1 Initial Military Deployments of Australian Forces: 2001-2003

Date	Mission
Fall 2001-Winter 2002	Afghanistan – Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): 150 SAS Kandahar region and Operation Anaconda
March-May 2003	Iraq – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OEF): Operation Falconer 2000 military personnel, including Special Forces, and F-18s, naval warships, P3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft, C-130 transports.
July 2003- present	Iraq – Operation Catalyst: 1200 military personnel for stabilization mission.

This section details Australia's involvement in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, with a focus on the political decisions made prior to each military commitment. I argue that, although American expectations and the high level of perceived threat were strong factors in Australia's involvement, regional insecurity forced the ADF to make manageable commitments in both cases. To compensate for the modest numbers, Australia's commitments were tailored to American needs by being self-sufficient, and open-ended. This approach empowered Australia to achieve certain concessions, though indirectly, as it Howard government's access to the Bush administration improved.

Afghanistan

The threat posed by terrorism and al-Qaeda, in particular, is salient for Australia due to its geography. Concerned with extremism in Southeast Asia, counterterrorism for Australia

translated into regional initiatives, in addition to its initial and continued military involvement in Afghanistan. Indeed, Australia's neighbour state, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and has been grappling with political instability in its transition to democracy. The situation is closely monitored by Canberra, as radicalization of that country would translate into an increased terrorist threat in its immediate neighbourhood.

The struggle against terrorism has been described by Australia as an ideological confrontation, akin to the war against communism during the Cold War. For example, the 2003 Defence update states that the objective of modern terrorists is to "…roll back Western values, engagement and influence, and to weaken and ultimately supplant moderate Islamic governments."[401] What is interesting about the way Australian politicians framed the threat of international terrorism prior to their commitment in Afghanistan is in the global nature of the struggle, arguing that 9/11 was an attempt to "…re-order the international system…"[402] There is also an attempt to enhance Australia's commitment by highlighting the unconventional nature of the military confrontation, by referring to Australia's commitment to Vietnam and putting the emphasis on Australian capabilities in terms of intelligence and Special Forces.[403] On several occasions, terrorism is expressed as a common threat shared with the United States through ANZUS. However, the scope of the

---

[401] Australia, Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003), 11.

[402] Allan Hawke, *The War Against Terrorism, The White Paper and Industry* (Speech to Australian Business Limited, Canberra, October 26, 2001.

[403] *Ibid*.

relationship is clearly regional, as Australia is dependent on a consistent US presence in the Asian theater.

In a speech given to the Australian Defence Association on October 25, 2001, Prime Minister Howard makes a statement in this regard: "we expressed the conviction that the alliance has been a pillar of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and I welcomed the President's commitment to continued active US engagement in our region".[404] Soon after this declaration, Howard committed "two 707 aircraft refuelers, a 150-man SAS squadron, and an Orion Aircraft".[405] Australia also aligned its foreign and defence policy on American initiatives. For example, on September 21, 2001, Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer and Minister for Defence Peter Reith (who was succeeded by Robert Hill in November) announced that it would lift punitive measures against Pakistan, its role in the struggle against terrorism as the main reason to reinstate defence relations between the two countries.[406]

The first request made by the United States was to extend the Australian deployment in the Persian Gulf. On September 16 2001, Australia responded favourably to the request, ordering HMAS ANZAC to assist the US naval task group. The Australian frigate, with a crew of 164, had been in the Persian Gulf as part of the International

---

[404] John Howard, "Speech to the Australian Defence Association" (Canberra, October 25, 2001. Online. http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/pm_251001_speech.html).

[405] White, *Beyond the Defence of Australia,* 146.

[406] Alexander Downer and Peter Reith, *Australia and Pakistan – Resumption of Defence Links* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001).

Coalition to enforce trade sanctions against Iraq.[407] ADF personnel on exchange with the US, numbering 295, received the authorization to deploy with American forces, within and outside the United States.[408] ADF exchange personnel with the UK, numbering 44, were also authorized to deploy as part of coalition counter-terrorist operations.[409] The initial Australian commitment to *Operation Enduring Freedom* was announced in October 2001 and included a Navy presence in the Persian Gulf with three rotations of 150 SASR troops, air-to-air refuellers, F/A 18's, and P3Orions, as part of its supporting role in American combat operations with a total of approximately 2000 military personnel.

The Australian military commitment in Afghanistan, code-named Operation Slipper, had a presence in Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf. It had a significant leadership role through its maritime operations. Captain Peter Jones commanded the Multinational Interception Operations from an American ship, with an overall commitment of 400 Royal Australian Navy personnel.[410] Special Forces Task Groups in Afghanistan operated at the Forward Operating Base Rhino in the Kandahar region and in Tora Bora, in the Fall of 2001 and Winter of 2002 respectively.[411]

---

[407] Australia. Department of Defence. "HMAS ANZAC's Gulf Deployment Extended", *Defence Media Release* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001).

[408] Australia. Department of Defence. "ADF Support to the United States".

[409] Australia. Department of Defence. "Further Australian Military Support to the United States and the United Kingdom", *Defence Media Release* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001).

[410] Australia. Department of Defence. "Operation Slipper Update", *Defence Media Release* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002).

[411] Australia. Department of Defence. "No Australians Injured in Coalition Incident", *Defence Media Release* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001).

The Australian commitment was designed to operate self-sufficiently, if needed, and had the benefit of full interoperability. In January 2002, Brigadier Gary Bornholt updated information on the Australian Defence Force operations in the Coalition against Terrorism.[412] The naval taskforce would ensure a longer term presence and the SASR would engage in combat operations with the United States searching for al-Qaeda and Taliban pockets of resistance in the rough terrain near Pakistan's border. This included the replacement of *HMAS Sydney* by *HMAS Newcastle* after 105 days in the Persian Gulf as part of Coalition maritime operations, along with *HMAS Kanimbla* and *Adelaide*. The Royal Australian Air Force F18 detachment also underwent a rotation of 80 personnel while continuing air operations. In terms of land operations, the Special Forces Task Group, operating in Southern Afghanistan, engaged in Operation Anaconda with 150 troops. The SASR are tasked with intelligence gathering through clandestine strategic reconnaissance tasking.[413] Australian Special Forces operated with the US, in parallel with British and Canadian Special Forces.

It is important to note that, as part of the International Coalition in Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States has been in control of all forward operating bases in Afghanistan.[414] Operations in support of OEF have been conducted independently by the

---

[412] Gary Bornholt, "Australia`s Commitment to the International Coalition Against Terrorism" (Media Conference, January 19, 2002).

[413] Gary Bornholt, "Australia's Contribution to the Coalition Against Terrorism" (Press Conference, January 22, 2002).

[414] *Ibid*.

ADF with the US or with other coalition special forces.[415] The US called upon Australia's SASR for long-range reconnaissance and surveillance activities, offensive operations, recovery operations and counter-terrorism during Operation Anaconda in February and March 2002. The Australian and British Special Forces were the only "…non-Americans who were fully equipped and didn't need anything more from the American" which meant that the United States needed them more.[416] In the Fall of 2002, the Bali terrorist attacks did much to strengthen Australia's resolve as a member of the US coalition against terrorism and further united the Howard government as it considered participating in the Iraq War.

In addition to US expectations as a determinant of Australian military commitments, domestic-level constraints complement the analysis. The first such constraint is related to the level of available military capabilities. Concurrent commitments of the ADF during that period of time were in East Timor and Bougainville, meaning that the ADF were sustaining a high operational tempo. Military overstretch and the need for flexibility in case of a regional deployment had a limiting effect on the scope of Canberra's military contribution. Indeed the Australian government had invested in its regional approach to counter-terrorism. Canberra has sought to position itself as a leader in the Asia Pacific region and assure its presence at the forefront of regional initiatives.

Another domestic-level consideration, the level of government cohesion, was solidified through John Howard's third term as Prime Minister. Strong support for US

---

[415] Bornholt, "Australia's Contribution to the Coalition Against Terrorism".

[416] Greg Sheridan, *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance under Bush and Howard*, 51.

actions in Afghanistan within the Howard government meant that Australia deferred to the United States for this first phase of military cooperation under the OEF umbrella. Howard even ran his 2001 election campaign on foreign policy concerns, stressing the critical threat posed by terrorism. The next section provides an explanation for the Australian commitment in the Iraq War in March 2003 and for stabilization operations starting in July of 2003.

Iraq

The link between 9/11 and the war in Iraq came into being in a new strategic environment where rogue regimes were no longer to be tolerated, especially if the leaders of those regimes harboured WMD ambitions. Such was the case with Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. Although North Korea was not targeted by the United States to the same extent as Iraq, Australia has repeatedly pleaded the case of the nuclear threat posed North Korea. This threat was part of its own international security policy and was included as an Australian priority during its bilateral interactions with the United States. Australia's approach to the threat of WMDs has been termed "layered defence," which entails contributing to multilateral initiatives against the proliferation of WMDs and participating in military coalitions that punish non-compliant states and reinforcing domestic defence.[417] According to the terms of the May 2003 Non-Proliferation Regime**,** Australia has been a supporter of the CTBT, the 2002 NPT Review Conference, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention, and the negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and of

---

[417] Australia, Department of Defence, *Australia's National Security: A Defence Update*, 17.

course, the Australia Group. This involvement in the Non-Proliferation Regime is cited as the backdrop for taking a harder stand against Iraq. This has also translated in Australian support for American missile defence.

The Howard government also clearly positioned itself in favour of American action in Iraq. If the past can also serve as an indicator, Australia could be counted on by the United States to support it in Iraq. In September of 2002, Defence Minister Robert Hill acknowledged this by saying that "… you can look at the sort of contributions we're making at the moment, and the contributions that we've made in the past to get a reasonable sort of assessment of what we might one day be able to do in the future".[418] On the same occasion, Hill also mentioned the difficulties such a commitment would impose on the ADF, pointing to the limited availability of their military capabilities: "We are very stretched. It's almost an unprecedented level of operational tempo".[419] Although this would impose certain constraints on the scope of Australia's military engagement to the war in Iraq, it did not dissuade Canberra. Howard's firm backing from the government did not impose further constraints on engagement and the preparation of Australia's commitment in the Iraq War.

As early as January 2003, Australia had troops in the region to increase its readiness for the anticipated invasion of Iraq and to put additional pressure on Saddam's regime. As an al-Jazeera journalist put it, Iraq is "a long way from home" for a country like

---

[418] Robert Hill, "US Still Has to Make Case", (Interview given on September 25, 2002. Online. http//www.abc.net.au/pm/s684957).

[419] *Ibid*.

Australia.[420] However, Australia's involvement in Iraq is not exactly an outlier. Australia has been a consistent US ally in its involvement in the Middle East though the region is not directly tied to its national interests.

Australia's involvement in the Middle East can be traced back to the end of the Iran-Iraq War. It sent 96 Australian soldiers as part of a peacekeeping mission in the late 1980s, along the Iraq-Iran border. Like Britain, Australia participated in the Gulf War and offered military forces to the Gulf in 1998, although these were not needed by the US in the end. Since 1991, Australia has also maintained a naval presence in the region, its longest running deployment. Canberra's detachment from the region is clear, however. Unlike Britain, Australia has neither made attempts to build a strong connection between the Iraq War and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, nor did Canberra attempt to engage diplomatically on the MEPP. While the UK made it a point to negotiate progress on the MEPP as part of the conditions for its involvement in Iraq, Australia seldom made that connection or attempted to tie its commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq to immediate strategic interests in the region.

Rather the threat posed by the Iraq regime has been consistently expressed in reference to the threat of WMDs. Echoing the United States' justification for intervention in Iraq, the Howard government argued that 9/11 gave a new sense of urgency to the threat of WMDs. As mentioned before, the threat of WMDs was emphasized in the Asian theater. Preoccupied with Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, Australia wanted to bring focus to North

---

[420] Quoted in Alexander Downer, "Australia and the Middle East: Enduring Interests" (Speech at the Institute of Diplomacy, Amman, Jordan, May 22, 2003).

Korea in its bilateral exchanges with the Washington.[421] On numerous occasions, the problem of North Korea was posed to officials from the Bush administration as the Howard government tried to push the issue higher on the agenda.[422] This point was further discussed during the annual Australia-US Ministerial Meeting in Washington on October 26, 2002. Then, in dozens of speeches given by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in the Fall of 2002, the threat coming from North Korea and Iraq are depicted with equal gravity. Forceful action against Iraq could then act to set a deterrent or a precedent for other regimes posing WMD threats. In an address to Parliament on February 4, 2003, Downer asks "If Iraq is allowed to develop weapons of mass destruction, what message does it send to countries like North Korea?"[423]

In the winter of 2003, Howard saw domestic constraints increase against his support for the Iraq intervention with manifest divisions within his party. However, Howard managed to contain division by remaining elusive: "Parliament had not debated it…"[424] In avoiding political debate on the issue, Howard relied on a key assumption, namely that American military capability, with its new weapons' technology, would make for a quick and decisive victory as had been the case in 1991. Even in the aftermath of the WMD debacle, as no weapons were found, Howard stood firm on the idea that both Afghanistan and Iraq continued to represent key battlegrounds for global terrorism: "the most immediate

---

[421] Sheridan, *The Partnership.*

[422] Alexander Downer, "Australia's Security Policy: New Challenges, Enduring Interests" (Speech given at the Royal United Services Institute of Australia, South Australia, November 4, 2002).

[423] Alexander Downer, "Statement to Parliament on Iraq".

[424] Alison Broinowski, *Howard's War* (Melbourne: Scribe, 2003), 25.

security threats to Australia in 2006 come from the interlocking networks of terror, arms proliferation and fundamentalist ideology… For Australia, Iraq and Afghanistan are both vital battlegrounds in the fight against terrorism."[425] The Iraq War gave Canberra a more visible commitment than Afghanistan, which was essential for the weakened Howard government. To consolidate its position, the government in Canberra had to appeal for a high-level role in Iraq, to demonstrate that military cooperation was not being dictated by the Americans with little Australian input. The level of deference to the US was contained, when compared with the commitment in Afghanistan.

The initial Australian commitment to the Iraq War consisted of 2000 military personnel from all three services, including 500 SASR. The SAS regiment was on the ground on the first day of the Iraq war in the Western part of the country.[426] Under code-name Operation Falconer, Australia operated in support of British and American forces. Australia was also heading the multinational operations in the northern Persian Gulf under the command of Captain Jones, overseeing Australian, British and American ships.[427] The stated goal of the mission was to remove the threat of WMDs. As early as April 28, 2003, at the Centcom base in Qatar, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, jointly with Australian Defence Minister Robert Hill, was announcing cuts in the number of military

---

[425] Frost, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 2006", 414.

[426] Greg Sheridan, *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance under Bush and Howard*,19; Woodward, *Plan of Attack,* 382.

[427] Robert Hill, "Operation Falconer" (Senate Question Time, March 24, 2003).

personnel needed in Iraq.[428] Citing that Operations Northern and Southern Watches were no longer necessary, that the stabilization phase would be less demanding, and that Iraq no longer posed a threat to the region, Rumsfeld discussed General Tommy Franks' plans to adjust the size of the commitment, while the Australians would be sending a peacekeeping force.[429] But in May 2005, given the worsening conditions on the ground after the initial military "victory," the ADF deployed 450 extra troops. Australia's role in stabilization operations was subsequently held back. Domestic constraints can be cited as an explanation for this shift: the strain placed on Australia's military capabilities, combined with divisions within the Howard's government on Iraq had made any increase in commitment difficult. In the next section, I explore the first domestic constraint, the strain put on Australia's military capabilities. This leads to a discussion on regional security, as concurrent military engagements narrowed the range of militarily feasible options for Canberra.

Regional Security: Asia Pacific

In this section, I assess the salience of security threats in Australia's immediate region: the Asia-Pacific. To measure the impact of regional security concerns on the Australian decision-making process leading to a military commitment in the war in Iraq, the key indicators from chapter 3 are restated: (1) the involvement or presence of the United States in the immediate region of the ally, where a strong presence would alleviate these concerns and disengagement exacerbate them; (2) the level of threat, which can be measured by

---

[428] Robert Hill, "Media Conference with U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld" (Transcripts, Central Command Qatar, April 28, 2003).

[429] *Ibid.*

other ADF commitments in the region or the number of criminal and/or hostile incidents close to the state's borders; and (3) fluctuations in military expenditure. These are assessed concurrently with American expectations and demands for military cooperation with Australia.

Successive Australian governments have had a predisposition for supporting American initiatives, as have the British. This predisposition has been an important driving force of Australian foreign and defence policy insofar as it seeks greater American involvement in the Pacific region. The necessity of managing the perceived special relationship, increasing Australia's visibility and influence in Washington, and fostering an expectation of mutual support on issues of national interest, comprises a strategy seen as beneficial to Australia's security. Furthermore, being perceived as a close ally to the United States may also increase Australia's leverage when dealing with other states, especially in the Asian region.[430] Underlying this consistent support for American leadership and presence in the region is a profoundly realist understanding of interstate interactions. As stated by the Foreign Minister, "The United States' strategic presence and US alliances in the region continue to underpin regional stability, by balancing and containing potential rivalries".[431] At the same time, Australia has leveraged its position in Asia by tightening its bilateral ties with China.

---

[430] Doig and al., "Marching in Time: Alliance Politics, Synchrony and the Case of War in Iraq, 2002-2003", 26 and Geoffrey Barker, *Sexing it Up: Iraq, Intelligence and Australia* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2003), 65-86.

[431] Downer, "Australia's Security Policy".

The stability of Australia's immediate neighbourhood is a constant theme for DFAT and Defence. As Paul Dibb, former Deputy Secretary for Defence, has said, echoing the words of Prime Minister Howard, Australia is confronted with an "arc of instability" in its vicinity.[432] Through successive foreign and defence policy papers, Australia has declared Asia and the Pacific as the key focus of its security, where "…the web of US security alliances in the region are the linchpin for regional security and prosperity…"[433] Australia is an important regional player through its involvement in the South Pacific neighbourhood, specifically in East Timor, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea, with the Bougainville crisis. The ADF contribution in Bougainville, code-name Operation Belisi II, was the leading commitment for the peace monitoring group. In 2003, Australia sent 2000 military personnel to the Solomon Islands to the Regional Assistance Mission, under code-named Operation *Helpem Fren* ("help a friend" in English), a commitment equal in size to Australia's contribution in Iraq.

Weak states in Australia's immediate region have all required the attention and involvement of the ADF. However, the most pressing preoccupation in the region remains Indonesia because of its proximity, the high level of illegal migration and risks of terrorist attacks. There has been no alternative to Australian leadership in the South Pacific to

---

[432] Paul Dibb, "The Arc of Instability and the North of Australia: Are They Still Relevant to Australia's New Defence Posture?" (Paper presented at the Charles Darwin Symposium Series, Northern Territory University, Darwin, 29-30 September 2003). Howard made a parallel to George Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech during the 2002 State of the Union Address. Indeed, Prime Minister Howard often referred to an "arc of instability" as threatening Australia's regional interests. See Graeme Dobell, "The 'Arc of Instability': the History of an Idea", in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), *History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia's Defence Policy* (Canberra: Australian National University E Press, 2007), 85-104.

[433] Alexander Downer, "Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign Policy Challenge" (Speech at the National Press Club, Canberra, May 7, 2002).

address regional security problems like these. While indicating that the campaign against terrorism remains the central challenge, Australia's foreign policy identifies other areas of concern including the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula and Kashmir.[434] At the end of 2002, as Australia was ending a year-long commitment in Afghanistan and drawing up contingency plans for Iraq, the ADF had about 2500 deployed personnel in 12 countries around the world.[435] This represented a high operational tempo for the ADF, the highest since World War II.

In response to the 9/11 attacks, Australia made a commitment to the United States by sending forces in Afghanistan, but it also made a commitment to its own region. Canberra has reinforced regional cooperation through intelligence sharing and the enhancement of counter-terrorism capabilities. Australia and Indonesia joined forces after the 2002 Bali attacks and Australia has also sought bilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines to enhance regional counter-terrorism cooperation.[436] Further regional cooperation has also been promoted through forums such as the Pacific Islands Forum, the ASEAN, Regional Forum and the APEC Forum.

However, the achievements of such institutional arrangements remain limited. The norm of non-interference has been an impediment to further integration, and expansion has

---

[434] *Ibid*.

[435] Australia. Department of Defence. "Australia's Commitment to the International Coalition against Terrorism", *Defence Media Release* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2002).

[436] Alexander Downer, "Terrorism and Stability in the Region: The Australian Government's Perspective" (Speech to the Australian Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, November 11, 2002).

diluted the common purpose of organizations such as ASEAN.[437] In other words, the region is still far from developing a security community. Indonesia in particular has been a constant security preoccupation for Australia, especially with the growing problem of illegal migration. Furthermore, Indonesia has had a slow transition from a military authoritarian regime to being a democracy, where efforts are further undermined because of economic difficulties.[438] Even after the accession to independence of East Timor**,** the further disintegration of Indonesia remains a major strategic concern for Australia.[439]

Figure 6.1 Map of Australia's immediate neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific region

The Asia Pacific is Australia's area of primary strategic concern (Figure 6.1). As such, defence policy is and will continue to be driven by the Defence of Australia doctrine,

---

[437] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2000/2001* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001).

[438] Paul Dibb, "Indonesia: the key to South-East Asia's Security", *International Affairs* 77, 4 (2001), 829-842.

[439] Donald K. Emmerson, "Will Indonesia Survive?" *Foreign Affairs* 79, 3 (2000), 95.

the concept of self-reliance and the display of strong leadership and engagement in its immediate neighbourhood. The threat of terrorism increased the salience of security concerns in the region especially after the 2002 Bali bombings. Regional security concerns, therefore, acted as an important factor in the curtailment of Australia's commitment to US military operations, allowing it to focus on self-sufficient niche contributions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Contrary to the hypothesis on regional security, as stated in chapter 3, it seems that an increase in regional security concerns does not increase military contributions to US-led coalitions. The relationship leans in the opposite direction, where regional security concerns compete with US alliance expectations, leading the allied state to make more modest and short-term military contributions because of increased demands (real or anticipated) on its armed forces.

Alternative Explanations

In this section, I discuss competing explanations to understand Australia's participation to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although I will devote less attention to the explanations which were previously discussed in chapters 4 and 5, I will focus on arguments that feature prominently in the analyses of Australian foreign policy during that period. The main arguments are: 1) that Australia's participation was motivated by striking a deal on a free trade agreement with the US; 2) that domestic politics restricted the Howard government's political options when deciding on military commitments in Iraq, as well as further commitments in Afghanistan. One difference that stands out in the comparative analysis is that domestic politics, understood as opposition voiced by the opposition and public

opinion, appear much less important in conventional explanations of Australia's involvement. Indeed, public dissent over Australia's role in Afghanistan and Iraq has been more subdued, when compared with Britain or, a situation that can be attributed to the disarray of the opposition Labour Party.

First, several commentators have opined that Australia's military contribution to the War on Terror was part of a deal to secure a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Although this goal is mentioned as a key strategic objective for DFAT, it is difficult to assess if the pursuit of such an agreement was brought up as part of the Australia-US negotiations over the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, between 2001 and 2003. It is conceivable that Australia's support of American engagements improved the overall relationship with advantages that went beyond the security relationship. Statements by the Foreign Affairs Minister, Alexander Downer are often ambiguous on this point. In a speech delivered to the National Press Club, he states that "Our relationship with the United States is vital. But we must work to match the strong security relationship with a much better economic relationship. Too often, American decision-makers harm our trade. That is why we are seeking to put the economic relationship on a more strategic footing through our proposal for a Free Trade Agreement…"[440]

On a separate occasion, when addressing an American audience in Dallas, Texas, the link between economic and security concern is reaffirmed: "Sometimes it is difficult not to get the impression that the maturity of our security relationship is not matched by equally

---

[440] Downer, "Advancing the National Interest".

mature economic and commercial relations. I believe that we should match our strong security relations with the US with a more sound economic relationship – and on a better strategic footing. That is why we are seeking a Free Trade Agreement between our two countries."[441] The timing of the speech is impeccable, in the middle of the American campaign to recruit allied support for the war in Iraq.[442] However, there is evidence to suggest that the bilateral FTA negotiations were rather arduous and left important Australian grievances unresolved.[443] The benefits of a closer US-Australia relationship can thus be measured in terms of access which permitted the Australian delegation to bring the FTA up the list of priorities, rather than concrete results in Australia's favour. Therefore, no direct link can be established between trade concerns with the United States and Australian military commitments to the War on Terror. However, negotiating access was a bilateral strategy used by Canberra to leverage its military commitment.

Furthermore, some concerns have been expressed with regards to the negative impacts of 9/11 on Australia's trade. Much like Canada, Australia is dependent on its exports and dependent on the United States for trade. Policy papers have outlined the impact of the threat of terrorism on trade flows, but are presented differently than in Canada, where security and trade are seen as a trade-off, rather than mutually reinforcing

---

[441] Alexander Downer, "Australia and the United States : A Dynamic and Diverse Relationship" (Speech in Dallas, July 12, 2002).

[442] Greg Sheridan, "Free Trade Deal Would Boost Anzus: US", *The Australian* (Sydney), July 12, 2002.

[443] Brendon O'Connor, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2003", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58, 2 (2004), 212; Tor Krever, "The US-Australia Free Trade Agreement: the Interface between Partisan Politics and National Objectives", *Australian Journal of Political Science* 41, 1 (2006), 51-69; Ross Garnaut, "An Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 56, 1 (2002), 123-141.

goals as they are in Australia.[444] There is little convincing evidence to suggest that concerns over trade could have steered Australia's security relationship with the United States especially in the absence of a contiguous border.

Second, domestic-level explanations stress the pressures exerted by the opposition and public opinion on the Howard government. Here too, popular dissent was heard loud and clear with a majority opposing the war in Iraq before the commitment was announced, according to polls conducted during the Fall months of 2002.[445] The Labour Party also voiced strong opposition to the war in Iraq arguing that Australia should go to war only with UN approval. Citing past experiences with the UN, Voeten notes that "SC authorization was crucial to Australia's willingness to intervene in East Timor," for which there was bipartisan support and that there were similar expectations regarding Iraq.[446] This fit with the party line, as debates in the House of Commons grew increasingly aggressive.[447]

Why was Labour unable to capitalize on public opinion's negative view of the Howard government? On the subject of Australia's bilateral alliance with the United States and the overarching importance of this alliance for Australia's foreign and defence policy, there has always been consistent bipartisan support. This was reflected in the Labour

---

[444] Geoff Raby, "The Costs of Terrorism and the Benefits of Cooperating to Combat Terrorism" (Paper presented to APEC Senior Officials Meeting, Chiang Rai, Thailand, February 21, 2003).

[445] Fia Cumming, "We're with the UN, Not the US, on Iraq", *The Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney), September 15, 2002.

[446] Voeten, "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force", 532.

[447] Daniel Flitton, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2002", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, 1 (2003), 38.

party's posture: "…Labour carefully maintained open avenues of retreat into realist support for the US in the event of unilateral action."[448] Labour even joined the government in defeating a motion introduced by the Green party, to condemn military action taken in Iraq without UN authorization.[449]

On November 12, 2002, as UNMOVIC was preparing for its work in support of UNSC 1441 to begin on November 25, the Defence and Foreign Affairs ministers issued a joint statement updating the Australian position: "Saddam Hussein accepted resolution 1441 only with an assertion that Iraq does not possess weapons of mass destruction. This is not the case to the best of our knowledge. Robust inspections will enable this issue to be tested."[450] Despite public divisions over Iraq, the Howard government carried on with its policy on Iraq, demonstrating that domestic politics did not bear directly on the final decision. In the final analysis, Labour party failed to make political gains, as shown by the 2004 re-election of Howard.

Conclusion

By supporting the Bush administration early on, during both the war in Afghanistan and in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Prime Minister Howard was able to leverage his support for the War on Terror to gain unprecedented access to Washington.[451] This access allowed the

---

[448] Ibid., 47.

[449] Megan Saunders, "Crean Rules Out a War Conscience Vote", *The Australian* (Sydney), September 24, 2002.

[450] Robert Hill and Alexander Downer, "Weapons Inspections in Iraq" (Media Release, Canberra, November 14, 2002).

[451] O'Connor, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2003", 208.

Prime Minister, as well as his Defence Minister and Foreign Minister, to push for items which were high on the Australian agenda, such as the Free Trade agreement, the threat of North Korea, and the reinforcement of Australian-American security ties.

It is important to acknowledge that the US alliance, and the expectations it placed on Australian participation, was the most important motive in the decision-making process leading to the Australian military commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq. Canberra's strategy between 2001 and 2003 was to make early commitments in support of the United States. This strategy allowed Australia to engage in military cooperation at a minimum risk, through small and tailored military contributions, but with maximum impact in its ability to extract concessions from its American ally.[452] The case study analysis also finds support for domestic-level constraints, defined as the level of government cohesion and military feasibility. The latter placed especially strong constraints on Australian's military cooperation, due to Australia's many regional security concerns and its level of engagement in its immediate neighbourhood.

This case study led to a counter-intuitive finding with respect to the management of regional security threats. In chapter 3, the hypothesis on the relationship between regional security concerns and military cooperation with the United States suggests that an increase in the former would lead to an increase in the latter, because the allied state would try to leverage its commitment to obtain the support of the dominant power for its regional ventures. However, looking at the period between 2001 and the present, regional security

---

[452] Sheridan, *The Partnership*, 42.

concerns have acted as a competing demand on the Australian armed forces, ultimately resulting in reluctance on the part of Australian decision-makers to make increase its commitment in Afghanistan or Iraq. In the long term, the hypothesis holds, but in the short term, concerns over the operational tempo of the military are paramount.

In the final analysis, Canberra leveraged its military commitment across issue-areas and enhanced its alliance with Washington, by re-enforcing intelligence and defence relationship, by gaining greater access to the President and his senior officials, and by drawing attention to Asia, encouraging greater American involvement in the region. The Howard government also pushed to accelerate negotiations over a bilateral free trade agreement with the United States, a mission he may have accomplished as a result of greater Australia-US relations and more frequent interactions.

Table 6.2 Comparative Military Expenditure of Australia [2000; 2008]

	2000	2008
Local Currency m.dollars	12,435	21,935
US $m.	11,057	15,321
As Percentage of GDP	1.9	1.9

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (Consulted March 3, 2009).

To the extent that the ADF will be increasingly called upon for operations with the US, or solicited for stabilization operations in its immediate region, we are likely to see a force structure prioritizing the army. This is reflected in the government's decision to increase the size of the army by two battalions of 1000 to 1500 soldiers in 2006 (from six to eight

battalions).[453] Although military expenditures have increased by over 70% since 2000, they have remained stable as a percentage of the GDP (Table 6.2) with an increase of almost 3000 military personnel over the same period.

The support offered to the United States by Australia, apparent with Australia's continued involvement in Iraq through to 2009, has been nuanced under the new Rudd government. Without underestimating the importance of the US alliance for Australian interests, he says that "…our alliance with the United States does not automatically mandate our compliance with every element of US foreign policy."[454] This echoes nicely what was told to Richard Armitage by an Australian official: "You Americans have got to understand that after Vietnam we'll never give you a blank cheque again."[455] Although Vietnam represents a closer strategic interest than Iraq geopolitically, there is an established practice where Australia will defend its alliance beyond its immediate region of strategic interest. However, when military cooperation imposes domestic political costs in the end, as it did in the cases of Vietnam and Iraq, such commitments are difficult to sustain politically and are likely to undermine Australian resolve over the long term. As a result, the appeal of the "niche contribution" will be appealing for military interventions that are in support of the US alliance but not directly relevant for Australia's strategic interests.

---

[453] Australia. Department of Defence, "A Stronger Army: Two More Battalions", *Defence* August (2006), Online. http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/200608/.

[454] Cited in Frank Frost, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 2006", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, 3 (2007), 414.

[455] Cited in Beazley, "Thinking Security: Influencing National Security Strategy from the Academy: An Australian Experience", 17.

Conclusion

Peace, Commerce, and honest friendship with all nations – entangling alliances with none.

- Thomas Jefferson 1743-1826
3rd President of the US, 1801-1809

For the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, engaging the United States begs caution. Since the end of World War II, their foreign and defence policy was decisively harmonized with their American ally. The end of the Cold War only reinforced American leadership as Western alliances such as NATO endured. This is not to say that there have not been major disagreements between the United States and its allies. Even special allies, the focus of the three case studies presented here, have turned down opportunities for military cooperation with the United States. The War in Vietnam and the recent War in Iraq are two famous episodes, showing that alliance support is not unconditional. Despite these disagreements, close allies have not lost any privileges, such as access to intelligence or American military technology. Why is this so? Special allies have strong incentives to engage in military cooperation with the United States but domestic-level constraints mitigate the equation.

This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables, the level of government cohesion and military capabilities, determine its implementation. By examining British, Canadian and Australian decision-making during the lead-up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this study also

shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle.

This research puzzle makes a contribution to alliance theory. In the absence of a credible challenger to American primacy, we are compelled to look at how the United States has managed its alliance partners so successfully. In this context, understanding the relationship between the United States and its allies becomes crucial, as a prominent feature of the lasting unipolar distribution of power. This is especially important in times of war, when the US demonstrates the might of its global power. Furthermore, it allows secondary states an opportunity to renegotiate their alliance with the US when considering military cooperation. The stated goal of this dissertation was thus to develop a theory of foreign policy which accounts for allied contributions in times of war by examining the United States and its closest allies, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

In this concluding chapter, I summarize the theoretical argument and main findings. I will also present an overview of the case studies, showing how America's special allies responded to 9/11 and joined the international campaign against terrorism. Finally, I introduce avenues for future research and address the policy relevance of this study in regards to asymmetric security cooperation.

Great Expectations: Special Allies and Military Cooperation

The field of International Relations theory is rich with explanations about the United States' management of the international system as the dominant global power. Realist authors argue that the power disparities are so great that America is likely to remain

unchallenged and that the balance of power will remain unchanged for some time.[456] Tenants of liberalism tend to focus on international institutions, as providing key constraints on the exercise of unbridled hegemonic power, or focus on domestic institutions to explain the emergence of a peaceful democratic order based on a cohesive group of core states that will not challenge each other to war.[457] Finally the constructivist school points to the emergence of international norms that constrain states into compliant behaviour.[458]

All three schools have made important contributions to alliance theory but are ill-suited to explain foreign policy outcomes. Indeed, many of the macro-level theories discussed in chapter 2 were not designed to explain foreign policy decision-making. Similarly, many domestic-level explanations, such as democratic peace theory, attempt to explain international outcomes, rather than state behaviour in a specific context. Therein lays the theoretical appeal of the neoclassical realist approach, where the attempt is to introduce state-level variables into the analysis, as a complement to systemic variables, in order to gain a more contextual understanding of foreign policy decision-making. Introduced in the 1990s, there is room for scholarly contributions and theoretical innovations in this burgeoning research area. For example, most research conducted under the neoclassical realist research agenda focuses on the grand strategies of modern great

---

[456] Brooks and Wohlforth, *A World Out of Balance.*

[457] Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled.*

[458] Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*.

powers.[459] The theoretical avenue proposed by neoclassical realists is equally well-suited in the study of the behaviour of secondary states, though this is rarely undertaken: "Unit-level variables constrain or facilitate the ability of all types of states – great powers as well as lesser states – to respond to systemic imperatives."[460] In my analysis, state responses to international threats are the product of an asymmetric bargaining game, where secondary states are inclined to respond to American expectations but are limited in their ability to deliver on those commitments domestically. Alliance expectations are thus negotiated with reference to resources that can be mobilized for military cooperation. There is thus a three-step decision-making process that we can identify to make sense of foreign and defence policy-making, starting from the assessment of international threats by state leaders, to the consideration of options in response to this threat, and finally, the extraction of societal resources to implement the plan.[461]

The point of departure is thus relative power distribution at the systemic level. Because I focus on three of the United States' closest allies, this implies that these partners share similar external constraints: due to the proximity of their security relationship with the United States, international assessments are evaluated through the prism of this dominant relationship. To explain the variation in foreign and defence policy responses, we

---

[459] Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategies Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993); Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power*; Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[460] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the States, and Foreign Policy", in Steve E. Lobell, Norrin P. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

[461] *Id*.

need to account for interactions between the dominant power and its allies, but also understand how domestic constraints limit the options of secondary allied states.

Alliance Decision-Making from 2001 to 2003

When President George W. Bush presented the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) on September 17, 2002, his speech outlined a set of renewed expectations of the United States' allies in the post-9/11 context. Though the NSS clearly reinforced Washington's independence in drafting its grand strategy, as was apparent by the stated preference for coalitions of the willing and the concept of pre-emption, the need for strong alliances remained an underlying theme. For example, NATO commitments were emphasized, reminding members to bring their military capabilities up to par. Moreover, President Bush identified the need for more military bases for its troops abroad in anticipation of longer deployments.[462] To gain a fuller picture of intra-alliance interactions, the analysis has also taken into account what allies want from the United States in studying decision-making processes leading to military cooperation.

The UK

To the UK, its alliance with the US is priceless. The Anglo-American alliance is a priority above all other foreign policy goals. The term appeasement is often used as a rhetorical tool to criticize inaction in the face of threats. Successive British prime ministers have used this device to defend the special relationship on the basis of internationalism and to uphold their

---

[462] George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington D.C.: White House, 2002).

role in preventing American isolationism. The UK needs the US to have a foreign policy worthy of great power status. At the outset, the UK shares important strategic interests with the United States, notably in the Middle East where British presence has been consistent in supporting American involvement. London also vies for a leadership position in NATO, through initiatives such as leading the International Stabilization and Assistance Force or ISAF at the beginning of the American invasion of Afghanistan.

An underlying assumption for British decision-makers is that proximity to the United States translates into a degree of influence and leverage worth pursuing. The evidence from the case studies suggests otherwise. The UK appears as the least independent of the three special allies. By tying its foreign policy so closely to American demands, it enhances its great power status but undermines its autonomy. The UK, as a great power, could withstand American pressures and act autonomously. However, dependence on the US in upholding its great power status has had the opposite effect. For London, the risk of being marginalized by Washington is worse than the risk of disapproval on the domestic front. Six years of involvement in an unpopular, American-led war serve as evidence for this claim. The Iraq War both disabled the New Labour Party and ostracized Tony Blair, once appreciated as a charismatic Prime Minister.

Nevertheless, key domestic constraints mitigate the influence of US demands on British military commitments, as the case studies show. I have highlighted the causal significance of two, by tracing fluctuations in the level of cohesion within the Blair government and by weighing concerns over the availability of military capabilities. These factors balance US expectations of its closest allies.

Canada

As long as Canada is not seen as a security liability to the United States, it can get away with a lot in Washington. In other words, security and economic interdependence allows Ottawa some flexibility in managing its alliance with the US. Canadian strategic interests have been limited to its immediate region and have not relied on its ability to project power abroad independently from the US. Because Canada's immediate region is relatively secure, it looks to the US for initiatives on international engagements. Following 9/11, Canada's priorities were dictated by its geographical position: security concerns on the continent and at the border dominated the agenda, but Ottawa was still able to make a commitment to the War in Afghanistan.

The case study analysis explains Canada's military commitments between 2001 and 2003. It demonstrates how American expectations about Canada's military role structured the type of commitment made to the War in Afghanistan. These were relatively low, given the strong border security concerns shared by the two countries. It also shows that in the Fall of 2001, few domestic constraints operated beyond the limits inherent to Canada's military capacity. The Chrétien government was cohesive which translated into a swift implementation of Canada's military contribution. Things changed in the Fall of 2002 as the government's cohesion was undermined by a battle for the leadership of the Liberal party. Over the same period, an American request for a renewed commitment in Afghanistan increased the pressure on its military capabilities. As such, both sets of domestic constraints are seen as dominant factors in explaining Ottawa's decision to opt out

of the Iraq War, despite strong but short-lived diplomatic consequences. This is the doctrine of selective engagement at its best.[463]

The analysis presented here shows that decision-makers assess US expectations in order to determine the type of military commitment to make. To the extent that what the US requested was feasible militarily for Canada and that Chrétien led a cohesive government, these demands were met and implemented with a high degree of deferral to American leadership. Following my line of argument, the imminent change in leadership in late 2003, combined with overstretched military capabilities made a commitment in Iraq unlikely. Domestic constraints also contributed to changes in the implementation of the Canadian strategy in Afghanistan. Under such conditions, commitments would need to appear free from American influence, though the price of operating more independently was high: by taking over ISAF, extending the engagement and eventually moving the CF to a more volatile and dangerous region. This significantly raised the profile of Canada in the War on Terror and represented the most significant military engagement undertaken by the Canadian Forces since the Korean War. Canada's response played well with domestic audiences: Ottawa offered support for Afghanistan on moral grounds and turned its back on the controversial invasion of Iraq.

---

[463] William N. Peters, "Beyond Kosovo: Will Canada's Army Fight for the Western Alliance?", in David G. Haglund (ed.), *New Nato, New Century: Canada, the United States, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 2000).

Australia

Australia both benefits and suffers from its insularity in the Pacific region. On the one hand, it enjoys natural defences since it is surrounded by water and fairly isolated from other major powers that could compete for regional influence. On the other hand, its Pacific neighbourhood is fraught with instability, such as the case of East Timor, and Australia must manage this insecurity constantly. Australia is at a safe distance from potential regional contenders but it is also far from its closest allies, the United States and United Kingdom. Its strong alliance with the United States allows Australia to promote its primary interests: having a greater presence in Asia and upholding the regional balance of power.

Following 9/11, there has been a strong convergence between Australia and the United States on the perception of international threats. The 2002 Bali bombings, resulting in a high number of Australian casualties, rallied the Howard government more closely to the Bush administration's framing of the terrorist threat and the broader Global War on Terror label. The decision to take part in the American-led coalition was also motivated by the need to strengthen the Australia-US alliance because Australia depends on American support to establish its regional leadership. Although there is an expectation of mutual support, Australia has traditionally opted for a low investment/low risk approach in meeting American expectations and soliciting assistance from the alliance.

The explanation also focuses on domestic constraints to explain Australian military cooperation with the United States during the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq. The period between 2001 and 2003 is characterized by fluctuations in the level of government cohesion under Howard and a high operational tempo for the ADF. This translated into

niche commitments and deferral to American leadership in Afghanistan, but a more cautious approach in Iraq. The case study shows that regional commitments undertaken by Australia placed strong constraints on how it could assist the United States, imposing limits on its military capabilities.

In sum, structural differences in power translate into different evaluations of threat. While the interests of the dominant partner are truly global, smaller alliance partners have interests that are more regional in scope. Reiterated, my argument stresses that alliance expectations have a more direct influence on the decision-making process of secondary states when the use of force is at stake. As such, political elites must balance their assessments of US expectations for military cooperation with domestic constraints.

Referring back to the typology of strategies for asymmetric security cooperation, as presented in chapter 1, a basic trade-off exists for secondary allied states: strategies to secure closer cooperation with the United States minimize decision-making input and flexibility; while opting out of US plans purchases autonomy at the risk of losing alliance privileges. The main alliance benefits are status for the UK, international relevance for Canada and regional security guarantees for Australia. In the end, Canada has the least to lose from opting out of US plans, since the impact of any retributions are likely to be just as costly for the US due to the interconnected nature of the relationship. A senior Canadian defence official noted that Canada was temporarily excluded from ‘Four Eyes’ but quickly

reinstated due to the technical difficulties that this exclusion entailed for the UK, Australia and the United States.[464]

Future Research and Policy Relevance

In the final analysis, each special ally is concerned with enhancing its bilateral relationship with the United States. Even when the US seeks out its allies for political or military support, it seems that the American willingness to engage in military operations with its closest alliance partners is not always forthcoming. The extent to which the United States needs its allies is unclear and deserves further research. On a few occasions, American officials have even expressed weariness with regards to allied meddling in the conduct of military campaigns.[465] In the case of Afghanistan, for example, it has been reported that Washington "want[s] to maintain US military flexibility to operate […] with minimal non-US interference.[466] These additional questions should further our understanding on the complexity of intra-alliance interactions, not only between the dominant power and its partners, but between the equal powers within the alliance.

A second avenue of research looks to the impact of the democratic system of government on alliance interactions and military cooperation. What is absent from the literature is the extent to which such bargaining is public and has signaling effects between allies. Thus, due to the democratic nature of their political system, Canada, the UK and Australia may send strong signals to the United States with regards to the strength of their

---

[464] Stéfanie von Hlatky, "Interview in Ottawa" (Ottawa, June 2009).

[465] Gordon, "NATO after 11 September".

[466] Marten, "Defending against Anarchy".

resolve in committing troops to a particular military operation. Both the UK and Australia pledged a strong political commitment to the United States in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, in the fall of 2002. However, as public dissent was increasing on the domestic front, the fall-out from the interaction between government and opposition sends a different signal to the United States. Beyond the initial displays of political support, will the ally be politically capable of staying the course?

Political competition on the domestic front can be seen as casting doubts on the ally's resolve to stay engaged in military cooperation with the United States. This signaling effect is indicative of a state's ability to see through its commitment in favour of the use of force and its resolve in supporting a longer term commitment once the war has been initiated.[467] Through comparative case studies, it would be possible to uncover if alignments between government and opposition enhance or undermine a state's reputation for reliability with its dominant ally.[468] According to this logic, the reputation for reliability will be affected by domestic competition.

The impact of reputation is well studied in the study of conflict, as a reputation for resolve translates into more credible threats by states, but less so in the study of military cooperation.[469] The impact of reputation on alliance relationships is not well understood, but the underlying logic in both contexts is similar: "honored commitments should build credible reputations, increasing the likelihood that other leaders expect future commitments

---

[467] Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*.

[468] For more on how democracy can influence diplomacy, see *Ibid*.

[469] Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, 5; also see the review of the literature in Huth, "Reputations and Deterrence".

will be honored, too".[470] The challenge is to demonstrate that concerns over reputation are part of the decision-making process leading to military cooperation with the United States.[471]

In terms of policy relevance, this project offers several recommendations for secondary states contemplating military cooperation with their dominant alliance partner. First, the research shows that tying foreign policy decisions on military cooperation more closely to domestic constraints can increase the level of flexibility when weighing out their options. The cases demonstrate that allied states tend to privilege the bilateral level of interaction when negotiating such commitments with the United States. Secondary states are better off using a combination of negotiation strategies when engaging with their dominant partner. For example, the UK, Canada and Australia could benefit from working more closely together, rather than channeling their interactions through the dominant alliance partner.

Second, this line of research would encourage decision-makers to think more pragmatically about coalitions of the willing as a model for engagement in military cooperation. On the one hand, attempts to channel military interventions through the UN appear to offer secondary states greater leverage, because multilateral processes can act to restrain a dominant power like the United States. On the other hand, tying the decision-

---

[470] Gibler, "The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation", 427.

[471] The working definition for alliance reputation is borrowed from Gibler: a leader's behavior during opportunities to honor an alliance commitment creates reputations for that leader regarding his or her likelihood of honoring future alliance commitments. See Gibler, "The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation", 427.

making process on military cooperation to the will of an international body undermines the flexibility of secondary powers just as it does for the leading power.

Conclusion

The decision to launch the war in Afghanistan was directly motivated by the September 11 attacks. The conviction that the Taliban regime was a terrorist harbour quickly brought together a coalition of nations in favour of bringing down the regime to address the threat of terrorism. The direct link between terrorism as experienced on 9/11 and Afghanistan garnered support for the United States which was not replicated in the case of the Iraq War.

Mutual expectations of alliance commitments are periodically readjusted at critical junctures. 9/11 and the new American grand strategy that followed was a crucial moment for its alliance relationships. Immediately after 9/11, Canada, Britain and Australia quickly demonstrated their support for the United States. However, in planning a response to the September 11 attacks, each state pursued different priorities. For Britain, the dominant concern was to secure the title of closest ally and increase its influence over the conduct of the war on terrorism; Canada's priority was focused on the border, demonstrating extreme caution in internationalizing the war on terrorism precipitously; and finally, for Australia, regional concerns were dominant, as it saw an opportunity for greater American engagement in the Asia-Pacific. Almost a decade after the event, the landscape has changed from the initial adjustment period. The UK is strengthening the European dimension of its security but is careful not to undermine the transatlantic link. Canada has reformed its military and invested in strengthening its security at home. Australia, for its part, has turned

to China as a result of increasing economic ties, and thus introducing certain caveats in its relationship with the United States.[472]

Even if alliance relationships endure and become institutionalized, allies will have individual assessments of international threats that may or may not be considered in the same order of priority by their alliance partners. Secondary states respond to threats in their immediate region but leave international burdens to the initiative of the dominant power. In other words, not all states, even allied states, perceive threats similarly given asymmetric capabilities. As such, secondary states rely on the United States in responding to international threats and are guided by American expectations when taking part in the effort. Although great expectations are often frustrated, managing each partner's aspirations is the key to any enduring alliance.

---

[472] Australia, Department of Defence, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*.

Bibliography

Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett. 1999. *Security Communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Alexander, David. 2002. *Canada's Dependence on Military Alliances: a Path for the Future*. MA thesis. Joint Command and Staff Program. Canadian Forces College.

Allison, Graham T. 1969. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis". *The American Political Science Review* 63 (3): 689-718.

Andres, Richard B., Craig Wills and Thomas E. Griffith Jr. 2005-06. "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model". *International Security* 30 (3): 124-160.

Annan, Kofi A. 2001. "Address by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the United Nations General Assembly", New York, September 24, 2001.

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. 2005. *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Art, Robert J. 2003. *A Grand Strategy for America*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Australia. Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2009. *Australian Demographic Statistics (3101.0)*. Online. http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3101.0Mar%202009?OpenDocument (Consulted October 5, 2009).

Australia. Department of Defence. 2000. *Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Australia. Department of Defence. 2001a. “ADF Support to the United States”. *Defence Media Release*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Australia. Department of Defence. 2001b. “Further Australian Military Support to the United States and the United Kingdom”. *Defence Media Release*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia,.

Australia. Department of Defence. 2001c. “HMAS ANZAC’s Gulf Deployment Extended”. *Defence Media Release*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Australia. Department of Defence. 2001d. “No Australians Injured in Coalition Incident”. *Defence Media Release*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Australia. Department of Defence. 2002a. “Australia’s Commitment to the International Coalition against Terrorism”. *Defence Media Release*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Australia. Department of Defence. 2002b. “Operation Slipper Update”. *Defence Media Release*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Australia. Department of Defence. 2003a. *Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Australia. Department of Defence. 2003b. *Defence and Justice Ministers to Visit Solomon Islands*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Australia. Department of Defence. 2006. “A Stronger Army: Two More Battalions”. *Defence* August. Online. http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine/editions/200608/.

Australian. Department of Defence. 2009. “Budget”. *Statutory Reports*. Online. http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/index.htm (Consulted 18 September 2009).

Australia. Department of Defence. 2009. *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Axworthy, Lloyd. 1998. “Canada and Human Security: the Need for Leadership”. *International Journal* 52 (2): 183-196

Axworthy, Lloyd. 2003. *Navigating a New World*. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf.

Bailey, Sidney D. and Sam Daws. 1998. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Baldwin, David. 1980. “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis”. *International Organization* 34 (4): 471-506.

Bali Bombs ‘Were Suicide Attacks’, *BBC News*, October 2, 2005. Online. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4301630.stm (Consulted October 7, 2009).

Ball, Desmond. 2001. “The US-Australian Alliance”. in Barry M. Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (eds), *US Allies in a Changing World*. London: Frank Cass, Chapter 12.

Barker, Geoffrey. 2003. *Sexing it Up: Iraq, Intelligence and Australia*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Barnett, Michael and Jack Levy. 1991. “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73”. *International Organization* 45 (3): 369-395.

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. 1999. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations". *International Organization* 53 (4): 699-732.

Barry, Donald and Duane Bratt. 2008. "Defence against Help: Examining Canada-US Security". *American Review of Canadian Studies* 38 (1): 63-89.

Beazley, Kim. 2008. "Thinking Security: Influencing National Strategy from the Academy: An Australian Experience", Coral Bell Lecture, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, March 2008

Beeson, Mark. 2003a. "American Hegemony: The View from Australia". *SAIS Review* 23 (2): 113-131.

Beeson, Mark. 2003b. "Australia's Relationship with the United States: the Case for Greater Independence". *Australian Journal of Political Science* 38 (3): 387-405.

Beltrame, Julian. "Martin, Chrétien Gird for Battle". *Maclean's*, 17 June 2002.

Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger. 1994. "Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War". *International Organization* 48 (1): 39-75.

Bennett, James. 2002. "American and the West: The Emerging Anglosphere". *Orbis* 46 (1): 111-126.

Bennett, James C. 2004. *The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Biddle, Stephen. 2005-06. “Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq”. *International Security* 30 (3): 161-176.

Blair, Tony. United Kingdom. House of Commons. “Iraq”. *Hansard,* March 18, 2003: Col 760-763.

Blair, Tony. 1997. “Speech by the Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor’s banquet”, November 10, 1997”. Online. http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1070.

Blair, Tony. 1999. “Doctrine of International Community”, Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, April 22, 1999, Online. http://www.Number10.gov.uk/Page1297.

Bluth, Christopher. 2004. “The British Road to War: Blair, Bush and the Decision to Invade Iraq”. *International Affairs* 80 (5): 871-892.

Bornholt, Gary. 2002a. “Australia’s Commitment to the International Coalition Against Terrorism”*,* Media Conference, January 19, 2002.

Bornholt, Gary. 2002b. “Australia’s Contribution to the Coalition Against Terrorism”, Press Conference, January 22, 2002.

Bothwell, Robert. 2003-04. “Back to the Future: Canada and Empires,” *International Journal* 59 (2):407-418.

Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Broinowski, Alison. 2003. *Howard’s War*. Melbourne: Scribe.

Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2005. “Hard Times for Soft Balancing”. *International Security* 30 (1): 72-108.

Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. 2008. *A World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bull, Hedley. 1977. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bush, George W. 2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Online. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ (Consulted September 22, 2009)

Bush, George W. 2006. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: White House.

Butler, Richard. 2000. *Saddam Defiant: The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Crisis of Global Security*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Byers, R.B. and Michael Slacks (eds). 1986. *Strategy and the Arctic*. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

Byman, Daniel L.and Kenneth M. Pollack. 2001. “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In”. *International Security* 25 (4): 107-146.

Calvert, Ashton. 2001. *The United States Alliance and Australian Foreign Policy – Past, Present and Future.* Sydney: University of Sydney, June 29, 2001.

Camilleri, Joseph A. 2003. "A Leap Into the Past: In the Name of the National Interest". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57 (3): 431-453.

Campbell, Alastair. 2008. *The Blair Years: The Alastair Campbell Diaries*. London: Random House.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2001a. *Canada Deploys More Forces to the Arabian Gulf Region*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2001b. *Canada's Naval Task Group Arrives in Arabian Sea*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2001c. *The Canadian Forces Contribution to the Campaign Against Terrorism*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2001d. *The Permanent Joint Board on Defence*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2002a. "Canada Battle Group Moving Forward for Combat Operations". *News Release*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2002b. "Canada Deploys Ground Forces to Afghanistan", *News Release*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2002c. "Canada Deploys Three Transport Aircraft to the Arabian Gulf Region", *News Release*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2002d. "Canadian Forces Ground Troops Departing for Afghanistan and the Arabian Gulf Region", *News Release*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2002e. "Canada to Send More Ground Troops to Afghanistan". *News Release*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2002f. "Canadian Troops to Return to Afghanistan". *News Release*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2002g. "The Canadian Forces Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism". *Backgrounder*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2002h. *The Contribution of the Tactical Airlift Detachment to Operation Apollo*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2003. "Strategic Reconnaissance Team Departs for Afghanistan". *News Release*. Ottawa: Government of Canada, March 2003.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2008. *Canada First*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Canada. Department of National Defence. 2009. "Recruiting and Retention in the Canadian Forces". *Backgrounder*. Online. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=2865 (Consulted September 18, 2009).

Canada. House of Commons. 2001. *House of Commons Debate*, Ottawa, September 18, 2001.

Canada. House of Commons. 2001. *Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade*. Ottawa, November 27, 2001.

Canada. Statistique Canada. 2008. "Estimations de la population canadienne". *Le Quotidien* (Ottawa). December 19, 2008. Online. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/081219/dq081219b-fra.htm (Consulted October 5, 2009).

Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. 2008. "National Defence" *Departmental Performance Report*. Online. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2007-2008/index-eng.asp?acr=50 (Consulted September 21, 2009).

Carter, Ashton B. and William J. Perry. 1999. *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Cellucci, Paul. 2005. *Unquiet Diplomacy*. Toronto: Key Porter Books.

Chayes, Antonia. 2008. "How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security," *International Security* 33 (1): 45-81.

Chrétien, Jean. 2007. *My Years as Prime Minister*. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada.

Christensen, Thomas J. 1993. *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategies Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Christensen, Thomas J. and Jack Snyder. 1990. "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity". *International Organization* 44 (2): 137-168.

Chung, Jea Ho. 1999. "The Korean-American Alliance and the 'Rise of China': a Preliminary Assessment of Perceptual Changes and Strategic Choices". *Occasional Papers*. Asia/Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.

Clark, Wesley K. 2001. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*. New York: Public Affairs.

Clark, William Roberts, Erick Duchesne and Sophie Meunier. 2000. "Domestic and International Asymmetries in United-States-European Union Trade Negotiations". *International Negotiation* 5: 69-95.

Claude, Inis. 1966. "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations". *International Organization* 20 (3): 367-379.

Cohen, Andrew. 2004. *While Canada Slept: How We Lost our Place in the World*. Toronto: McClelland Stewart.

Cooper, Andrew F. 2002. "Waiting at the Perimeter: Making US Policy in Canada". in Maureen Appel Molot and Fenn Osler Hampson (eds), *Canada Among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders*. Ottawa : Carleton University Press.

Cornish, P. 2001. "Kosovo: Moral War or Moral Hazard". *Defence Studies* 1 (2): 109-118.

Cumming, Fia. 2002. "We're with the UN, Not the US, on Iraq". *The Sydney Morning Herald* (Sydney). September 15, 2002.

Daalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O'Hanlon. 2000. *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Dauth, John. 2002. "United Nations Security Council Open Debate on Iraq", Statement by Australian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York, October 16, 2002.

Dauth, John. 2003. "United Nations Security Council Open Debate on Iraq", Statement by Australian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York, March 26, 2003.

David, Stephen R. 1991. "Explaining Third World Alignment". *World Politics* 43 (2): 233-256.

Dibb, Paul. 2001. "Indonesia: the key to South-East Asia's Security". *International Affairs* 77 (4): 829-842.

Dibb, Paul. 2003. "The Arc of Instability and the North of Australia: Are They Still Relevant to Australia's New Defence Posture?" Paper presented at the Charles Darwin Symposium Series, Northern Territory University, Darwin, 29-30 September 2003.

Dobell, Graeme. 2007. "The 'Arc of Instability': the History of an Idea". in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), *History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia's Defence Policy*. Canberra: Australian National University E Press: 85-104.

Doig, Alan, James P. Pfiffner, Mark Phythian and Rodney Tiffen. 2007. "Marching in Time: Alliance Politics, Synchrony and the Case of War in Iraq, 2002-2003," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61 (1): 23-40.

Donnely, Thomas and Vance Serchuk. 2005. "Transforming America's Alliances". *National Security Outlook* (January): 1-7.

Downer, Alexander. 2002a. "Advancing the National Interest: Australia's Foreign Policy Challenge", Speech at the National Press Club, Canberra, May 7, 2002.

Downer, Alexander. 2002b. "Australia and the United States : A Dynamic and Diverse Relationship", Speech in Dallas, July 12, 2002.

Downer, Alexander. 2002c. "Australia's Security Policy: New Challenges, Enduring Interests", Speech given at the Royal United Services Institute of Australia, South Australia, November 4, 2002.

Downer, Alexander. 2002d. "Terrorism and Stability in the Region: The Australian Government's Perspective", Speech to the Australian Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai, November 11, 2002.

Downer, Alexander. 2003a. "Australia and the Middle East: Enduring Interests", Speech at the Institute of Diplomacy, Amman, Jordan, May 22, 2003.

Downer, Alexander. 2003b. "Security in an Unstable World", Speech at the National Press Club, Canberra, June 26, 2003.

Downer, Alexander. 2003c. "Statement to Parliament on Iraq", Parliament House, Canberra, February 4, 2003.

Downer, Alexander. 2003d. "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Greatest Threat to International Security", Speech at the Proliferation Security Initiative, Brisbane, July 9, 2003.

Downer, Alexander. 2005. "Security Australia's Interests – Australian Foreign Policy Priorities". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59 (1): 7-12.

Downer, Alexander and Peter Reith. 2001. *Australia and Pakistan – Resumption of Defence Links*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Drahos, Peter. 2003. "When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization". *International Negotiations* 8 (1): 79-109.

Dumbrell, John. 2006. "Working with Allies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and the War on Terror". *Politics and Policy* 34 (2): 452-472.

Dunne, Tim. 2004. "'When the Shooting Starts': Atlanticism in British Security Strategy". *International Affairs* 80 (5): 893-909.

Dunne, Tim. 2007. "Britain and the Gathering Storm over Iraq". in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne (eds), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 339-358.

Earle, Neil. 2009. "Foreign Policy and Canadian Commentary on the Afghanistan War". *American Review of Canadian Studies* 39 (2): 162-171.

Eckstein, Harry. 1975. "Case Study and theory in Political Science". in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds), *Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry*. Reading: Addison-Wesley: 79-137.

Eggleton, Art. 2001. *National Defence Press Conference: Canadian Military Contributions*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Eggleton, Art. 2001. *Minister of National Defence Statement in the House of Commons*. Ottawa: Government of Canada.

Eichenberg, Richard C. 2005. "Victory Has Many Friend: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005". *International Security* 30 (1): 140-177.

Élie, Jérôme B. 2005. "Many Times Doomed but Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special Relationship". *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3 (1): 63-83.

Emmerson, Donald K. 2000. "Will Indonesia Survive?" *Foreign Affairs* 79 (3): 95-106.

Entman, Robert. 2003. *Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Evans, Gareth. 1989. "Australian Foreign Policy: Priorities in a Changing World". *Australian Outlook* 43 (2): 1-15.

Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds). 1993. *International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Fan, Xibo. 2002. "Korean War Armistice Negotiations". in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press: 225-252.

Fearon, James. 1998. "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Cooperation". *International Organization* 52 (2): 269-305.

Finnemore, Martha. 1996. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, Martha. 2003. *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change". *International* Organization 52 (4): 887-917.

Firth, Stewart. 2005. *Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy*. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Flitton, Daniel. 2003. "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2002". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57 (1): 37-54.

Fraser, Malcom. 2001. "An Australian Critique". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55 (2): 225-234.

Frederking, Brian. 2003. "Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security". *American Political Science Review* 97 (3): 363-378.

Freedman, Lawrence. 2004. "War in Iraq: Selling the Threat". *Survival* 46 (2): 7-50.

Frost, Frank. 2007. "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 2006". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61 (3): 403-426.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1982. *Strategies of Containment A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gaddis, John Lewis. 1992-93. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War". *International Security* 17 (3): 5-58.

Gammer, Nicholas. 2001. *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press.

Garnaut, Ross. 2002. "An Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 56 (1): 123-141.

Gelpi, Christopher. 1999. "Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control". in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander (eds), *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 107-139.

Gibler, Douglas M. 2008. "The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52 (3): 426-454.

Gibler, Douglas M. and John A. Vasquez. 1998. "Uncovering Dangerous Alliance, 1495-1980". *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (4): 785-807.

Gibler, Douglas M. and Meredith Reid Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 41 (2): 211-222.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2004. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.

Goh, Evelyn. 2003. "Hegemonic Constraints: The Implications of 11 September for American Power". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57 (1): 77-97.

Goh, Evelyn. 2007/08. "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies". *International Security* 32 (3):113-157.

Goldsmith, Lord. 2003. *Iraq: Legal Position Concerning the Use of Force*. London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Gordon, Michael R. 2003. "US Air Raids in '02 Prepared for War in Iraq" *New York Times* (New York). July 20, 2003.

Gordon, Philip H. 2001-02. "NATO after 11 September". *Survival* 43 (4): 89-106.

Gordon Philip H., and Jeremy Shapiro. 2004. *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Gordon, Philip H., Martin Indyk and Michael O'Hanlon. 2002. "Getting Serious about Iraq". *Survival* 44 (3): 9-22.

Gotlieb, Allan. 2003. "The Chrétien Doctrine," *Maclean's*, March 31, 2003: 42.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics". *International Organization* 32 (4): 881-912.

Graham, Bill. Canada. House of Commons. *House of Commons Debate*, December 2001.

Granatstein, J. L. 2007. *Whose War Is It? How Canada Can Survive in the Post-9/11 World*. Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers.

Grant, Thomas D. 2003. "The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice". *The American Journal of International Law* 97 (4): 823-842.

Gray, Charlotte. 1992. "New Faces in Old Places: The Making of Canadian Foreign Policy". in Fred Osler Hampton and Christopher J. Maule (eds), *Canada among Nations 1991-1992: A New World Order*. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.

Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism". *International Organization* 42: 485-507.

Grieco, Joseph M. 1990. *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith. 2002. "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (2): 175-200.

Haas, Peter. 1990. *Saving the Mediterranean*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Haas, Richard N. 2002. "Defining US Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold-War World", Arthur Ross Lecture, Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 22, 2002.

Haftendorn, Helga, Robert O. Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander. 1999. *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Haglund, David G. 2000. *The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canada's Grand Strategy at Century's End*. Toronto: Irwin.

Haglund, David G. and Michel Fortmann. 2002. “Le Canada et la question de la sécurité du territoire : l’exemption de Kingston tient-elle toujours?”. *Revue militaire canadienne* 3 (1): 17-22.

Ham, Paul. 2007. *Vietnam: The Australian War*. Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers.

Hawke, Allan. 2001. *The War Against Terrorism, The White Paper and Industry,* Speech to Australian Business Limited, Canberra, 26 October 2001.

Hill, Robert. 2002a. “7:30 Report”, Interview on ABC TV, June 19, 2002.

Hill, Robert. 2002b. “Asia Pacific Security after September 11 – Continuity and Change”, Speech to C.E.W. Bean Foundation, Canberra, September 25, 2002.

Hill, Robert, 2002c. “US Still Has to Make Case”, Interview given on September 25, 2002. Online. http//www.abc.net.au/pm/s684957.

Hill, Robert. 2003a. “Media Conference with U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld”, Transcripts, Central Command Qatar, April 28, 2003.

Hill, Robert. 2003b. “Operation Falconer”, Senate Question Time, Canberra, March 24, 2003.

Hill, Robert and Alexander Downer. 2002. “Weapons Inspections in Iraq”, Media Release, Canberra, November 14, 2002.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1969. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2008a. "Interview with Brian Burridge", London, June 2008.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2008b. "Interview with Eugene Lang", Ottawa, May 2008.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2008c. "Interview with Jeremy Greenstock", London, June 2008.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2008d. "Interview with Kevin Tebbit", London, June 2008.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2008e. "Interview with Simon Webb", London, June 2008.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2008f. "Interview with Sir Stephen Wright", London, June 2008.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2008g. "Is It Time to Revisit Traditional Security Approaches in the Arctic?". *Norteamerica* 2 (2): 211-223.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2008h. "Telephone Interview with Clare Lockhart", September 2008.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2008i. "What US Allies Learned from the War on Terror". Paper presented at the ISSS/ISAC Annual Conference, Vail, Colorado, October 15, 2008.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2009a. "Interview", Ottawa, February 2009.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2009b."Interview", Ottawa, June 2009.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2009c. "Interview", Montreal, May 2009.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2009d. “Interview with John McCallum”, Ottawa, June 2009.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2009e. “Interview with Peter Leahy”, Canberra, April 2009.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2009f. “Interview with Peter White”, Canberra, April 16, 2009.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2009g. “Interview”, Ottawa, May 2009.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2009h. “La politique de défense du Canada est-elle décidée à Washington?”. in *La politique internationale en questions*. Montreal : Presses de l’Université de Montréal: chapter 12.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie. 2009i. “Private interview”, May 15, 2009.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie and Jessica Trisko. Forthcoming. “La frontière américaine du Québec: la sécurité avant tout?”. in Guy Lachapelle (ed.). *Le destin américain du Québec*. Montreal : Septentrion.

Hoggett, Paul. 2005. “Blair’s Mission Impossible”. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 7 (3): 418-428.

Holloway, Steven. 2000. “U.S. Unilateralism at the U.N.: Why Great Powers Do Not Make Great Multilateralists”. *Global Governance* 6 (3): 361-382.

Holsti, Ole R. 2006. “Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making: Foreign Policy Actors Viewed Psychologically”. in Ole R. Holsti (ed.), *Making American Foreign Policy*. New York; London: Routledge: 33-51

Holsti, Ole R., P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan. 1973. *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Howard, John. 2001. "Speech to the Australian Defence Association", Canberra, October 25, 2001. Online. http://www.dfat.gov.au/icat/pm_251001_speech.html).

Huntington, Samuel P. 1999. "The Lonely Superpower". *Foreign Affairs* 78 (2): 35-50.

Hurd, Ian. 2003. "Stayin' Alive: The Rumours of the UN's Death Have Been Exaggerated: Too Legit to Quit," *Foreign Affairs* 82 (4): 204-205.

Huth, Paul K. 1997. "Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Political Assessment". *Security Studies* 7 (1): 72-99.

Ignatieff, Michael. 2003. "Canada in the Age of Terror – Multilateralism Meets a Moment of Truth". *Policy Options* February 2003: 14-18.

Ikenberry, John G. 2001. *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ikenberry, John G. (ed.). 2002. *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press

International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2001. *Strategic Survey 2000/2001*. London: Oxford University Press.

International Monetary Fund. 2009. *World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009*. Online. http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm (Consulted March 3, 2009).

Iraq 'Growing Threat to Britain'. 2002. *BBC News World Edition,* September 1, 2002. Online. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/2228294.stm (Consulted August 25, 2009).

Jentleson, Bruce W., Ariel Levite, and Larry Berman. 1994. *Foreign Military Intervention*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jockel, Joseph T. and Joel J. Sokolsky. 2008. "Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO's Odd Man Out Steps Forward". *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 6 (1): 100-115.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. "Thinking about Strategic Culture". *International Security* 19 (4): 32-64.

Kampfner, John. 2003. *Blair's Wars*. London: Simon and Schuster.

Kelley, Judith. 2005. "Strategic Non-Cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq Was not Just about Iraq". *International Politics* 42 (2): 153-173.

Kellow, Aynsley and Anthony R. Zito. 2002. "Steering through Complexity: EU Environmental Regulation in the International Context". *Political Studies* 50 (1): 43–61.

Kelton, Maryanne. 2008. "Integrated Threat Perception and the Intensification of the US Alliance". in Maryanne Kelton (ed.), *'More than an Ally': Contemporary Australia-US Relations*. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 17-38.

Kennedy, Paul. 1987. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000*. New York: Random House.

Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline and Rhiannon Vickers. 2007. "'Blowback' for Britain?: Blair, Bush, and the War in Iraq". *Review of International Studies* 33: 205-221.

Keohane, Dan. 2005. "The United Kingdom". in A. Danchev and J. Macmillan (eds), *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics*. New York: Routledge, 59–76.

Keohane, Robert O. 1969. "Lilliputian's Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics". *International Organization* 23 (2): 291-310.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. *After Hegemony*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 1989. *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Scott Foresman.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. 2001. *Power and Interdependence, 3rd Edition*. New York: Longman.

Ki-Jung, Kim and Yongho Kim. 2008. "Alliance versus Governance: Theoretical Debates Regarding Security of Northeast Asia". *Pacific Focus* 17 (1): 5-28.

Kimball, Warren F. 2005. "The 'Special' Anglo-American Special Relationship: A Fatter, Larger Underwater Cable". *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3 (1): 1-5.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kirton, John. 1984. "Beyond Bilateralism: United States-Canadian Relations in the Arctic". in William E. Westermeyer and Kurt M. Shusterich (eds), *United States Arctic Interests: The 1980s and 1990s*. New York: Springer-Verlag: 295-318.

Kitchen, Veronica. 2004. “Smarter Cooperation in Canada-U.S. Relations?”. *International Journal* 59 (3): 693-711.

Knorr, Klaus (ed.). 1976a. *Historical Problems of National Security*. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press.

Knorr, Klaus. 1976b. “Threat Perception”. in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems*. Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 78-199.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier”. *World Politics* 43: 336-366.

Krebs, Ronald R. and Chaim Kaufmann. 2005. “Selling the Market Short? The Marketplace of Ideas and the Iraq War”. *International Security* 29 (4): 196-207.

Kreps, Sarah. 2008. “When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan”. *Security Studies* 17: 531-567.

Krever, Tor. 2006. “The US-Australia Free Trade Agreement: the Interface between Partisan Politics and National Objectives”. *Australian Journal of Political Science* 41 (1): 51-69.

Kupchan, Charles A. 2002. *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Knopf.

Kupchan, Charles A. and Peter Trubowitz. 2007. “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States”. *International Security* 32 (2): 7-44.

Lai, Brian. 2007. *Reducing the Effects of Moral Hazard: Institutional Designs Within International Alliance* (Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30, 2007). Chicago.

Lake, David. 2007. "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics". *International Security* 32 (1): 47-79.

Layne, Christopher. 1993. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Power Will Rise". *International Security* 17 (4): 5-51.

Layne, Christopher. 2006. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar moment". *International Security* 31 (2): 7-41.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1994. "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism". *International Organization* 48 (2): 249-277

Leeds, Brett, Jeffrey Ritter, Sara Mitchell and Andrew Long. 2002. "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944". *International Interactions* 28 (3): 237-260.

Leeds, Brett Ashley and Sezi Anac. 2005. "Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance Performance". *International Interactions* 31: 183-202.

Levy, Jack. 1981. "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25: 581-613.

Lijphart, Aaron. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method". *American Political Science Review* 65: 682-693.

Lindblom, Charles. 1965. *The Intelligence of Democracy*. New York: Free Press.

Lobell, Steve E., Norrin P. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds). 2009. *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.

Macdonald, George. 2002. *Canada-U.S. Defence Relations, Asymmetric Threats and the U.S. Unified Command Plan*. Standing Senate Committee On National Security and Defence, Ottawa, May 6, 2002. Online. http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/view-news-afficher-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=1004 (consulted on 11 may 2009).

Mack, Andrew. 1975. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict". *World Politics* 27 (2): 175-200.

Marten, Kimberly Zisk. 2003. "Defending against Anarchy: From War to Peacekeeping in Afghanistan". *The Washington Quarterly* 26 (1): 35-52.

Mason, Dwight N. 2005. "The Canadian-American North American Defence Alliance in 2005". *International Journal* 60 (2): 385- 396.

McCallum, John. 2003. "Speech at the Conference of Defence Associations Annual General Meeting", February 27, 2003.

McDonald, Matt. 2005. "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2004". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59 (2): 153-168.

Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War". *International Security* 15 (1): 5-56.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Miller, Benjamin. 1998. “The Logic of U.S. Military Interventions in the Post-Cold War Era”. *Contemporary Security Policy* 19 (3): 72-109.

Miller, Gregory D. 2003. “Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past”. *Security Studies* 12 (3): 40-78.

Milner, Helen. 1992. “International theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses”. *World Politics* 44 (3): 466-496.

Meyer, Christopher. 2005. *DC Confidential: The Controversial Memoirs of Britain’s Ambassador to the U.S. at the Time of 9/11 and the Iraq War*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005.

Molan, Jim. 2008. *Running the War in Iraq: An Australian General, 300,000 troops, the Bloodiest Conflict of Our Time*. Sydney: Harper Collins Publishers.

Monten, Jonathan. 2005. “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy”. *International Security* 29 (4): 112-156.

Morgenthau, Hans. 1985. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Morrow, James D. 1991. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances”. *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (4): 904-933.

Morrow, James D. 1993. “Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security”. *International Organization* 47 (2): 207-233.

Morrow, James D. 2000. "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?". *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 63-83.

de Nevers, Renée. 2007. "NATO's International Security Role in the Terrorist Era". *International Security* 31 (4): 34-66.

Noble, John J. 2003. "Canada-US Relations in the Post-Iraq-War Era: Stop the Drift Toward Irrelevance". *Policy Options* May: 19-24.

Nunez, Joseph R. 2004. "Canada's Global Role: A Strategic Assessment of its Military Power". *Parameters* 34 (Autumn): 75-93.

Nye, Joseph S. 2002. *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nye, Joseph S. 2004. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs Press.

O'Connor, Brendon. 2004. "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2003". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 58 (2): 207-220.

Oliver, Mark. 2003. "Veto Deepens NATO Rift over Iraq". *The Guardian* (London), February 10, 2003:

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Ørvik, Nils. 1973. "Defence against Help: A Strategy for Small States?". *Survival* 15 (5): 228-231.

Ørvik, Nils. 1981. "The Basic Issue in Canadian National Security: Defence Against Help/Defence to Help Others". *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 11 (1): 3-7.

Owen, John M., IV, 2001/02. "Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy". *International Security* 26 (3): 117-152.

Packer, George. 2005. *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Pape, Robert A. 2005. "Soft Balancing against the United States". *International Security* 30 (1): 7-45.

Parkin, Andrew. 2003. "Pro-Canadian, Anti-American or Anti-War? Canadian Public Opinion on the Eve of War". *Policy Options* April: 5-7.

Paul, T.V. 1994. *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paul, T.V. 2005. "Soft Balancing in the Age of Primacy". *International Security* 31 (1): 46-71.

Paul, T.V., James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (eds). 2004. *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Peters, William N. 2000. "Beyond Kosovo: Will Canada's Army Fight for the Western Alliance?". in David G. Haglund (ed.), *New Nato, New Century: Canada, the United States, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance*. Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations.

Posen, Barry R. 2001-02. "The Struggle against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics". *International Security* 26 (3): 39-55.

Posen, Barry R. 2003. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony." *International Security* 28 (1): 5-46.

Pouliot, Vincent. 2008. "The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities". *International Organization* 62 (2): 257-288.

Powers, Kathy L. 2004. "Regional Trade Agreements as Military Alliances". *International Interactions* 30 (4): 373-395.

Press-Barnathan, Galia. 2006. "Managing the Hegemon: NATO under Unipolarity". *Security Studies* 15 (2): 271-309.

Pressman, Jeremy. 2009. "Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East". *International Security* 33 (4): 149-179.

Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games". *International Organization* 42 (3): 427-461.

Raby, Geoff. 2003. "The Costs of Terrorism and the Benefits of Cooperating to Combat Terrorism", Paper presented to APEC Senior Officials Meeting, Chiang Rai, Thailand, February 21, 2003.

Ragin, Charles C. 1989. *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Renato, Corbetta and William J. Dixon. 2004. "Multilateralism, Major Powers, Militarized Disputes". *Political Research Quarterly* 57 (1): 5-14.

Rice, Condoleezza. 2000. "Promoting the National Interest". *Foreign Affairs* 58 (1): 124-137.

Richter, Andrew. 2005. "From Trusted Ally to Suspicious Neighbor: Canada-U.S. Relations in a Changing Global Environment". *American Review of Canadian Studies* 35 (3): 471-502.

Risse, Thomas. 2002. "U.S. Power in a Liberal Security Community". in John Ikenberry (ed.) *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 260-283.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. *Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on US Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rose, Gideon. 1998. "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy". *World Politics* 51 (1): 144-172.

Rothstein, Robert L. 1967. *Alliances and Small Powers*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rousseau, David L. and Rocio Garcia-Retamero. 2007. "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: A Cross-National Experiment". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15 (5): 744-771.

Roussel, Stéphane. 2000. "Canadian-American Relations: Time for Cassandra?" *American Review of Canadian Studies* 30 (2): 135-157.

Roussel, Stéphane. 2002a. “Pearl Harbor et le World Trade Center: Le Canada face aux États-Unis en période de crise”. Études internationales 33 (4): 667-695.

Roussel, Stéphane. 2002b. “Sécurité, souveraineté ou prospérité? Le Canada et le périmètre de sécurité nord-américain” *Options politiques* 23 (3): 15-22.

Roussel, Stéphane (ed). 2008. *Culture stratégique et politique de défense : L'expérience canadienne*. Montréal: Éditions Athéna.

Sakurada, Daizo. 1998. “Why We Need the US-Japan Security Treaty”. *Asia Pacific Review* 5 (1): 13-38.

Salacuse, Jeswald W. 2002. “Lessons for Practice”. in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press: 255-270.

Sandler, Todd. 1993. “The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey”. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37 (3): 446-483.

Sartori, Giovanni. 2009a. “Comparing and Miscomparing”. in David Collier and John Gerring (eds), *Concept and Method in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori*. New York; London: Routledge, 151-164.

Sartori, Giovanni. 2009b. “Guidelines for Concept Analysis,” in David Collier and John Gerring (eds), *Concepts and Method in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori*. New York; London: Routledge, 97-150.

Saunders, Megan. 2002. “Crean Rules Out a War Conscience Vote”. *The Australian* (Sydney). 24 September 2002.

Savoie, Donald J. 2003. *Breaking the Bargain: Public Servants, Ministers, and the Parliament*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Schroeder, Paul. 1976. "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management". in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *Historical Problems of National Security*. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 247-286.

Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schweller, Randall L. 1993. *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Schweller, Randall L. 2004. "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing". *International Security* 29 (2): 159-201

Schweller, Randall L. 2006. *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sciolino, Elaine and Steven Lee Meyers. 2001. "U.S. Plans to Act Largely Alone". *New York Times* (New York), October 7, 2001: 1A.

Seldon, Anthony. 2007. *Blair Unbound*. London: Simon and Schuster.

Sharp, Jane M. O. 2003-04. "Tony Blair, Iraq and the Special Relationship: Poodle or Partner?". *International Journal* 59: 59-86.

Shawcross, William. 2003. *The Allies: The US, Britain, Europe and the War in Iraq*. London: Atlantic.

Sheridan, Greg. 2002. "Free Trade Deal Would Boost Anzus: US". *The Australian* (Sydney). July 12, 2002.

Sheridan, Greg. 2006. *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the US-Australian Alliance under Bush and Howard*. Sydney: The University of New South Wales.

Short, Clare. 2004. *An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power*. London: Simon and Schuster.

Simpson, Matthew Thomas. 2004. *Sleeping with an Elephant: A Canadian Defence against 21st Century U.S. Protectionism*. MA thesis. Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2004.

Skidmore, David. 2005. "Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in US Foreign Policy". *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2: 207-228.

Snidal, Duncan. 1991. "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation". *American Political Science Review* 85: 710-726.

Snyder, Glenn H. 1997. *Alliance Politics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Stein, Janice Gross and Eugene Lang. 2007. *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar*. Toronto: Penguin Group.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2009. The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Online. http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (Consulted March 3, 2009).

Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Steven E. Lobell and Norrin M. Ripsman. 2009. "Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the States, and Foreign Policy". in Steve E. Lobell, Norrin P. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds), *Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009: 1-41.

Talentino, Andrea Kathryn. 2006. *Military Intervention after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Tawney, R.H. 1931/1952. *Equality*. London: Unwin.

Thompson, Alex. 2006. "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission". *International Organization* 61 (1): 1-34.

Thompson, John Herd. 2003. "Playing by the New Washington Rules: The U.S. –Canada Relationship, 1994-2003". *American Review of Canadian Studies* 33 (1): 5-26.

Touval, Saadia. 2002. "The Impact of Multiple Asymmetries on Arab-Israeli Negotiations". in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press: 155-173.

Tow, William T. 2004. "Deputy Sheriff or Independent Ally? Evolving Australian-American Ties in an Ambiguous World". *The Pacific Review* 17 (2): 271-290.

Tow, William T. and Henry Albinski. 2002. "ANZUS – Alive and Well After Fifty Years". *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 48 (2): 153-173.

United Kingdom. Defence Analytical Services and Advice. 2009. "TSP 1 –UK Regular Forces Strengths and Changes". *Historical National Statistics Publications*. Online. http://www.dasa.mod.uk/applications/newWeb/www/index.php?page=67&pubType=1&thiscontent=30&date=2009-05-28 (Consulted September 18, 2009).

United Kingdom. Foreign Affairs Committee. *British-US Relations*, House of Commons, HC327, 2nd Report of Session 2001-02, December 11, 2001.

United Kingdom. Foreign Affairs Committee. *The Decision to Go to War in Iraq*. House of Commons, HC813-I, 9th Report of Session 2002-03, July 7, 2003.

United Kingdom. House of Commons. *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors*, HC898, July 14, 2004.

United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. 2001. "Defence Secretary and Chief of the Defence Staff: Press Conference", London, October 23, 2001.

United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. 2001. *International Security Assistance Force (Operation Fingal)*, December 3, 2001.

United Kingdom. Ministry of Defence. 2002. "The Secretary of State for Defence's statements in the Commons", House of Commons, London, March 18, 2002.

United Kingdom. National Statistics. 2009. *Population Estimates: UK population grows to 61,4 million*. Online. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?ID=6 (Consulted October 5, 2009).

United Kingdom. Prime Minister's Office. 2003. *September 11 attacks – Culpability document*. May 15, 2003. Online. http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page3682 (Consulted October 6, 2009).

United States. White House. 2001. *President Bush Speaks to the UN*. Washington, DC: White House Papers, November 2001.

United States Census Bureau. Population Division. 2002. *Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 (NST-EST2008-01)*. Online. http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (Consulted October 5, 2009).

United States Department of Defence. 2002. *Fact Sheet: International Contribution to the War Against Terrorism*, February 26, 2002. Online. http://www.fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/2002/fact_sheetintl.contr.pdf (Consulted October 6, 2009)

United States Department of Defense. 2009. "Active Duty Military Personnel by Service, by Region/Country". *Military Personnel Statistics*. Online. http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm (Consulted September 17, 2009).

United States Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. *Report on the US intelligence community's prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq,* 108th Congress, July 7, 2004.

US Seeks Tough UN Motion on Iraq. 2002. *Financial Times* (London), September 14, 2002.

de Villepin, Dominique. France. Sénat. "Iraq". *Compte rendu intégral des débats*. February 26, 2003.

Vital, David. 1967. *The Inequality of States*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Voeten, Erik. 2005. "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force". *International Organization* 59: 527-557.

Vucetic, Srdjan. 2006. "Why Did Canada Sit Out of the Iraq War? One Constructivist Analysis". *Canadian Foreign Policy* 13 (1): 133-153.

Walt, Stephen. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Walt, Stephen. 1997. "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse". *World Politics* 39 (1): 156-179.

Walt, Stephen. 1998-99. "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart". *The National Interest* 54: 3-11.

Walt, Stephen. 2001-02. "Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy". *International Security* 26 (3): 56-78

Walt, Stephen. 2005. *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Walters, William. 2004. "The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective". *Geopolitics* 9 (3): 674-698.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1993. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”. *International Security* 18 (2): 44-79.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1997. “Evaluating Theories”. *American Political Science Review* 91 (4): 913-917.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 2000. “Structural Realism after the Cold War”. *International Security* 25 (1): 5-41.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

West, Nigel. 2004. “Making War Controversial”. *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 17: 358-363.

White, Hugh. 2006. *Beyond the Defence of Australia: Finding a New Balance in Australian Strategic Policy*. Double Bay, Australia: Lowy Institute Paper, Longueville Media.

Wilkins, Thomas S. 2007. “Towards a ‘Trilateral Alliance’? Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in American-Japanese-Australian Relations”. *Asian Security* 3 (3): 251-278.

Willis, Gary. 1999. “Bully of the Free World”. *Foreign Affairs* 78 (2): 50-59.

Winham, Gilbert R. 1988. *Trading with Canada: The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.* New York: Priority Press Publications.

Winham, Gilbert R. and Elizabeth De Boer-Ashworth. 2002. "Canada-US Free Trade Agreement". in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press: 35-52.

Wohlforth, William C. 1999. "The Stability of a Unipolar World". *International Security* 24 (1): 5-41.

Womack, Brantly. 2001. "How Size Matters: The United States, China and Asymmetry". *Journal of Strategic Studies* 24 (4): 123-150.

Womack, Brantly. 2004. "Asymmetry Theory and China's Concept of Multipolarity". *Journal of Contemporary China* 13 (39): 351-366.

Woodward, Bob. 2004. *Plan of Attack*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Wylie, Lana. 2009. "Valuing Reputation and Prestige: Canadian Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court". *American Review of Canadian Studies* 39 (2): 112-130.

Young, Oran R. 1985-86. "The Age of the Arctic". *Foreign Policy* 61: 160-179.

Young, Oran R. 1987. "Canada and the United States in the Arctic: Testing the 'Special Relationship'". *CARC* 15 (2): http://www.carc.org/pubs/v15no2/2htm (Consulted in May 2005).

Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, I. William. 1997. “The Structuralist Dilemma in Negotiation” (Working Paper 1). Research Group in International Security (REGIS). Université de Montréal and McGill University.

Zartman, I. William and Jeffrey Z. Rubin. 2002. “Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation”. in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press: 271-293.

Zartman, I. William and Jeffrey Z. Rubin. 2002. “The Study of Power and the Practice of Negotiation”. in I. William Zartman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), *Power and Negotiation*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press: 3-28.

.